Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 28, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
January 28, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant Inspector-General.
Sir: I am informed that General Order No. 2 has been distributed to the "war regiments" of the army.
A recent order of the Secretary of War directs me to send to Richmond six thousand of the muskets belonging to our absent sick. This deprives the different regiments of the means of arming their men who return from the hospital even, and of course there are no arms for recruits. I shall not, under such circumstances, permit the expense of recruiting to be incurred, without additional orders.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Jefferson Finis Davis, February 25, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
February 25, 1862.
To his Excellency the President:
I respectfully inclose a copy of a report by Major-General Jackson.
[p. 483]
Brigadier-General Whiting informs me that Brigadier-General French and Captain Chatard think it impracticable to make the desired movement by water. I submit General French's letter on the subject. The land transportation would, it seems to me, require too much time and labor, even were the roads tolerable. They are not now practicable for our field artillery with their teams of four horses.
The army is crippled, and its discipline greatly impaired, by the want of general officers. The four regiments observing the fords of the lower Occoquan are commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, and a division and five brigades besides are without generals, and at least half the field-officers are absent -- generally sick.
The accumulation of subsistence stores at Manassas is now a great evil. The Commissary-General was requested, more than once, to suspend those supplies. A very extensive meat-packing establishment at Thoroughfare is also a great incumbrance. The great quantities of personal property in our camps is a still greater one. Much of both kinds of property must be sacrificed in the contemplated movement.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Vicksburg, December 22, 1862.
Mr. President: From such information as I have been able to obtain, I think that we shall require, to hold this department and the Mississippi River, an active army of about forty thousand men, to oppose the troops of Grant and Banks, and for garrisons at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, capable of holding those places against combined attacks until succored by the active army.
Major-General Smith has about five thousand nine hundred
[p. 494]
artillery and infantry for duty to defend a line of ten miles, exclusive of the position of Snyder's Mill, which requires three of his eight regiments. Should the enemy attack by land as well as by water, which is highly probable -- almost certain -- we would require at least eight more regiments of five or six hundred men each.
I have not seen Port Hudson, but a map of the ground gives me the opinion that it requires a garrison as strong as that necessary here. It now amounts to about five thousand five hundred of all arms; so that an addition of as many more will be required there -- in all, eleven or twelve thousand men. For the active force we have now twenty-one thousand men near the Yallobusha. About nine thousand have been ordered to this department from Lieutenant-General Smith's, and it is supposed that an equal force is on its way from Arkansas.
No more troops can be taken from General Bragg without the danger of enabling Rosecrans to move into Virginia, or to reënforce Grant. Our great object is to hold the Mississippi. The country beyond the river is as much interested in that object as this; and the loss to us of the Mississippi involves that of the country beyond it. The eight or ten thousand men which are essential to its safety ought, therefore, I respectfully suggest, to be taken from Arkansas; to return after the crisis in this department.
I firmly believe, however, that our true system of warfare would be to concentrate the forces of the two departments on this side of the Mississippi, beat the enemy here, and then reconquer the country beyond it which he might have gained in the mean time.
I respectfully ask your Excellency's attention to the accompanying letter of Major-General Smith in relation to the inadequacy of the garrison of Vicksburg, begging you to take his estimate of the force needed instead of mine, as his is based upon accurate calculation.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 18, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
I am much relieved to find our troops are on the Duck River. Not at Deckered.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 9, 1863.
To the President, Richmond, Virginia:
Colonel Ewell informs me, from Chattanooga, that on the 31st General Bragg had thirty - five thousand, including Wharton's cavalry. Lost nine thousand -- three thousand sick since from exposure. We have not force enough here if the enemy is vigorous. Prisoners tell General Bragg of Federal reënforcements from West Tennessee.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, July 9, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
Your dispatch of to-day received. I have never meant to fail in the duty of reporting to the Executive whatever
[p. 516]
might interest it in my command. I informed the Secretary of War that my force was much too weak to attempt to raise the siege of Vicksburg, and that to attempt to relieve Port Hudson would be to give up Mississippi, as it would involve the loss of this point, and that want of adequate means of transportation kept me inactive until the end of June. I then moved toward Vicksburg to attempt to extricate the garrison, but could not devise a plan until after reconnoitring, for which I was too late. Without General Pemberton's coöperation, any attempt must have resulted in disaster.
The slowness and difficulty of communication rendered coöperation next to impossible.
J. E. Johnston.
Jackson, June 16, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
Your dispatch of 15th received. I meant to tell the Secretary of War that I considered the order directing me to command here as limiting my authority to this department, especially as that order was accompanied by War Department orders transferring troops from Tennessee to Mississippi. And, whether commanding there or not, that your reply to my application for more troops, that none could be spared, would have made it improper for me to order more troops from Tennessee. Permit me to repeat that an officer having a task like mine, far above his ability,
[p. 512]
cannot, in addition, command other remote departments. No general can command separate armies.
I have not yet been able to procure the means of moving these troops. They are too weak to accomplish much. The reënforcements you mention have joined Grant.
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston.
Jackson, June 20, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
I much regret the carelessness of my reply of the 16th to your telegram of the 15th. In my dispatch of the 12th, to the Secretary of War, I referred to your words, "We have withheld nothing which it was practicable to give," in your telegram of May 28th, and to the telegram of June 5th, [1] except the last sentence. I considered Executive as including the Secretary of War.
J. E. Johnston.
Notes
[p. nts]
Note from page 512: 1 From the Secretary of War.
Jackson, January 2, 1863.
Mr. President: General Pemberton continues to command at Vicksburg. He has asked for all the troops here, after being reënforced by Maury's division, in addition to those brigades agreed upon between us. The line of twelve miles to Snyder's Mills probably requires them all. I fear difficulty of subsisting them, however. A report just handed in by the inspecting officers shows that the supply of provision is much smaller than General Pemberton supposed. The place may be reduced, I fear, in consequence of this; or, should it be invested, we shall not have a sufficient force to break the investment.
Grant is still on the Tallahatchie, so that the remainder of Loring's and Price's troops cannot be withdrawn from Grenada. From his halting I suppose he is repairing the railroad. The force at Grenada (about eleven thousand effectives) is too weak to do more than delay the passage of the river by the enemy. My hope of keeping him back is in Van Dorn, under whom I propose to unite all the available cavalry, when Forrest and Roddy can be found.
Should Grant join Sherman at Vicksburg, it would be very embarrassing, for, as he could reach the place from Memphis as soon as we could learn whether he was embarking or moving along the railroad to Grenada, it could be invested by the combined armies. We could not break the investment with eleven thousand men, but it would be necessary to try.
The necessity of holding the Yazoo, as well as Vicksburg, employs a large force, too widely distributed to be in condition for the offensive.
We have no news from Arkansas, which proves, I think, that we are to get no help from that side of the Mississippi.
The Legislature has done nothing yet.
We require about twenty thousand men, the number you have asked for from Arkansas, to make headway against both Grant and Sherman. Will the great victory at Fredericksburg enable General Lee to spare a part of his force?
Should the enemy's forces be respectably handled, the
[p. 496]
task you have set me will be above my ability. But the hand of Almighty God has delivered us in times of great danger! Believing that He is with us, I will not lose hope.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 6, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
Your dispatch of yesterday received. Enemy's troops and transports reported gone up the river from Milliken's Bend. We hear of no movement in this direction by General Holmes. Grant's forces are reported distributed at Memphis, Holly Springs, and Corinth. The country said to be impracticable. General Bragg reports he has been checked. I hear indirectly that he has withdrawn from Murfreesboro. Should he need help, and there appear no danger in Mississippi except by the river, could E. K. Smith's men return? The impossibility of my knowing the condition of things in Tennessee shows that I cannot direct both parts of my command at once. I am hoping to hear from General Bragg.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, Mississippi, January 7, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
The following dispatch was received from General M. L. Smith: "I am returning from Little Rock. No troops will be sent."
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 7, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
General Bragg telegraphs from Winchester that the enemy did not follow in force. I regret his falling back so
[p. 497]
far. He wants twenty thousand more men to secure East Tennessee. Can any large part of it be furnished? E. K. Smith's troops here might be spared for a few weeks, unless Sherman reappears. One of Grant's divisions is at Humboldt. Which is most valuable, Tennessee or the Mississippi?
J. E. Johnston, General.
Camp on Caney Creek,
July 5, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
Your dispatch of June 30th received. I considered my assignment to the immediate command in Mississippi as giving me a new position, and limiting my authority to this department. The orders of the War Department transferring three separate bodies of troops from General Bragg's army to this, two of them without my knowledge, and all of them without consulting me, would have convinced me, had I doubted. These orders of the War Department expressed its judgment of the number of troops to be transferred from Tennessee. I could no more control this judgment by increasing the number, than by forbidding the transfers. I regret very much that an impression which seemed to me to be natural, should be regarded by you as a "strange error."
J. E. Johnston.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Jefferson Finis Davis, March 3, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
March 3, 1862.
His Excellency.
Mr. President: I respectfully submit three notes from Major-General Jackson, and one from Brigadier-General Hill, for the information they contain of the enemy.
Your orders for moving cannot be executed now, on account of the condition of the roads and streams. The removal of public property goes on with painful slowness, because, as the officers employed in it report, a sufficient number of cars and engines cannot be had. It is evident that a large quantity of it must be sacrificed, or your instructions
[p. 484]
not observed. I shall adhere to them as closely as possible. In conversation with you, and before the cabinet, I did not exaggerate the difficulties of marching in this region. The suffering and sickness which would be produced can hardly be exaggerated.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Headquarters, Centreville,
March 5, 1862.
To His Excellency.
Mr. President: In connection with one of the subjects of my letter of the 1st inst., I respectfully submit herewith a handbill said to be circulating in our camps. Several such recruiting advertisements have been pointed out to me in the newspapers. It is said that such cases are common -- that many officers profess to have letters from the Honorable Secretary of War authorizing them to raise troops endowed with special privileges, which would render them useless as soldiers, should their generals be weak enough to respect such privileges.
It is easy to perceive how ruinous to the reoganization of our excellent infantry such a system must be, and how it is calculated to produce present discontent and future mutiny.
I have just directed that a citizen should be excluded from the camps who professes to have the privilege, granted by the War Department, of raising troops in this army for local service -- in "the Valley."
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Tullahoma, February 12, 1863.
Mr. President: . . . In Mississippi every thing depends upon the result of the labor opposite to Vicksburg. If Grant should succeed in making a navigable canal, and through it pass Vicksburg and invest Port Hudson with the combined armies, it would be difficult for us to succor the place. Indeed, we have not the means of forming a relieving army. General Pemberton is not communicative. I am told, however, that he is confident that the canal cannot be made. It seems to me to depend upon the condition of the river, whether or not it is too high for work with spades. [p. 502]
I have been told by Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hardee that they have advised you to remove General Bragg and place me in command of this army. I am sure that you will agree with me that the part that I have borne in this investigation would render it inconsistent with my personal honor to occupy that position. I believe, however, that the interests of the service require that General Bragg should not be removed.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Tullahoma, February 3, 1863.
Mr. President: Your telegram ordering me to General Bragg's headquarters was received in Mobile, when I was on my way to them. Your letter of January 22d reached me here on the 30th. I have spoken to General Bragg, Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hardee, and Governor Harris, on the subject of your letter. . . . I respectfully suggest that, should it then appear to you necessary to remove General Bragg, no one in this army, or engaged in this investigation, ought to be his successor.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Tullahoma, March 28, 1863
Mr. President: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 20th, and with it a copy of your telegram of the 16th. I fear that my reply to the latter did not express my meaning, from my anxiety to be brief.
At Mobile, in Mississippi, and in Middle Tennessee, we cannot foresee attack long enough beforehand to be able to reënforce the threatened army from either of the others. At the first two, the enemy's appearance may, and probably would be the first indication of his intention to attack. In Middle Tennessee, after he begins to advance, his march may be so delayed as to give us three or four days, but in that time troops could be drawn from East Tennessee only, and that department could furnish but a small force. The transportation of eight or ten thousand infantry (without their wagons) from Jackson to Tullahoma, would require more than three weeks. The wagons and horses would require five. I think, therefore, that it is not practicable to strengthen this army by drawing to it "for temporary use" a portion of the troops of Mississippi or Mobile. At the latter, besides the garrisons of the forts and batteries for water-defense, General Buckner has but three thousand infantry to hold the land-side.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 7, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 7, 1862.
To the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d instant by the last mail.
On the 2d instant, I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison, Virginia cavalry, with a proposition to Major-General McClellan for an exchange of prisoners of war. That officer was stopped by the enemy's pickets near Falls Church, and his dispatches carried to Brigadier-General Wadsworth at Arlington. That officer informed Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison that they were promptly forwarded to General McClellan. He waited for the answer until yesterday, when, being informed by Brigadier-General Wadsworth that he could form no opinion as to the time when it might be expected, he returned.
On receiving your letter in reply to mine, in relation to reënlistments, I directed your orders on that subject to be carried into immediate effect; furloughs to be given at the rate of twenty per cent. of the men present for duty.
The order directing recruiting for the war regiments is also in course of execution.
In my opinion, the position of the "Valley Army" ought, if possible, to enable it to coöperate with that of the Potomac, but it must also depend upon that of the enemy and his strength. General Jackson occupied Romney strongly, because the enemy was reported to be concentrating his troops, including those supposed to be near Harper's Ferry, at New Creek. I regret very much that you did not refer this matter to me before ordering General Loring to Winchester, instead of now. I think that orders from me,
[p. 479]
now conflicting with those you have given, would have an unfortunate effect -- that of making the impression that our views do not coincide, and that each of us is pursuing his own plan. This might especially be expected among General Loring's troops, if they are, as represented to me, in a state of discontent little removed from insubordination.
Troops stationed at Moorefield could not well coöperate with those in the northern part of the Valley, as the President remarks.
Let me suggest that, having broken up the dispositions of the military commander, you give whatever other orders may be necessary.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 11, 1862
Centreville, February 11, 1862.
Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: On the morning of the 2d instant, I dispatched to Major-General G. B. McClellan a proposition for the general exchange of prisoners of war according to modern usage. He was informed that the proposition was made under authority derived from you.
According to some of the Northern newspapers, this letter was the subject of a cabinet council at which General McClellan assisted.
No answer has been received, and it is now reasonable to suppose that none is intended. Under such circumstances, permit me to suggest the propriety of at least suspending the unprecedented mode of exchange now practised.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 14, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 14, 1862.
To the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: . . . . In a letter dated February 12th, Major-General Jackson informed me that, since the evacuation of Romney by your orders, the United States troops have returned to it; and that the officer commanding at Moorefield reported that the enemy, three thousand strong, were approaching that place.
The reduction of our force by the operation of the furlough system, makes it impracticable to reënforce the Valley district from that of the Potomac.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 16, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 16, 1862.
To the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 11th inst., in relation to Captain Rhett, and that of Captain Dyerle to you, dated February 8th, referred to me.
I think that you were mistaken in regarding General Beauregard as the commander of these troops. I have been so considered here, and so styled by yourself.
More furloughs have already been granted than the condition of the army will justify. I hope, therefore, that
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you will not require a rule published to the army to be broken in the case of Captain Rhett's company.
The army is so much weakened by loss of officers from sickness, and soldiers on furlough, that I am compelled to use every man in the way in which he can serve best. It is essential that this authority should not be taken from me. Captain Dyerle's company is serving as infantry, as it engaged to do, for a year. It would be useless as artillery.
The granting authority to raise artillery companies from our present force of infantry has interfered very much with the object of your order No. 1. Besides the persons having such authority, many others have been induced by their success to attempt to form such companies, and have thereby injured the reorganization of our infantry. The infantry which has been converted into artillery is excellent infantry, but entirely ignorant of artillery. We therefore lose decidedly by the change.
The rules of military correspondence require that letters addressed to you by members of this army should pass through my office. Let me ask, for the sake of discipline, that you have this rule enforced. It will save much time and trouble, and create the belief in the army that I am its commander; and moreover will enable you to see both sides of every case (the military and personal) at once.
I have just received information from General Whiting that the enemy's forces near Evansport have just been considerably increased, both on land and on water. And from General Jackson, that from Moorefield the enemy has a graded road to Strasburg, passing a good deal to the south of Winchester.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to S. Bassett French, January 29, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, January 29, 1862.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp of Governor of Virginia.
Sir: Your letter of the 25th insf., in relation to arms, the property of the Commonwealth of Virginia, not in the hands of the troops of this army, and desiring me to take measures for their return to the State authorities so far as they can be found within this Department of the Army of the Confederate States, has been duly received.
I am sorry that I can afford little information and less aid in relation to the important and interesting object of your communication.
The troops under my command have generally come into my department with arms in their hands. I had and have no means of ascertaining by whom the arms were furnished. I understand that Virginia does not wish to reclaim arms now in actual use. As arms have become disposable by the deaths or discharges of soldiers, they have been withdrawn from my control under orders of the War Department of the Confederate States. These orders have been repeatedly issued by the Department and executed by me. Of late they have gone to the length of taking the arms of the sick. When removed from the army, the arms,
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of course, passed under the direct control of the Department of War. To that Department I must refer you for the information which you seek of me.
There are no flint-lock muskets in the hands of my soldiers, nor have there been any since I assumed the command here. There were five hundred such in the depot at Manassas when I arrived here from the Valley. They were soon afterward sent to Richmond, in accordance with the general practice in such matters above specified.
Do me the favor to express to the Governor my grateful acknowledgments of his kind and patriotic message. Nothing earthly could afford me higher gratification than the fulfillment of his good wishes by the army striking a great blow for the freedom and independence of Virginia and the South.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp to the Governor of Virginia.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to S. Bassett French, January 29, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, January 29, 1862.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp of Governor of Virginia.
Sir: Your letter of the 25th insf., in relation to arms, the property of the Commonwealth of Virginia, not in the hands of the troops of this army, and desiring me to take measures for their return to the State authorities so far as they can be found within this Department of the Army of the Confederate States, has been duly received.
I am sorry that I can afford little information and less aid in relation to the important and interesting object of your communication.
The troops under my command have generally come into my department with arms in their hands. I had and have no means of ascertaining by whom the arms were furnished. I understand that Virginia does not wish to reclaim arms now in actual use. As arms have become disposable by the deaths or discharges of soldiers, they have been withdrawn from my control under orders of the War Department of the Confederate States. These orders have been repeatedly issued by the Department and executed by me. Of late they have gone to the length of taking the arms of the sick. When removed from the army, the arms,
[p. 476]
of course, passed under the direct control of the Department of War. To that Department I must refer you for the information which you seek of me.
There are no flint-lock muskets in the hands of my soldiers, nor have there been any since I assumed the command here. There were five hundred such in the depot at Manassas when I arrived here from the Valley. They were soon afterward sent to Richmond, in accordance with the general practice in such matters above specified.
Do me the favor to express to the Governor my grateful acknowledgments of his kind and patriotic message. Nothing earthly could afford me higher gratification than the fulfillment of his good wishes by the army striking a great blow for the freedom and independence of Virginia and the South.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp to the Governor of Virginia.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 30, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
January 30, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: The execution of War Department General Order No. 1 will greatly reduce the strength of the "one year" regiments of this army. They constitute about two-thirds of the whole number. I respectfully suggest that men to fill those regiments, say twenty or thirty per company, be sent to us as soon as possible.
The Secretary of War proposed to send unarmed regiments to supply the places of the men furloughed. Such regiments would be of little value for some time, but the men composing them, if distributed among our present
[p. 478]
troops and mixed with them in companies, would be valuable at once, and soon equal to the old soldiers.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 11, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 11, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: An order from the War Department removed two artillery companies which manned four of the heavy batteries at Manassas. I cannot supply their places without taking for the purpose excellent infantry who are ignorant of artillery service. I therefore respectfully ask that two companies may be sent to Manassas to man the batteries in
[p. 481]
question without delay. They might be sent without small-arms.
Let me again urge the importance of sending to the army the proper number of general officers. The great number of sick field-officers makes the want of them felt the more.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 2, 1862
Centreville, February 2, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: We are beginning to feel the want of the arms recently sent to Richmond under orders from the War Department. One regiment already has twenty-three men returned from hospital, who are without arms. The recruiting directed in General Order No. 2 will give us men who cannot be armed, unless a part at least of the arms referred to can be returned.
Permit me again to remind the War Department that a division and five brigades are without their proper generals. The great number of colonels and other field-officers who are absent sick, makes the want of general officers the more felt.
Several of the colonels of this army are well qualified to be brigadier-generals. Besides Colonels A. P. Hill and Forney, Colonels Hampton, Winder, Garland, and Mott, are fully competent to command brigades.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 9, 1862
Centreville, February 9, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: I am informed that a law recently passed authorizes the President to organize a provisional corps of engineers.
Officers and soldiers of that branch of the service are greatly needed by us. If one or two competent engineers, with eight or ten subalterns of those appointed under this law, could be sent to this district soon, their services would be of great value. They should have sappers and pontoniers as soon as practicable. Such an organization would add greatly to our strength, and, in the event of marches, would be essential.
We should have a much larger cavalry force. The greatest objection, or rather difficulty, in increasing it, is said to be the want of proper arms. This can be easily removed by equipping a large body of lancers. These weapons can be furnished easily and soon, and would be formidable -- much more so than sabres -- in the hands of new troops, especially against the enemy's numerous artillery.
[p. 480]
The shafts should be about ten feet long, and the heads seven or eight inches. Those furnished to us are, many of them, of heavy wood, and too short, the heads too thin and unnecessarily broad. Ash is the best wood.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Thomas Jonathan Jackson, January 28, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
January 28, 1862.
Major-General Jackson,
Commanding Valley District, Winchester.
General: I have to-day received your letters of 21st and 24th.
I regret to be unable to reënforce you. May not your own cavalry -- Colonel Ashby's regiment -- be concentrated and used for the purpose for which you apply to me for cavalry?
[p. 475]
I am an enemy to much distribution of troops. May not yours be brought together -- so posted, that is to say, that you may be able to assemble them all to oppose an enemy coming from Harper's Ferry, Williamsport, or the northwest?
Should the report given by General Hill prove to be correct, it would be imprudent, it seems to me, to keep your troops dispersed as they now are. Do you not think so? The enemy might not only prevent yours concentrating, but interpose himself between us, which we must never permit.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Thomas Jonathan Jackson, January 28, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
January 28, 1862.
Major-General Jackson,
Commanding Valley District, Winchester.
General: I have to-day received your letters of 21st and 24th.
I regret to be unable to reënforce you. May not your own cavalry -- Colonel Ashby's regiment -- be concentrated and used for the purpose for which you apply to me for cavalry?
[p. 475]
I am an enemy to much distribution of troops. May not yours be brought together -- so posted, that is to say, that you may be able to assemble them all to oppose an enemy coming from Harper's Ferry, Williamsport, or the northwest?
Should the report given by General Hill prove to be correct, it would be imprudent, it seems to me, to keep your troops dispersed as they now are. Do you not think so? The enemy might not only prevent yours concentrating, but interpose himself between us, which we must never permit.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
Headquarters, Cross-Roads, New Kent Court-House,
May 10, 1862, 10.30 P. M.
General: I have written to you several times on the subject of concentrating near Richmond all the troops within reach. I have ordered Major-General Huger to evacuate Norfolk, and conduct his troops to Richmond, but have no information of his progress. "The Army of the North" must be in the Department of Northern Virginia, but, as I have been informed neither of its location, strength, nor the name of its immediate commander, I must suppose that it is not under my orders. If the President will direct the concentration of all the troops of North Carolina and Eastern Virginia, we may be able to hold Middle Virginia at least. If we permit ourselves to be driven beyond Richmond, we lose the means of maintaining this army.
The enemy is now almost exactly between us and "The Army of the North." That army should, therefore, be drawn back to secure its communication with this one.
A concentration of all our available forces may enable us to fight successfully. Let us try.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston.
General R. E. Lee.
May 19, 1862.
Sir: Before taking command in the Peninsula I had the honor to express to the President my opinion of the defects of the position then occupied by our troops there. After taking command, I reported that the opinion previously expressed was fully confirmed.
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Some of my objections to the position were, that its length was too great for our force; that it prevented offensive movements, except at great disadvantage; and that it was untenable after the guns of Yorktown were silenced -- a result admitted to be inevitable by all our officers -- from the enemy's great superiority in artillery. York River being thus opened, a large fleet of transports and five or six hundred batteaux would enable him to turn us in a few hours.
It seemed to me that there were but two objects in remaining in the Peninsula: the possibility of an advance upon us by the enemy; and gaining time, in which arms might be received and troops organized. I determined, therefore, to hold the position as long as it could be done without exposing our troops to the fire of the powerful artillery which, I doubted not, would be brought to bear upon them.
I believed that, after silencing our batteries on York River, the enemy would attempt to turn us by moving up to West Point by water.
Circumstances indicating that the enemy's batteries were nearly ready, I directed the troops to move toward Williamsburg on the night of the 3d by the roads from Yorktown and Warwick Court-House. They were assembled about Williamsburg by noon on the 4th, and were ordered to march by the road to Richmond, Major-General Magruder leading.
Early in the afternoon the cavalry rear-guard on the Yorktown road was driven in, and rapidly followed by the enemy. Brigadier-General McLaws was sent with the brigades of Kershaw and Semmes to support the cavalry. He met the enemy near the line of little works constructed by Major-General Magruder's forethought, made his dispositions with prompt courage and skill, and quickly drove the Federal troops from the field, in spite of disparity of numbers. I regret that no report of this handsome affair has been made by General McLaws. Major-General Magruder's. march was too late to permit that of Major-General Smith's the same afternoon. His division moved at daybreak on the 5th, in heavy rain and deep mud.
About sunrise the rear-guard was again attacked. The
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action gradually increased in magnitude, until about three o'clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, requested that a part of General Hill's troops might be sent to his aid. Upon this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a mere spectator; for Longstrect's clear head and brave heart left me no apology for interference. For details of the action, see the accompanying reports.
Our wounded, and many of those of the enemy, were placed in hospitals and residences in Williamsburg. Major-General Smith's division reached Barhamsville, eighteen miles; and Major-General Magruder's (commanded by Brigadier-General D. R. Jones) the Diascund Bridge on the Chickahominy road on that day. Those of Longstreet and Hill marched from Williamsburg, twelve miles, on the 6th. On that evening Major-General Smith reported that the enemy's troops were landing in force on the south side of York River, near West Point. On the following morning the army was concentrated near Barhamsville. In the mean time it had been ascertained that the enemy occupied a thick and extensive wood between Barhamsville and their landing-place. Brigadier-General Whiting was directed by General Smith to dislodge him, which was handsomely done -- the brigade of Hood, and part of that of Hampton, performed the service. You are respectfully referred, for details, to the accompanying reports.
Want of means of subsistence compelled the army to move on toward Richmond; the divisions of Smith and Magruder taking the road by New Kent Court-House, those of Longstreet and Hill that along the Chickahominy. On the evening of the 9th the army halted; its left near the Crossroads on the New Kent Court-House road, and its right near the Long Bridge. In this position the York River Railroad supplied us from Richmond.
On the 15th the attack upon the battery at Drury's Bluff by the enemy's gunboats suggested to me the necessity of so placing the army as to be prepared for the enemy's advance up the river or on the south side, as well as from the direction of West Point. We therefore crossed the
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Chickahominy, to take a position six or seven miles from Richmond. That ground being unfavorable, the present position was taken on the 17th. Had the enemy beaten us on the 5th, as he claims to have done, the army would have lost most of its baggage and artillery. We should have been pursued from Williamsburg, and intercepted from West Point. Our troops engaged, leaving Williamsburg on the following morning, marched but twelve miles that day; and the army on its march to the Cross-roads averaged less than ten miles a day. Had not the action of the 5th been, at the least, discouraging to the enemy, we would have been pursued on the road, and turned by way of West Point. About four hundred of our wounded were left in Williamsburg, because they were not in condition to be moved. Nothing else was left which we had horses to draw away. Five pieces, found by the chief quartermaster at the Williamsburg wharf, were abandoned for want of horses and harness. In the three actions above mentioned our troops displayed high courage, and, on the march, endured privations and hardships with admirable cheerfulness.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston, General.
General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston, May 7, 1862
Headquarters Barhamsville,
May 7, 1862.
General: The enemy has a large fleet of gunboats (seven iron-clads) and transports at West Point. He has been landing troops and artillery under his guns, but in a position in which we cannot reach him. The want of provision, and of any mode of obtaining it here -- still more the dearth of forage -- makes it impossible to wait to attack him while landing; the sight of the iron-clad boats makes me apprehensive for Richmond, too -- so I move on in two columns, one by the New Kent road, under Major-General Smith; the other by that of the Chickahominy, under Major-General Longstreet. The battle of Williamsburg seems to have prevented the enemy from following from that direction. All the prisoners were of Heintzelman's corps, except a few of the last, who said they belong to Sumner's.
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Fresh troops seemed to be arriving upon the field continually during the day. Yours, most respectfully,
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston