The Gettysburg Campaign - Full Report of General J. E. B. Stuart Page 23

It was thought by many that my command could have rendered more service had it been in advance of the army the first day at Gettysburg, and the Commanding-General complains of a want of cavalry on the occasion; but it must be remembered that the cavalry (Jenkins' brigade) specially selected for advance guard to the army by the Commanding-General, on account of its geographical location at the time, was available for this purpose, and had two batteries of horse artillery serving with it. If, therefore, the peculiar functions of cavalry with the army were not satisfactorily performed in the absence of my command, it should rather be attributed to the fact that Jenkins' brigade was not as efficient as it ought to have been, and as its numbers (3,800) on leaving Virginia warranted us in expecting. Even at that time by its reduction incident to the campaign, it numbered far more than the cavalry which successfully covered Jackson's flank movement at Chancellorsville, turned back Stoneman from the James, and drove 3,500 cavalry under Averill across the Rappahannock.

Properly handled, such a command should have done everything requisite, and left nothing to detract, by the remotest implication, from the brilliant exploits of their comrades, achieved under circumstances of great hardship and danger.

Arriving at York, I found that General Early had gone, and it is to be regretted that this officer failed to take any measure, by leaving an intelligent scout to watch for my coming, or a patrol to meet me to acquaint me with his destination. He had reason to expect me, and had been directed to look out for me. He heard my guns at Hanover, and correctly conjectured whose they were; but left me no clue to his destination on leaving York, which would have saved me a long and tedious march to Carlisle and thence back to Gettysburg. I was informed by citizens that he was going to Shippensburg. I still believed that most of our army was before Harrisburg, and justly regarded a march to Carlisle as the most likely to place me in communication with the main body. Besides, as a place for rationing my command, now entirely out, I believed it desirable.

The cavalry suffered much in this march, day and night, from loss of sleep and the horses from fatigue, and while in Fairfax for want of forage, not even grass being attainable.

In Fauquier the rough character of the roads and lack of facility for shoeing added to the casualties of every day's battle, and constant wear and tear of man and horse reduced the command very much in numbers. In this way some regiments were reduced to less than one hundred men; yet when my command arrived at Gettysburg, from the accessions which it received from the weak horses left to follow the command, it took its place in line of battle with a stoutness of heart and firmness of tread impressing one with the confidence of victory which was astounding, considering the hardness of the march lately endured.

With an aggregate loss of about 2,200 killed, wounded and missing, including the battle of Fleetwood, June 9th, we inflicted a loss on the enemy's cavalry confessedly near 5,000.

Some of the reports of subordinate commanders are herewith forwarded - others will follow - and it is hoped they will do justice to that individual prowess for which Confederate soldiery is most noted, and which the limits of personal observation, and this report, deprive me of the power of doing.