I have the honor herewith to report the operations of this brigade during the actions of September 14th in Maryland.
On the morning of the 14th my brigade relieved Anderson's about half a mile west of Boonesborough. Toward noon it was ordered to follow Ripley's brigade to the top of the South Mountain. Overtaking Ripley's brigade on the mountain, it was halted, and immediately reported to Major General Hill. After looking over the field of battle, I was ordered by Major General Hill to take position on the ridge immediately to the left of the gap through which the main road runs (Frosttown Gorge, Turner's gap). Remaining there three quarters of an hour, part of the time under artillery fire, and throwing our scouts and skirmishers to the left and front, I was then ordered to occupy another bare hill about three quarters of a mile still farther to the left. The whole brigade was moved to that hill, crossing, in doing so, a deep gorge which separated the hills. This movement left a wide interval between the right of my brigade, which in it's last position rested in the gorge, and the balance of the division, which being reported to General Hill, together with the fact that no troops supported the battery on the first mentioned ridge, by his order I sent back one of my regiments (the Twelfth Alabama) to support the battery. By this time the enemy's line of battle was pretty well developed and in full view. It became evident that he intended to attack with a line covering both ridges and the gorge before mentioned, and extending some half a mile to my left. I had, immediately after my arrival on the extreme left, discovered that the the hill there was accessible to artillery, and that a good road, passing by the left of said hill from the enemy's line, continued immediately in my rear and entered the main road about half a mile west of the gap. Under these circumstances, I sent for artillery, and determined upon the only plan by which the enemy could be prevented from immediately obtaining possession of said road, and thus marching entirely in our rear without difficulty, and that was to extend my line as far as I could to the left, to let the right rest in the gorge, still, and to send to my superiors for reinforcements to continue the line from my right to the gap on the main road, an interval of three-quarters of mile at least. Having thrown out skirmishers along the whole front and to the left, they very soon became engaged with the enemy's skirmishers.
This was about 3 p. m. and it was perfectly evident then that my force of about 1,200 muskets was opposed to one which outflanked mine on either side by at least half a mile. I thought the enemy's force opposed to my brigade was least a division. In a short time the firing became steady along the whole line, the enemy advancing very slowly. The danger of his possessing the top of the left hill, and thus being in my rear, became so imminent that I had to cause my left regiment (6th Alabama) to move further left. By this time the enemy, though gallantly met by all four of the regiments with me, had penetrated between them, and had begun to swing their extreme right around toward my rear, making for the head of the gorge, up the bottom and sides of which the whole force, except the Sixth Alabama, had to retreat, if at all.
The Twenty-sixth Alabama, which had been placed on my right, was by this time completely demoralized; it's Colonel (O'Neal) was wounded, and the men mingled in utter confusion with some South Carolina stragglers on the summit of the hill, who stated that their brigade had been compelled to give way, and had retired. Notwithstanding this, if true, left my rear entirely exposed to give again (I had not time or means to examine the worth of their statements).The Twenty-sixth was isolated with no friendly troops on either flank within sight of each other. The Twenty-sixth was the far right Regiment with the 5th Alabama out of sight to their left. The Twenty-sixth was fighting portions of the 12th, 13th and 7th Pennsylvania Reserve Regiments. The 12th head-on, the 13th on the left flank while also engaging the 5th Alabama's right flank, and the 7th came in a little later and hit their unprotected right flank. According to Lt. James Silas Odom of Company K, there were only 3 left in his company at the end of the battle. This would take into account also that most of the company at that time were just getting exchanged from their capture at Fort Donelson.
My loss up to this time had been heavy in all the regiments except the Twelfth Alabama. The enemy by this time were nearly on top of the highest peak, and were pushing on, when Gordon's Regiment , unexpectedly to them, opened fire on their front and checked them. The last stand was so disastrous to the enemy that it attracted the attention of the stragglers, even many of whom Colonel Battle and I had been endeavoring to organize, and who were just then on the flank of that portion of the enemy engaged with Gordon, and for a few minutes they kept up a brisk enfilading fire upon the enemy. Finding his fire turning from Gordon upon them, and that another body of Federal troops were advancing upon them they speedily fell back. It was now so dark that it was difficult to distinguish objects at short musket range, and both parties ceased firing. Directing Colonel Gordon to move his regiment to his right and to the rear, so as to cover the gap, I endeavored to gather up stragglers form the other regiments. Colonel Battle still held together a handful of his men. These, together with the remnants of the Twelfth, Fifth, and Twenty-sixth Alabama Regiments, were assembled at the gap, and were speedily placed alongside of Gordon's regiment, which by this time had arrived in the road ascending the mountain from the gap forming a line on the edge of the woods parallel to and about 200 yards from the main road. This position we held till 11 o'clock at night, when we were ordered to take the Sharpsburg road and to stop at Keedysville, which we did. We had rested about an hour, when I was ordered to proceed to Sharpsburg with all the force under my command--Colquitt's brigade and mine--to drive out a cavalry force reported to be there.