The Gettysburg Campaign - Full Report of General J. E. B. Stuart Page 10

Our wagon train was now a subject of serious embarrassment, but I thought by making a detour to the right by Jefferson, I could save it. I, therefore, determined to try it, particularly as I was satisfied from every accessible source of information, as well as from the lapse of time, that the Army of Northern Virginia must be near the Susquehanna.

My numerous skirmishers had greatly diminished, almost exhausted, my supply of ammunition. I had this immense train in an enemy's country, very near a hostile army, and besides about four hundred prisoners, which had accumulated since the paroling at Cookesville. I, therefore, had the train closed up in park, and Hampton, arriving in the meantime, engaged the enemy farther to the right, and finally with his sharpshooters dislodged the enemy from the town - the enemy moving towards our left, apparently to reunite his broken column, but pressing us with dismounted men on our left flank. General Fitz. Lee's brigade was put at the head of the column, and he was instructed to push on with the train, through Jefferson, for York, Pennsylvania, and communicate as soon as practicable with our forces.
Hampton's brigade brought up the rear. We were not molested in our march, which, on account of the very exposed situation of our flank, and the enemy's knowledge of it, was continued during the night. The night's march, over a very dark road, was one of peculiar hardship, owing to the loss of rest to both men and horses. After a series of exciting combats and night marches, it was a severe tax to their endurance. Whole regiments slept in the saddle, their faithful animals keeping the road unguided. In some instances they fell from their horses overcome with physical fatigue and sleepiness.

Reaching Dover, Pennsylvania, on the morning of the 1st of July, I was unabled to find our forces. The most I could learn was that General Early had marched his division in the direction of Shippensburg, which the best information I could get seemed to indicate as the point of concentration of our troops. After as little rest as was compatible with the exhausted condition of the command, we pushed on for Carlisle, where we hoped to find a portion of the army. I arrived before that village by way of Dillstown in the afternoon. Our rations were entirely out. I desired to levy a contribution on the inhabitants for rations; but was informed before reaching it that it was held by a considerable force of militia, infantry and artillery, who were concealed in the buildings, with the view to entrap me upon my entrance into the town. They were frustrated in their intention, and although very peaceable in external aspect, I soon found the information I had received was correct. I disliked to subject the town to the consequences of attack; at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations. I, therefore, directed General Lee to send in a flag of truce, demanding unconditional surrender or bombardment. This was refused. I placed artillery in position commanding the town, took possession of the main avenues to the place, and repeated the demand. It was again refused, and I was forced to the alternative of shelling the place.
Although the houses were used by their sharpshooters while firing on our men, not a building was fired except the United States cavalry barracks, which were burnt by my order; the place having resisted my advance instead of peaceable surrender, as in the case of General Ewell.