All of this could have serious implications for international security as al-Qaida and the AQIM take advantage of their extensive network and export operatives to the European continent and the United States. In January 2007, French intelligence produced a dossier which highlighted the possibility of a terrorist attack within France during the elections in April and May 2007. The purpose of the attack would be to influence the outcome of the elections as the Madrid bombings did in 2004. Both al-Qaida and the former GSPC are cited as possible sources of threat, due to communiqués from both groups, which state that France is a viable target.

The former GSPC already presented itself as a threat even before its official amalgamation with al-Qaida. Terrorist cells and plots by AQIM or its affiliates have been foiled in Germany, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands. Plots included attacks on the G-8 summit in Genoa, on a Christmas market in Strasbourg and a plan to blow up U.S. embassies in Paris and Rome. Arrests of former-GSPC members in Italy have uncovered that a network of groups have used it and other European countries as platforms to provide logistical support, communications, propaganda mechanisms and weapons to radical Islamist cells in order to enable them to plan and initiate attacks across Europe.

In the United States three Algerians – Abdel Ghani Meskini, Ahmed Ressam, and Mokhtar Haouari – were caught before what became known as the “millennium plot” to bomb Los Angeles Airport could be executed. It is alleged that these individuals either belonged to the former GSPC or one of its affiliated groups. In April 2005, Kamel Bourgass, a GSPC member who was already convicted of murdering a British police officer in 2003 during a raid in England, was convicted for conspiracy to cause public nuisance by use of poisons and/or explosives. In this case it was suspected that Bourgass was trying to produce ricin, a lethal toxin produced from castor beans. Bourgass and Ressam both had connections with Abu Doha, who was sometimes called “the doctor”. Doha led GSPC’s London-based cell, set-up a Canadian cell, and was linked with the millennium and ricin plots.

Doha, who planned many of his operations from the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, which has become synonymous with Islamic extremism, ran terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and had strong ties to al-Qaida. He was also credited with being the mastermind behind the previously mentioned plot to bomb a Christmas market in Strasbourg. Doha has been in a UK prison since 2001 and is currently being held on an immigration charge because there is not enough evidence to continue to hold him under terrorism legislation. He was awaiting extradition to the United States when the case against him had to be dropped because a primary informant refused to testify.

Because of the links that the former GSPC and al-Qaida have shared since the former’s inception, the news announcing the merger between the two groups could merely be seen as bin Laden and Zawahiri placing an official stamp of approval on the Algerian group. That should not be deemed as an insignificant event, however, as both groups gain certain advantages from re-branding the GSPC as an al-Qaida affiliate. Some experts have stated that this recent evolution is a reaction to increasing improvements in Algerian counter-terrorism efforts. Such efforts, including the national “Peace and Reconciliation Charter,” counter-propaganda against Algerian terrorist groups, and the eradication of terrorist cells, have seen the GSPC relatively well-contained in recent times. The group’s re-branding of itself into an organization with a strong militant presence in both Africa and Europe is seen as a move around this. Others believe that the group needed an infusion of new blood in the form of money, material and support to continue to exist after suffering setbacks from the arrests of their members and in-fighting between the leadership.

Moreover, any GSPC partnership with al-Qaida is beneficial to both sides. The latter group gains the perception that its organization is growing while the GSPC is able to strengthen its previously weakened image, simply by associating itself with the more infamous group and possibly drawing more members to its cause. The GSPC also stands to gain financial and other support.  They may gain access to al-Qaida tactical expertise, something that would account for the higher level of sophistication and escalation suggested by the seven near-simultaneous attacks on Feb. 13, 2007, and the suicide bombings of April 11. Such incidents suggest the cross-fertilization of a typically al-Qaida tactic to AQIM, which had never used these methods before their union with bin Laden’s group.

Whether the escalation will persist steadily in Algeria will depend on a few factors, including (1) al-Qaida’s ability to provide or inspire more fighters to help sustain AQIMs offensive in the long term, (2) the strength of Algerian counter and anti-terrorist methods, and (3) whether a significant portion of the former GSPC will join the global jihad and export themselves to foreign theaters to fight. According to some, Algerian counter terrorism initiatives might prove to be a double-edged sword. By thwarting terrorism in Algeria the government could be inadvertently pushing the militants into the surrounding Maghreb countries and Europe, where they plot and stage attacks in both domestic and foreign operational theaters.

GSPC cells have been dismantled in Morocco and, allegedly, a team killed by Tunisian authorities in December 2006, was affiliated with the group. Regionally, the threat from the former-GSPC will be measured by its ability to continue exploiting the Western Sahara as an entry point into other Maghreb countries in order to perpetrate attacks and, also, their success in organizing themselves in a broader network of pan-African terrorist groups.

According to some sources, many AQIM members have joined the insurgency in Iraq (also dubbed ‘Terrorism University’), thus gaining a high level of expertise in terrorist tactics, lessons which they brought back to the Maghreb. The use of suicide bombers is the first indication of the proliferation of al-Qaida’s methods in Algiers and there is no reason to believe that AQIM will not export these tactics to the western arena. Indeed, statements by al-Wadoud underscore his desire to have the group used in any way that al-Qaida wishes. In any case, terrorist operatives from this group or its affiliates are likely to continue to appear as part of cells in both the European and American arena. With al-Qaida having infused the group with possible support and its label, GSPC is now obligated to support the other organization’s ideology and goals. This is not a positive development as it implies a deeper commitment of the group to support and orchestrate attacks not only in the Maghreb, but to contribute its forces to al-Qaida plots against western targets elsewhere.