Favorite battles or campaigns...POLL

[leadhead]

ole,

I still don't understand the "war was won in the west" statement that I hear so frequently. Care to elaborate?

TomH
(Celebrating my latest find, a very nice 64 dated James D. Mowry Model 61 contract rifle musket with blued retaining springs and sling swivels. Mowry was also an inspector for Norwich Arms and his cartouche is found on many contract rm's produced there. He produced around 20,000 weapons with his own lock stamp and these have become one of the more difficult contracts to find these days. I have a Mowry cartouched Norwich so this completes the pair.)

[Henry Moon]

Tom, thanks for the detailed info about the weapons situation in the east and west. That obviously played a big part in the winning and/or losing in the Western theater for both sides.


Terry

[ole]

ole,

I still don't understand the "war was won in the west" statement that I hear so frequently. Care to elaborate?

TomH
(Celebrating my latest find, a very nice 64 dated James D. Mowry Model 61 contract rifle musket with blued retaining springs and sling swivels. Mowry was also an inspector for Norwich Arms and his cartouche is found on many contract rm's produced there. He produced around 20,000 weapons with his own lock stamp and these have become one of the more difficult contracts to find these days. I have a Mowry cartouched Norwich so this completes the pair.)

Good to see you back. I missed the first post asking the question.

That the "War was Won in the West" is, of course, a generality. It's kinda based on the idea that the war in the east just kinda wandered around in Virginia with a foray or two into Maryland and Virginia. In the West, however, the Union Armies were biting off chunks of territory vital to the war in the East.

With Shiloh and Corinth there was no more supply for the AoNV from Tennessee and Kentucky. With Vicksburg, Texas and Arkansas could no longer supply Confederate supplies. With Atlanta and Augusta, oops, nothing from there either. With Columbia, that's about the end of the story for the AoNV.

The Army of Northern Viginia could not exist on supplies available in the east. Most of that corn and wheat and fodder came from the west. About the time Sherman got to Savannah, Lee's boys in Petersburg were down to less than half rations--with little prospect of getting more. About the time Sherman got to Columbia, the rations for the AoNV got smaller. (Down to 1/8th, I've heard.)

Grant couldn't, or chose not to, destroy the AoNV. He really only had to wait, so I can believe "chose not to." There just wasn't enough coming in.

Hence, when I advocate that the war was won in the west, that's what I mean.

Will cheerfully rattle on and on, if you'd like. Thanks for asking.

ole

[ole]

Tom:

You'd likely not want me to see that treasure as I'd drool all over it. Great find!

ole

[leadhead]

Ole,

Thanks for the response and I can see your point about the western theater battles resulting in the occupation of, and therefore denial of to the CS, major territories and supply regions. You are right on about the battles in the east generally not resulting in the occupation of territory.

Since I generally (and probably incorrectly) view success in war as measured by the destruction of the opposing force I did not recognize the value of the territorial control of the western armies. Thanks for the explanation of your contention.

The Mowry was an unexpected find and my second rare contract of the year. I had already resigned myself to the fact that there was nothing at the show that had to come home with me and was making my last walk around of the day when I spotted two Model 61's on a table that I hadn't really looked over before. One was a decent Providence Tool and the other was the Mowry, and both were priced very reasonably. In June, I scored a William Mason contract made in Taunton, MA and wearing barrel retaining bands that were made in my hometown (Fall River, MA). So, between the cartridges and bullets that I was able to get this year, and the hard to find Mowry and Mason contracts, 2007 was a great year for my collection.

Later,
TomH

[ole]

Other than I wish it was me and not you, I'm happy for your find. Enjoy.

ole

[ole]

Since I generally (and probably incorrectly) view success in war as measured by the destruction of the opposing force I did not recognize the value of the territorial control of the western armies. Thanks for the explanation of your contention.

If one army can destroy another, the war is generally over; hence, the principal object of an army is to destroy the other. It rarely works out that way. McClellan is a prime example, he waited and postured and moved about hoping to get the Lee in a position where he could swoop in and destroy his army. When he had a hint of a chance, he blew it. Otherwise, he did nothing.

Grant also hoped to obliterate his opposing armies; however, when in the West, he always also aimed to cut the railroads feeding the Confederacy.

Somewhere between Napoleon and the CW, reality intervened. The AoT and the AoNV were simply to large to crush. If you don't have 200,000 to crush their 50,000, you do the next best thing: molest them as much as you can, take their supplies and bust up their rails.

Just a thought. ken

[Johan Steele]

Major CS Armies were truly destroyed in the field only once ans that was at Nashville after which the AoT CS all but ceased to exist as a coherent fighting force.

While the CS Army at Vicksburg was not destroyed, being immedietly paroled and almost as quickly put back in the field by the CS, they had been disarmed losing both small arms & arty.  There were no spares for the CS Army in the west and they made do w/ what they could.

The strategic disaster in the West for the CS, yes I would certainly call them disasters, were really only stopped once at Chickamauga and that was not followed up largely because of Bragg and a wrecked CS AoT.  The CS offensive in the winter of 64 was ill conceived bordering on the criminaly negligent IMO.  To over simplify the war was won in the west because that was where all the strategic victories were for the Union, w/ the exception of Chickamauga there really was never catastrophic bad news from the west... only victories and fairly decisive ones at that.

I would add, Leadhead, superb grasp on the principles of the arms distribution of the various armies... though not 100% accurate IMO.  THe AoT (CS) was actually pretty well armed by the fall of 63/spring 64.  Mostly Lorenzes & M1841's in .54 and a splendid Enfields of various types P53, 56 & 58's.  By that time there were mostly only 2 calibers in the AoT CS .54 & .577/.58 w/ .69 smoothies increasingly doled out to rear echelon units. Ironic actually since at the same time the AOP still had significant #'s (20% or so) of .54, .69 and even still some .71's while the ANV was almost completely .577/.58 simplifying supply greatly.  The AoT US was a mess of small arms w/ a little of everything (though after the Vicksburg surrender there were a lot of nice Enfields in the mix) though at least one Illinois unit was still carrying French rifles on their shoulders on the way into Atlanta.

With the loss of New Orleans the CS lost their major seaport.  And w/ the tightening blocade making it more and more hazardous for blockaders to make the run into Mobile or other seaports the CS lost the startegic war very early, summer 63 at the latest.  After that summer the CS had been effectively split in half and carved up.

The war was won in the west strategically IMO.  IIRC neither the ANV or AOP were ever much over 100 miles from their respective capitals while the AOT both US & CS marched that far on a lark.

[leadhead]

Shane,

The number of .69 cal projectiles recovered in the western theater, including later battles, would dispute your statement. Many of the rarer variants, including 2 groove musketoon bullets and .69/.71 cal three groove variants are unique to those fields. The same can be said for 63/64 southeastern battlefields. Western CS camps produce the most varied range of calibers and designs, from .45 cal Tennessee Rifle, NC Rifles and imported Kerr's to .75 cal Arkansas Hogs, and the big bore stuff represents about the same percentage as the .54 cal stuff.

True, 65% of the imported arms were P53 (with a much smaller mix of P56) Enfields, but the P58 was rarely used. The P58 had 5 groove rifling as opposed to the three groove rifling on the P53/P56 and it is extremely rare to find a .577 cal bullet with 5 groove deformation. Documentation supports approximately 482,000 Enfields having been imported by the CS.

Recently discovered documentation gives a much better picture of CS small arms manufacturing. Dean Thomas is currently working on Volume IV of the Roundball to Rimfire series (Vols I to III are on Federal production, IV is the first of the CS Volumes) and the information that he has unearthed may actually make it neccessary to release Vols IV, V and VI. The number of large bore ammunition produced in the west was consistent through the entire war.

Regarding the AOP, I would respectfully disagree about the number of "non-standard" arms in use in 63/64. By then, Springfield and 28 contractors were producing Model 61 and 63 Rifle muskets, enough that even USCT troops in 64 were being armed with them (my icon is a Norris and CLement Model 63 ID'd to W.W.Lewis, 39th USCT). Enfields were used throughout the war in the North as well, but they used the same ammunition as the Model 61/63.

Just a humble opinion,
TomH

[Webmaster]

I think that the Gettysburg battle was the most intressting