The Gettysburg Campaign - Full Report of General J. E. B. Stuart Page 13

After dark I directed a withdrawal to the York road, as our position was so far advanced as to make it hazardous at night, on account of the proximity of the enemy's infantry.

During the night of the 3d of July, the Commanding-General withdrew the main body to the ridges west of Gettysburg, and sent word to me to that effect, but his messenger missed me. I repaired to his headquarters during the latter part of the night, and received instructions as to the new line, and sent in compliance therewith a brigade (Fitz. Lee's) to Cashtown to protect our trains congregated there. My cavalry and artillery were somewhat jeopardized before I got back to my command, by the enemy's having occupied our late ground before my command could be notified of the change; none, however, were either lost captured.

During the 4th, which was quite rainy, written instructions were received from the Commanding-General as to the order of march back to the Potomac, to be undertaken at nightfall. In this order two brigades of cavalry (Baker's and Hampton's) were ordered to move, as heretofore stated, by way of Cashtown, guarding that flank, bringing up the rear on the road via Greenwood to Williamsport, which was the route designated for the main portion of the wagon trains and ambulances, under the special charge of Brigadier-General Imboden, who had a mixed command of artillery, infantry and cavalry (his own).

Previous to these instructions I had, at the instance of the Commanding-General, instructed Brigadier-General Robertson, whose two brigades (his own and Jones') were now on the right near Fairfield, Pennsylvania, that it was essentially necessary for him to hold the Jack Mountain passes. These included two prominent roads - the one north and the other south of Jack mountain, which is a sort of peak in the Blue Ridge chain.

In the order of march (retrograde) one corps (Hill's) preceded everything through the mountain; the baggage and prisoners of war, escorted by another corps (Longstreet's), occupied the centre, and the Third (Ewell's) brought up the rear. The cavalry was disposed of as follows: two brigades on the Cashtown road under General Fitz. Lee, and the remainder (Jenkins's and Chambliss'), under my immediate command, was directed to proceed by way of Emmettsburg, Maryland, so as to guard the other flank. I dispatched Captain Blackford, Corps Engineers, to General Robertson to inform him of my movement and direct his co-operation, as Emmettsburg was in his immediate front and was probably occupied by the enemy's cavalry. It was dark before I had passed the extreme right of our line; and having to pass through very dense woods, taking by-roads, it soon became so dark that it was impossible to proceed. We were in danger of losing the command as well as the road. It was raining also. We halted for several hours, when, having received a good guide, and it becoming more light, the march was resumed and just at dawn we entered Emmettsburg. We there learned that a large body of the enemy's cavalry (the citizens said 15,000, which I knew, of course, was exaggerated) had passed through that point the afternoon previous, going towards Monterey, one of the passes designated in my instructions to Brigadier-General Robertson. I halted for a short time to procure some rations; and examining my map,I saw that this force could either attempt to force one of those gaps, or foiled in that (as I supposed they would be), it would either turn to the right and bear off towards Fairfield, where it would meet with like repulse from Hill's or Longstreet's corps, or, turning to the left before reaching Monterey, would strike across by Oeiler's gap towards Hagerstown, and thus seriously threaten that portion of our trains which, under Imboden, would be passing down the Greencastle pike the next day, and interpose itself between the main body and its baggage. I did not consider that this force could seriously annoy any other portion of the command, under this order of march prescribed - particularly as it was believed that those gaps would be held by General Robertson till he could be reinforced by the main body. I, therefore, determined to adhere to my instructions, and proceed by way of Cavetown, by which I might intercept the enemy should he pass through OEiler's gap