Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

In Brief

  • On Sept. 11, 2006, al-Qaida deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the merger of al-Qaida and the GSPC.
  • The GSPC officially changed its name to the Organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb on Jan. 26, 2007, after being given permission by Osama bin Laden.
  • The GSPC broke away from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1996.
  • GSPC has approximately 300-1,000 active members.  

In the Spotlight: Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

The newly renamed organization of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) -- formerly the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) -- recently killed approximately 30 people and wounded more than 220 in two suicide attacks in Algiers, an action which sparked fears among some civilians of a resurgence in terrorist violence reminiscent of an earlier insurgency in Algeria which began in 1992, due to the cancellation of elections by the government and lasted until the Armed Islamic Group was defeated in 2002. On April 11, 2007, two explosions set off by suicide bombers utilizing vehicles rocked the capital city for the first time in several years. One of the devices was detonated when the driver careened his vehicle into a guard post at the prime minister’s government building. The second driver detonated outside a police station in Bab Ezzouar. Some evidence has been found that suggests that one of the devices may have been remotely detonated.

The AQIM also bombed seven targets in Algeria on Feb. 13, 2007, in what appeared to be coordinated, near-simultaneous attacks. At least four people were killed in the bombings which largely targeted police stations. Car bombs were used in all seven explosions. At the time, the relatively large-scale nature of these attacks was unprecedented in the group’s history and suggested an escalation of violence as well as a show of strength after their recent unification with al-Qaida.

Abu Mus'ab al-Wadoud, the leader of the GSPC, made a statement officially changing the organization’s name on Jan. 26, 2007. This statement, which appeared on the group’s website, read, “We had wished to do this from the first day we joined [al-Qaida] but we wanted the permission of Sheikh Osama [bin Laden], may God protect him. This obstacle has now been removed.” Al-Wadoud’s announcement came after al-Qaida deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a statement on the fifth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, announcing the merger between the two groups. According to al-Wadoud, the official renaming of the GSPC was intended to prove “the sincerity of the ties between the mujaheddin in Algeria and the rest of their brothers in al-Qaida.”

Some journalists and experts initially saw the change in the group’s name as a superficial move. They pointed to a lack of evidence to prove that more intrinsic operational changes were taking place. However, the tactical coordination, scale and planning surrounding the recent bombings in Algeria suggest that the former-GSPC is growing in operational sophistication and ability. Like the December 2006 attack against Halliburton affiliate Brown & Root-Condor (BRC), whose employees were shot at and targeted by a bomb while driving past in two vehicles, the recent attacks also had al-Qaida “trademarks.” Previously, attacks on American civilians and companies were rare (the French, being the former colonial rulers of Algeria, attracted most of the GSPC’s attentions). As such, a shift can be discerned, with not just French, but American and Western influence being specifically targeted. Choosing BRC as a target was also symbolically relevant as the company is working in the oil and gas industry, building production facilities as a subsidiary of Halliburton, which is the largest American multinational company involved oilfield services. In a communiqué released on Jan. 22, 2006, the GSPC identified BRC as the intended target and specifically accused France and the United States of stealing oil and natural gas belonging to the ummah, or community of believers.

AQIM Historical Background

Al-Qaida’s Hidden Hand?

The Implications of the AQIM-al-Qaida Linkage