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Letters from soldier that first name start with J
CAMP NEAR BELLE PLAIN, VA., January 19, 1863.Mrs. Mary BradyDear Friend :There is one of my comrades in the West Philadelphia Hospital (Ward H) by the name of Harry Griffin. I wish you would be so kind as to call and see him as you make your daily rounds.You are engaged in a good work in visiting the afflicted, and by contributing to their wants ; and surely you will reap your reward in good season, and God will bless you. Every true soldier you have helped shall remember you with respect and gratitude. I shall always remember you myself with deep feelings of gratitude, and I shall never forget the kindness bestowed on me by the ladies." A friend in need is a friend indeed."My arm is still sore.Believe me to be, madam, yours truly,JOSEPH A. WINTERS,CO. B, 7th Regiment Pa. Vol.
General McDowell's orders for the 21st of July were as follows:
Headquarters Department Army of Eastern Virginia,
Centreville, July 20, 1861.
The enemy has planted a battery on the Warrenton turnpike to defend the passage of Bull Run; has seized
[p. 473]
the Stone Bridge and made a heavy abattis on the right bank, to oppose our advance in that direction. The ford above the bridge is also guarded, whether with artillery or not is not positively known, but every indication favors the belief that he proposes to defend the passage of the stream. It is intended to turn the position, force the enemy from the road, that it may be reopened, and, if possible, destroy the railroad leading from Manassas to the Valley of Virginia, where the enemy has a large force. As this may be resisted by all the force of the enemy, the troops will be disposed as follows: The First Division (General Tyler), with the exception of Richardson's brigade, will, at half-past two o'clock in the morning precisely, be at the Warrenton turnpike to threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not open fire until full daybreak. The Second Division (Hunter's) will move from its camp at two o'clock in the morning precisely, and, led by Captain Woodbury of the Engineers, will, after passing Cub Run, turn to the right, and pass the Bull Run stream above the ford at Sudley's Spring, and, then turning down to the left, descend the stream and clear away the enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and bridge. It will then bear off to the right, and make room for the succeeding division. The Third Division (Heintzelman's) will march at half-past two in the morning, and will follow the road taken by the Second Division, but will cross at the lower ford, after it has been turned as above; and then, going to the left, take place between the stream and Second Division. The Fifth Division (Miles's) will take position on the Centreville Heights (Richardson's brigade will for the time form part of the Fifth Division, and will continue in its present position). One brigade will be in the village, and one near the present station of Richardson's brigade. This division will threaten the Blackburn Ford, and remain in reserve at Centreville. The commander will open fire with artillery only, and will bear in mind that it is a demonstration only he is to make. He will cause such defensive works, abattis and earthworks, to be thrown up as will strengthen his position. Lieutenant Prime, of the Engineers,
[p. 474]
will be charged with this duty. These movements may lead to the gravest results, and commanders of divisions and brigades should bear in mind the immense consequences involved. There must be no failure, and every effort must be made to prevent straggling. No one must be allowed to leave the ranks without special authority. After completing the movements ordered, the troops must be held in order of battle, as they may be attacked at any moment.
By command of
Brigadier-General McDowell.
James B. Fry, Adjutant-General.
Dear Sister Lizzie,
I rec'd a very few words from you yesterday evening, and was very glad to hear that the folks was al well at home. I am well at present hoping this will find you the same. I have heard from home but very few times since I left Keokuk, and in fact I have not written as often as I did while I was there, for we have been pretty busy for the last two or three week, but now we have got [to] this place, and I think we will get to rest a few days at least. Now I will try to give you a few of the particulars about the [?] of the place.
We started to come to this place on the 30 inst. and found the rebels skirmish line a short time before sundown. Our skirmishers advanced, driving the rebs before them until they were within 6 or 8 hundred yds. of the enemies main works and there they established our picket line by throwing up light works, or rifle pits the next day. If we strengthen our works until our skirmish line was a tolerable good line of breast works, There was not anything of importance done on the 5th, but on the 6th we plant some artillery and during the night of the 6th we advanced our picket line 250 yds. When the rebs found that our line had advanced they charged on it and tried to drive it back but they were repulsed back as fast as they come,
Not anything worth note happened on the 7th and 8, but on the 9th toward evening we was ordered out to the reserve picket lines while we was lying there. Macks [xxx] Battery came out and took a position in front of the Fort and they and the 2nd Illinois Battery (it had been planted before) went to work and fired pretty rapid for about 40 minutes.
But before they commenced firing our front line of 2 inft. was ready to storm their Fort as the Artillery ceased our whole line was ordered forward and went forward with a yell which ceased not until the enemies works was gained they had surrendered. From the time our line started until the surrender was made was, I think I may safely say, no more than 17 minutes. They surrendered about 3,000 Prisoners to us, several guns and enough Provisions to last us a while. We lost about 300 in wounded [xxxxxx] I guess [xxxx] have no offensive [xxx] yet. I can tell exactly [xxxx] or how many prisoners we got. [xxxx] Now I will tell you that our regiment was not in the fight and that accounts for me not being in it. Our regiment was the reserve. I guess I have told all that I know about the fight so I will change the subject.
I understand that gen Grant has got Richmond and I guess it is true. I think [xxx] we'll have it Maybe in a short time and then I don't know where the Rebs wil go to next, next they try a hole and [xxxxxxxx] the hole in after them. I guess you can see that I think they are out whipped and then of course the war will be over and we will all get to come home that lives through it...
Now I must stop writing and get some dinner, though before I stop I will tell you that the boys are all well. Ace and Bill are in camp and Nick [xxxx] is on guard.
I want you all to write often and try and write a little more when you do write, I almost forgot to tell you that. Muffly was slightly wounded the other day but he is all right now. A ball struck his shoulder and bruised it but did not got through his clothes: he is as hearty as any man in the company.
Now I will bring my scribbling to a close by bidding you all good by for this time.
James M. Miller
Dear Mother
After a weeks delay I take my pen in hand to write you again. I might have written sooner but thought you would see Effies letter and therefore defered until the present time. I was in hopes to get home this month but now I see very plainly that I shall not be able, but if there is any chance shall try to come next month, but that is very doubtful as the season is so far advanced that military movements must commence very soon, but perhaps not until Gen. Sherman comes Which will not be long as he is within two or three weeks march of this place, provided he is not delayed by the enemy if he has a fight with them he has a force large enough to whip them but if they fall back upon Richmond then their doom is sealed and, I think a few weeks or months at most will finish up this unnatural rebellion. Some are of the opinion that there will not be another battle but they think different than I do for it is my opinion that there may be one or two very great battles yet, the enemy has over one hundred thousand men yet and that is enough to make a strong fight—, if they feel so disposed, and very likely they will, but it will do no good—
I believe I wrote you once before that we had to man four batteries with our company, well this Redoubt is one of them therefore you will direct your letters to me the same as before.
I am very sorry to hear that Austin is so headstrong, if I come home and find he is such a bad boy I shall have to see that he is properly taken care of, I had hoped that he was a good boy doing all he could to help you and make your duties lighter, but I fear I was mistaken.
If Edward is in the land of the living he now has another chance to return to his regiment and be pardoned, the chance is open until the 10th of May—
Hoping to see you soon with Love to you all I close affectionately
James
Nov 10th, 1863
Far north,Va.
My dearest Ella,
I now have some time to scratch out a few lines to let you know that I am well and Charles is also well.
I cannot begin to describe the horror mine eyes hath witnessed. I do not know yet if victory can be won. Oh, what will become of our country. Seargent say that the War will be won by Christmas time if we can break through the Rebel embankments. I do not believe him or Captain, as I see a certain defeat for all Christian souls.
My heart can not bear to be without mine love. I applied to the Adjutant for furlough next December. When I arrive we shall be married as best as planned.
Please remind Mother of our plans. Let Frank in on it to. Do not speak to Arthur, as he will not agree. Do write as soon as possible, as I can not read enough of your sweet thoughts and words.
Your faithful &&
John Donaldson
Dec. 7th 1863
Stevensburg, Va.
My dearest Ell,
I have received your welcome letter of the 21st yesterday morn. I have not received Mothers or Lizzies letters yet.
Ella, I have not obtained my furlough and most likley will not for love or money. This Army is run like a great hive with many combs to pass before getting to the queen.
Remember Pat Dempsey. Old Cap say'd that he skeedaddled last week. He rose up and walked away. I am sure that he is just run out of Who hit John, and that he can be found securely tied to an innkeepers keg.
Oh, Ell I must see to you soon if we are to be married. soon a new year will be upon us and there is no end in sight to this terrible war. I am sure that I will hear from the department about my complaint in the next inst. until then I remain
your obt. &&
J. D.
NB- Please have mother send her letter to the Captain in haste.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 28, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
January 28, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant Inspector-General.
Sir: I am informed that General Order No. 2 has been distributed to the "war regiments" of the army.
A recent order of the Secretary of War directs me to send to Richmond six thousand of the muskets belonging to our absent sick. This deprives the different regiments of the means of arming their men who return from the hospital even, and of course there are no arms for recruits. I shall not, under such circumstances, permit the expense of recruiting to be incurred, without additional orders.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Jefferson Finis Davis, February 25, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
February 25, 1862.
To his Excellency the President:
I respectfully inclose a copy of a report by Major-General Jackson.
[p. 483]
Brigadier-General Whiting informs me that Brigadier-General French and Captain Chatard think it impracticable to make the desired movement by water. I submit General French's letter on the subject. The land transportation would, it seems to me, require too much time and labor, even were the roads tolerable. They are not now practicable for our field artillery with their teams of four horses.
The army is crippled, and its discipline greatly impaired, by the want of general officers. The four regiments observing the fords of the lower Occoquan are commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, and a division and five brigades besides are without generals, and at least half the field-officers are absent -- generally sick.
The accumulation of subsistence stores at Manassas is now a great evil. The Commissary-General was requested, more than once, to suspend those supplies. A very extensive meat-packing establishment at Thoroughfare is also a great incumbrance. The great quantities of personal property in our camps is a still greater one. Much of both kinds of property must be sacrificed in the contemplated movement.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Vicksburg, December 22, 1862.
Mr. President: From such information as I have been able to obtain, I think that we shall require, to hold this department and the Mississippi River, an active army of about forty thousand men, to oppose the troops of Grant and Banks, and for garrisons at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, capable of holding those places against combined attacks until succored by the active army.
Major-General Smith has about five thousand nine hundred
[p. 494]
artillery and infantry for duty to defend a line of ten miles, exclusive of the position of Snyder's Mill, which requires three of his eight regiments. Should the enemy attack by land as well as by water, which is highly probable -- almost certain -- we would require at least eight more regiments of five or six hundred men each.
I have not seen Port Hudson, but a map of the ground gives me the opinion that it requires a garrison as strong as that necessary here. It now amounts to about five thousand five hundred of all arms; so that an addition of as many more will be required there -- in all, eleven or twelve thousand men. For the active force we have now twenty-one thousand men near the Yallobusha. About nine thousand have been ordered to this department from Lieutenant-General Smith's, and it is supposed that an equal force is on its way from Arkansas.
No more troops can be taken from General Bragg without the danger of enabling Rosecrans to move into Virginia, or to reënforce Grant. Our great object is to hold the Mississippi. The country beyond the river is as much interested in that object as this; and the loss to us of the Mississippi involves that of the country beyond it. The eight or ten thousand men which are essential to its safety ought, therefore, I respectfully suggest, to be taken from Arkansas; to return after the crisis in this department.
I firmly believe, however, that our true system of warfare would be to concentrate the forces of the two departments on this side of the Mississippi, beat the enemy here, and then reconquer the country beyond it which he might have gained in the mean time.
I respectfully ask your Excellency's attention to the accompanying letter of Major-General Smith in relation to the inadequacy of the garrison of Vicksburg, begging you to take his estimate of the force needed instead of mine, as his is based upon accurate calculation.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 18, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
I am much relieved to find our troops are on the Duck River. Not at Deckered.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 9, 1863.
To the President, Richmond, Virginia:
Colonel Ewell informs me, from Chattanooga, that on the 31st General Bragg had thirty - five thousand, including Wharton's cavalry. Lost nine thousand -- three thousand sick since from exposure. We have not force enough here if the enemy is vigorous. Prisoners tell General Bragg of Federal reënforcements from West Tennessee.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, July 9, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
Your dispatch of to-day received. I have never meant to fail in the duty of reporting to the Executive whatever
[p. 516]
might interest it in my command. I informed the Secretary of War that my force was much too weak to attempt to raise the siege of Vicksburg, and that to attempt to relieve Port Hudson would be to give up Mississippi, as it would involve the loss of this point, and that want of adequate means of transportation kept me inactive until the end of June. I then moved toward Vicksburg to attempt to extricate the garrison, but could not devise a plan until after reconnoitring, for which I was too late. Without General Pemberton's coöperation, any attempt must have resulted in disaster.
The slowness and difficulty of communication rendered coöperation next to impossible.
J. E. Johnston.
Jackson, June 16, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
Your dispatch of 15th received. I meant to tell the Secretary of War that I considered the order directing me to command here as limiting my authority to this department, especially as that order was accompanied by War Department orders transferring troops from Tennessee to Mississippi. And, whether commanding there or not, that your reply to my application for more troops, that none could be spared, would have made it improper for me to order more troops from Tennessee. Permit me to repeat that an officer having a task like mine, far above his ability,
[p. 512]
cannot, in addition, command other remote departments. No general can command separate armies.
I have not yet been able to procure the means of moving these troops. They are too weak to accomplish much. The reënforcements you mention have joined Grant.
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston.
Jackson, June 20, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
I much regret the carelessness of my reply of the 16th to your telegram of the 15th. In my dispatch of the 12th, to the Secretary of War, I referred to your words, "We have withheld nothing which it was practicable to give," in your telegram of May 28th, and to the telegram of June 5th, [1] except the last sentence. I considered Executive as including the Secretary of War.
J. E. Johnston.
Notes
[p. nts]
Note from page 512: 1 From the Secretary of War.
Jackson, January 2, 1863.
Mr. President: General Pemberton continues to command at Vicksburg. He has asked for all the troops here, after being reënforced by Maury's division, in addition to those brigades agreed upon between us. The line of twelve miles to Snyder's Mills probably requires them all. I fear difficulty of subsisting them, however. A report just handed in by the inspecting officers shows that the supply of provision is much smaller than General Pemberton supposed. The place may be reduced, I fear, in consequence of this; or, should it be invested, we shall not have a sufficient force to break the investment.
Grant is still on the Tallahatchie, so that the remainder of Loring's and Price's troops cannot be withdrawn from Grenada. From his halting I suppose he is repairing the railroad. The force at Grenada (about eleven thousand effectives) is too weak to do more than delay the passage of the river by the enemy. My hope of keeping him back is in Van Dorn, under whom I propose to unite all the available cavalry, when Forrest and Roddy can be found.
Should Grant join Sherman at Vicksburg, it would be very embarrassing, for, as he could reach the place from Memphis as soon as we could learn whether he was embarking or moving along the railroad to Grenada, it could be invested by the combined armies. We could not break the investment with eleven thousand men, but it would be necessary to try.
The necessity of holding the Yazoo, as well as Vicksburg, employs a large force, too widely distributed to be in condition for the offensive.
We have no news from Arkansas, which proves, I think, that we are to get no help from that side of the Mississippi.
The Legislature has done nothing yet.
We require about twenty thousand men, the number you have asked for from Arkansas, to make headway against both Grant and Sherman. Will the great victory at Fredericksburg enable General Lee to spare a part of his force?
Should the enemy's forces be respectably handled, the
[p. 496]
task you have set me will be above my ability. But the hand of Almighty God has delivered us in times of great danger! Believing that He is with us, I will not lose hope.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 6, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
Your dispatch of yesterday received. Enemy's troops and transports reported gone up the river from Milliken's Bend. We hear of no movement in this direction by General Holmes. Grant's forces are reported distributed at Memphis, Holly Springs, and Corinth. The country said to be impracticable. General Bragg reports he has been checked. I hear indirectly that he has withdrawn from Murfreesboro. Should he need help, and there appear no danger in Mississippi except by the river, could E. K. Smith's men return? The impossibility of my knowing the condition of things in Tennessee shows that I cannot direct both parts of my command at once. I am hoping to hear from General Bragg.
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, Mississippi, January 7, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
The following dispatch was received from General M. L. Smith: "I am returning from Little Rock. No troops will be sent."
J. E. Johnston, General.
Jackson, January 7, 1863.
To the President, Richmond:
General Bragg telegraphs from Winchester that the enemy did not follow in force. I regret his falling back so
[p. 497]
far. He wants twenty thousand more men to secure East Tennessee. Can any large part of it be furnished? E. K. Smith's troops here might be spared for a few weeks, unless Sherman reappears. One of Grant's divisions is at Humboldt. Which is most valuable, Tennessee or the Mississippi?
J. E. Johnston, General.
Camp on Caney Creek,
July 5, 1863.
To his Excellency the President:
Your dispatch of June 30th received. I considered my assignment to the immediate command in Mississippi as giving me a new position, and limiting my authority to this department. The orders of the War Department transferring three separate bodies of troops from General Bragg's army to this, two of them without my knowledge, and all of them without consulting me, would have convinced me, had I doubted. These orders of the War Department expressed its judgment of the number of troops to be transferred from Tennessee. I could no more control this judgment by increasing the number, than by forbidding the transfers. I regret very much that an impression which seemed to me to be natural, should be regarded by you as a "strange error."
J. E. Johnston.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Jefferson Finis Davis, March 3, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
March 3, 1862.
His Excellency.
Mr. President: I respectfully submit three notes from Major-General Jackson, and one from Brigadier-General Hill, for the information they contain of the enemy.
Your orders for moving cannot be executed now, on account of the condition of the roads and streams. The removal of public property goes on with painful slowness, because, as the officers employed in it report, a sufficient number of cars and engines cannot be had. It is evident that a large quantity of it must be sacrificed, or your instructions
[p. 484]
not observed. I shall adhere to them as closely as possible. In conversation with you, and before the cabinet, I did not exaggerate the difficulties of marching in this region. The suffering and sickness which would be produced can hardly be exaggerated.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Headquarters, Centreville,
March 5, 1862.
To His Excellency.
Mr. President: In connection with one of the subjects of my letter of the 1st inst., I respectfully submit herewith a handbill said to be circulating in our camps. Several such recruiting advertisements have been pointed out to me in the newspapers. It is said that such cases are common -- that many officers profess to have letters from the Honorable Secretary of War authorizing them to raise troops endowed with special privileges, which would render them useless as soldiers, should their generals be weak enough to respect such privileges.
It is easy to perceive how ruinous to the reoganization of our excellent infantry such a system must be, and how it is calculated to produce present discontent and future mutiny.
I have just directed that a citizen should be excluded from the camps who professes to have the privilege, granted by the War Department, of raising troops in this army for local service -- in "the Valley."
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Tullahoma, February 12, 1863.
Mr. President: . . . In Mississippi every thing depends upon the result of the labor opposite to Vicksburg. If Grant should succeed in making a navigable canal, and through it pass Vicksburg and invest Port Hudson with the combined armies, it would be difficult for us to succor the place. Indeed, we have not the means of forming a relieving army. General Pemberton is not communicative. I am told, however, that he is confident that the canal cannot be made. It seems to me to depend upon the condition of the river, whether or not it is too high for work with spades. [p. 502]
I have been told by Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hardee that they have advised you to remove General Bragg and place me in command of this army. I am sure that you will agree with me that the part that I have borne in this investigation would render it inconsistent with my personal honor to occupy that position. I believe, however, that the interests of the service require that General Bragg should not be removed.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Tullahoma, February 3, 1863.
Mr. President: Your telegram ordering me to General Bragg's headquarters was received in Mobile, when I was on my way to them. Your letter of January 22d reached me here on the 30th. I have spoken to General Bragg, Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hardee, and Governor Harris, on the subject of your letter. . . . I respectfully suggest that, should it then appear to you necessary to remove General Bragg, no one in this army, or engaged in this investigation, ought to be his successor.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Tullahoma, March 28, 1863
Mr. President: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 20th, and with it a copy of your telegram of the 16th. I fear that my reply to the latter did not express my meaning, from my anxiety to be brief.
At Mobile, in Mississippi, and in Middle Tennessee, we cannot foresee attack long enough beforehand to be able to reënforce the threatened army from either of the others. At the first two, the enemy's appearance may, and probably would be the first indication of his intention to attack. In Middle Tennessee, after he begins to advance, his march may be so delayed as to give us three or four days, but in that time troops could be drawn from East Tennessee only, and that department could furnish but a small force. The transportation of eight or ten thousand infantry (without their wagons) from Jackson to Tullahoma, would require more than three weeks. The wagons and horses would require five. I think, therefore, that it is not practicable to strengthen this army by drawing to it "for temporary use" a portion of the troops of Mississippi or Mobile. At the latter, besides the garrisons of the forts and batteries for water-defense, General Buckner has but three thousand infantry to hold the land-side.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 7, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 7, 1862.
To the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d instant by the last mail.
On the 2d instant, I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison, Virginia cavalry, with a proposition to Major-General McClellan for an exchange of prisoners of war. That officer was stopped by the enemy's pickets near Falls Church, and his dispatches carried to Brigadier-General Wadsworth at Arlington. That officer informed Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison that they were promptly forwarded to General McClellan. He waited for the answer until yesterday, when, being informed by Brigadier-General Wadsworth that he could form no opinion as to the time when it might be expected, he returned.
On receiving your letter in reply to mine, in relation to reënlistments, I directed your orders on that subject to be carried into immediate effect; furloughs to be given at the rate of twenty per cent. of the men present for duty.
The order directing recruiting for the war regiments is also in course of execution.
In my opinion, the position of the "Valley Army" ought, if possible, to enable it to coöperate with that of the Potomac, but it must also depend upon that of the enemy and his strength. General Jackson occupied Romney strongly, because the enemy was reported to be concentrating his troops, including those supposed to be near Harper's Ferry, at New Creek. I regret very much that you did not refer this matter to me before ordering General Loring to Winchester, instead of now. I think that orders from me,
[p. 479]
now conflicting with those you have given, would have an unfortunate effect -- that of making the impression that our views do not coincide, and that each of us is pursuing his own plan. This might especially be expected among General Loring's troops, if they are, as represented to me, in a state of discontent little removed from insubordination.
Troops stationed at Moorefield could not well coöperate with those in the northern part of the Valley, as the President remarks.
Let me suggest that, having broken up the dispositions of the military commander, you give whatever other orders may be necessary.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 11, 1862
Centreville, February 11, 1862.
Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: On the morning of the 2d instant, I dispatched to Major-General G. B. McClellan a proposition for the general exchange of prisoners of war according to modern usage. He was informed that the proposition was made under authority derived from you.
According to some of the Northern newspapers, this letter was the subject of a cabinet council at which General McClellan assisted.
No answer has been received, and it is now reasonable to suppose that none is intended. Under such circumstances, permit me to suggest the propriety of at least suspending the unprecedented mode of exchange now practised.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 14, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 14, 1862.
To the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: . . . . In a letter dated February 12th, Major-General Jackson informed me that, since the evacuation of Romney by your orders, the United States troops have returned to it; and that the officer commanding at Moorefield reported that the enemy, three thousand strong, were approaching that place.
The reduction of our force by the operation of the furlough system, makes it impracticable to reënforce the Valley district from that of the Potomac.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Judah Phillip Benjamin, February 16, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 16, 1862.
To the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 11th inst., in relation to Captain Rhett, and that of Captain Dyerle to you, dated February 8th, referred to me.
I think that you were mistaken in regarding General Beauregard as the commander of these troops. I have been so considered here, and so styled by yourself.
More furloughs have already been granted than the condition of the army will justify. I hope, therefore, that
[p. 482]
you will not require a rule published to the army to be broken in the case of Captain Rhett's company.
The army is so much weakened by loss of officers from sickness, and soldiers on furlough, that I am compelled to use every man in the way in which he can serve best. It is essential that this authority should not be taken from me. Captain Dyerle's company is serving as infantry, as it engaged to do, for a year. It would be useless as artillery.
The granting authority to raise artillery companies from our present force of infantry has interfered very much with the object of your order No. 1. Besides the persons having such authority, many others have been induced by their success to attempt to form such companies, and have thereby injured the reorganization of our infantry. The infantry which has been converted into artillery is excellent infantry, but entirely ignorant of artillery. We therefore lose decidedly by the change.
The rules of military correspondence require that letters addressed to you by members of this army should pass through my office. Let me ask, for the sake of discipline, that you have this rule enforced. It will save much time and trouble, and create the belief in the army that I am its commander; and moreover will enable you to see both sides of every case (the military and personal) at once.
I have just received information from General Whiting that the enemy's forces near Evansport have just been considerably increased, both on land and on water. And from General Jackson, that from Moorefield the enemy has a graded road to Strasburg, passing a good deal to the south of Winchester.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to S. Bassett French, January 29, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, January 29, 1862.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp of Governor of Virginia.
Sir: Your letter of the 25th insf., in relation to arms, the property of the Commonwealth of Virginia, not in the hands of the troops of this army, and desiring me to take measures for their return to the State authorities so far as they can be found within this Department of the Army of the Confederate States, has been duly received.
I am sorry that I can afford little information and less aid in relation to the important and interesting object of your communication.
The troops under my command have generally come into my department with arms in their hands. I had and have no means of ascertaining by whom the arms were furnished. I understand that Virginia does not wish to reclaim arms now in actual use. As arms have become disposable by the deaths or discharges of soldiers, they have been withdrawn from my control under orders of the War Department of the Confederate States. These orders have been repeatedly issued by the Department and executed by me. Of late they have gone to the length of taking the arms of the sick. When removed from the army, the arms,
[p. 476]
of course, passed under the direct control of the Department of War. To that Department I must refer you for the information which you seek of me.
There are no flint-lock muskets in the hands of my soldiers, nor have there been any since I assumed the command here. There were five hundred such in the depot at Manassas when I arrived here from the Valley. They were soon afterward sent to Richmond, in accordance with the general practice in such matters above specified.
Do me the favor to express to the Governor my grateful acknowledgments of his kind and patriotic message. Nothing earthly could afford me higher gratification than the fulfillment of his good wishes by the army striking a great blow for the freedom and independence of Virginia and the South.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp to the Governor of Virginia.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to S. Bassett French, January 29, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, January 29, 1862.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp of Governor of Virginia.
Sir: Your letter of the 25th insf., in relation to arms, the property of the Commonwealth of Virginia, not in the hands of the troops of this army, and desiring me to take measures for their return to the State authorities so far as they can be found within this Department of the Army of the Confederate States, has been duly received.
I am sorry that I can afford little information and less aid in relation to the important and interesting object of your communication.
The troops under my command have generally come into my department with arms in their hands. I had and have no means of ascertaining by whom the arms were furnished. I understand that Virginia does not wish to reclaim arms now in actual use. As arms have become disposable by the deaths or discharges of soldiers, they have been withdrawn from my control under orders of the War Department of the Confederate States. These orders have been repeatedly issued by the Department and executed by me. Of late they have gone to the length of taking the arms of the sick. When removed from the army, the arms,
[p. 476]
of course, passed under the direct control of the Department of War. To that Department I must refer you for the information which you seek of me.
There are no flint-lock muskets in the hands of my soldiers, nor have there been any since I assumed the command here. There were five hundred such in the depot at Manassas when I arrived here from the Valley. They were soon afterward sent to Richmond, in accordance with the general practice in such matters above specified.
Do me the favor to express to the Governor my grateful acknowledgments of his kind and patriotic message. Nothing earthly could afford me higher gratification than the fulfillment of his good wishes by the army striking a great blow for the freedom and independence of Virginia and the South.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Colonel S. Bassett French,
Aide-de-camp to the Governor of Virginia.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 30, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
January 30, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: The execution of War Department General Order No. 1 will greatly reduce the strength of the "one year" regiments of this army. They constitute about two-thirds of the whole number. I respectfully suggest that men to fill those regiments, say twenty or thirty per company, be sent to us as soon as possible.
The Secretary of War proposed to send unarmed regiments to supply the places of the men furloughed. Such regiments would be of little value for some time, but the men composing them, if distributed among our present
[p. 478]
troops and mixed with them in companies, would be valuable at once, and soon equal to the old soldiers.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 11, 1862
Headquarters Department of Northern Virginia,
Centreville, February 11, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: An order from the War Department removed two artillery companies which manned four of the heavy batteries at Manassas. I cannot supply their places without taking for the purpose excellent infantry who are ignorant of artillery service. I therefore respectfully ask that two companies may be sent to Manassas to man the batteries in
[p. 481]
question without delay. They might be sent without small-arms.
Let me again urge the importance of sending to the army the proper number of general officers. The great number of sick field-officers makes the want of them felt the more.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 2, 1862
Centreville, February 2, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: We are beginning to feel the want of the arms recently sent to Richmond under orders from the War Department. One regiment already has twenty-three men returned from hospital, who are without arms. The recruiting directed in General Order No. 2 will give us men who cannot be armed, unless a part at least of the arms referred to can be returned.
Permit me again to remind the War Department that a division and five brigades are without their proper generals. The great number of colonels and other field-officers who are absent sick, makes the want of general officers the more felt.
Several of the colonels of this army are well qualified to be brigadier-generals. Besides Colonels A. P. Hill and Forney, Colonels Hampton, Winder, Garland, and Mott, are fully competent to command brigades.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 9, 1862
Centreville, February 9, 1862.
General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: I am informed that a law recently passed authorizes the President to organize a provisional corps of engineers.
Officers and soldiers of that branch of the service are greatly needed by us. If one or two competent engineers, with eight or ten subalterns of those appointed under this law, could be sent to this district soon, their services would be of great value. They should have sappers and pontoniers as soon as practicable. Such an organization would add greatly to our strength, and, in the event of marches, would be essential.
We should have a much larger cavalry force. The greatest objection, or rather difficulty, in increasing it, is said to be the want of proper arms. This can be easily removed by equipping a large body of lancers. These weapons can be furnished easily and soon, and would be formidable -- much more so than sabres -- in the hands of new troops, especially against the enemy's numerous artillery.
[p. 480]
The shafts should be about ten feet long, and the heads seven or eight inches. Those furnished to us are, many of them, of heavy wood, and too short, the heads too thin and unnecessarily broad. Ash is the best wood.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Thomas Jonathan Jackson, January 28, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
January 28, 1862.
Major-General Jackson,
Commanding Valley District, Winchester.
General: I have to-day received your letters of 21st and 24th.
I regret to be unable to reënforce you. May not your own cavalry -- Colonel Ashby's regiment -- be concentrated and used for the purpose for which you apply to me for cavalry?
[p. 475]
I am an enemy to much distribution of troops. May not yours be brought together -- so posted, that is to say, that you may be able to assemble them all to oppose an enemy coming from Harper's Ferry, Williamsport, or the northwest?
Should the report given by General Hill prove to be correct, it would be imprudent, it seems to me, to keep your troops dispersed as they now are. Do you not think so? The enemy might not only prevent yours concentrating, but interpose himself between us, which we must never permit.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston, General
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston to Thomas Jonathan Jackson, January 28, 1862
Headquarters, Centreville,
January 28, 1862.
Major-General Jackson,
Commanding Valley District, Winchester.
General: I have to-day received your letters of 21st and 24th.
I regret to be unable to reënforce you. May not your own cavalry -- Colonel Ashby's regiment -- be concentrated and used for the purpose for which you apply to me for cavalry?
[p. 475]
I am an enemy to much distribution of troops. May not yours be brought together -- so posted, that is to say, that you may be able to assemble them all to oppose an enemy coming from Harper's Ferry, Williamsport, or the northwest?
Should the report given by General Hill prove to be correct, it would be imprudent, it seems to me, to keep your troops dispersed as they now are. Do you not think so? The enemy might not only prevent yours concentrating, but interpose himself between us, which we must never permit.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
Headquarters, Cross-Roads, New Kent Court-House,
May 10, 1862, 10.30 P. M.
General: I have written to you several times on the subject of concentrating near Richmond all the troops within reach. I have ordered Major-General Huger to evacuate Norfolk, and conduct his troops to Richmond, but have no information of his progress. "The Army of the North" must be in the Department of Northern Virginia, but, as I have been informed neither of its location, strength, nor the name of its immediate commander, I must suppose that it is not under my orders. If the President will direct the concentration of all the troops of North Carolina and Eastern Virginia, we may be able to hold Middle Virginia at least. If we permit ourselves to be driven beyond Richmond, we lose the means of maintaining this army.
The enemy is now almost exactly between us and "The Army of the North." That army should, therefore, be drawn back to secure its communication with this one.
A concentration of all our available forces may enable us to fight successfully. Let us try.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston.
General R. E. Lee.
May 19, 1862.
Sir: Before taking command in the Peninsula I had the honor to express to the President my opinion of the defects of the position then occupied by our troops there. After taking command, I reported that the opinion previously expressed was fully confirmed.
[p. 487]
Some of my objections to the position were, that its length was too great for our force; that it prevented offensive movements, except at great disadvantage; and that it was untenable after the guns of Yorktown were silenced -- a result admitted to be inevitable by all our officers -- from the enemy's great superiority in artillery. York River being thus opened, a large fleet of transports and five or six hundred batteaux would enable him to turn us in a few hours.
It seemed to me that there were but two objects in remaining in the Peninsula: the possibility of an advance upon us by the enemy; and gaining time, in which arms might be received and troops organized. I determined, therefore, to hold the position as long as it could be done without exposing our troops to the fire of the powerful artillery which, I doubted not, would be brought to bear upon them.
I believed that, after silencing our batteries on York River, the enemy would attempt to turn us by moving up to West Point by water.
Circumstances indicating that the enemy's batteries were nearly ready, I directed the troops to move toward Williamsburg on the night of the 3d by the roads from Yorktown and Warwick Court-House. They were assembled about Williamsburg by noon on the 4th, and were ordered to march by the road to Richmond, Major-General Magruder leading.
Early in the afternoon the cavalry rear-guard on the Yorktown road was driven in, and rapidly followed by the enemy. Brigadier-General McLaws was sent with the brigades of Kershaw and Semmes to support the cavalry. He met the enemy near the line of little works constructed by Major-General Magruder's forethought, made his dispositions with prompt courage and skill, and quickly drove the Federal troops from the field, in spite of disparity of numbers. I regret that no report of this handsome affair has been made by General McLaws. Major-General Magruder's. march was too late to permit that of Major-General Smith's the same afternoon. His division moved at daybreak on the 5th, in heavy rain and deep mud.
About sunrise the rear-guard was again attacked. The
[p. 488]
action gradually increased in magnitude, until about three o'clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, requested that a part of General Hill's troops might be sent to his aid. Upon this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a mere spectator; for Longstrect's clear head and brave heart left me no apology for interference. For details of the action, see the accompanying reports.
Our wounded, and many of those of the enemy, were placed in hospitals and residences in Williamsburg. Major-General Smith's division reached Barhamsville, eighteen miles; and Major-General Magruder's (commanded by Brigadier-General D. R. Jones) the Diascund Bridge on the Chickahominy road on that day. Those of Longstreet and Hill marched from Williamsburg, twelve miles, on the 6th. On that evening Major-General Smith reported that the enemy's troops were landing in force on the south side of York River, near West Point. On the following morning the army was concentrated near Barhamsville. In the mean time it had been ascertained that the enemy occupied a thick and extensive wood between Barhamsville and their landing-place. Brigadier-General Whiting was directed by General Smith to dislodge him, which was handsomely done -- the brigade of Hood, and part of that of Hampton, performed the service. You are respectfully referred, for details, to the accompanying reports.
Want of means of subsistence compelled the army to move on toward Richmond; the divisions of Smith and Magruder taking the road by New Kent Court-House, those of Longstreet and Hill that along the Chickahominy. On the evening of the 9th the army halted; its left near the Crossroads on the New Kent Court-House road, and its right near the Long Bridge. In this position the York River Railroad supplied us from Richmond.
On the 15th the attack upon the battery at Drury's Bluff by the enemy's gunboats suggested to me the necessity of so placing the army as to be prepared for the enemy's advance up the river or on the south side, as well as from the direction of West Point. We therefore crossed the
[p. 489]
Chickahominy, to take a position six or seven miles from Richmond. That ground being unfavorable, the present position was taken on the 17th. Had the enemy beaten us on the 5th, as he claims to have done, the army would have lost most of its baggage and artillery. We should have been pursued from Williamsburg, and intercepted from West Point. Our troops engaged, leaving Williamsburg on the following morning, marched but twelve miles that day; and the army on its march to the Cross-roads averaged less than ten miles a day. Had not the action of the 5th been, at the least, discouraging to the enemy, we would have been pursued on the road, and turned by way of West Point. About four hundred of our wounded were left in Williamsburg, because they were not in condition to be moved. Nothing else was left which we had horses to draw away. Five pieces, found by the chief quartermaster at the Williamsburg wharf, were abandoned for want of horses and harness. In the three actions above mentioned our troops displayed high courage, and, on the march, endured privations and hardships with admirable cheerfulness.
Most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston, General.
General Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Letter from Joseph Eggleston Johnston, May 7, 1862
Headquarters Barhamsville,
May 7, 1862.
General: The enemy has a large fleet of gunboats (seven iron-clads) and transports at West Point. He has been landing troops and artillery under his guns, but in a position in which we cannot reach him. The want of provision, and of any mode of obtaining it here -- still more the dearth of forage -- makes it impossible to wait to attack him while landing; the sight of the iron-clad boats makes me apprehensive for Richmond, too -- so I move on in two columns, one by the New Kent road, under Major-General Smith; the other by that of the Chickahominy, under Major-General Longstreet. The battle of Williamsburg seems to have prevented the enemy from following from that direction. All the prisoners were of Heintzelman's corps, except a few of the last, who said they belong to Sumner's.
[p. 486]
Fresh troops seemed to be arriving upon the field continually during the day. Yours, most respectfully,
(Signed)
J. E. Johnston
The letters which appear below are letters written by or on the behalf Capt. John A. Ritter during his service in the 49th Indiana Volunteers from Oct. 1861 to December 1861. The letters were transcribed from the original letters or copies of the original letters in the possession of descendents of Capt. John A. Ritter. The letters appear exactly as written. No effort was made to correct apparent misspelled words. Many of these apparent errors may be the result of differences between modern styles of handwriting and styles in use during the 19th century. Blanks were inserted where words or phrases were totally illegible and underlining was used for words or phrases for which the correct interpretation was questionable.
February 9, 1864
My dear Mother,
I received a letter from Henry a couple of days ago, and that, and the letter from you, are all that have so far found me out. I suppose others are on the way, and so, I hope, is the coffee. Yesterday, I received an invitation to dine up at old Ewell's at five. Of course, I accepted, and had quite a pleasant dinner. Pitched into the vegetables in a way that must have astonished Madam Ewell. It was my first chance at long forage that I have had since in the Camp.
I was presented to Miss Brown, Mrs. Ewell's daughter, a dark-skinned, dark-eyed, clever girl, but not very pretty; a very large head, and a stout roll-about figure. I had previously sent up the letter and palmetto. She was very much obliged to Mary for sending it, but wants some instruction as to preparing it for plaiting. The palmetto is very dry and stiff. It will, I think, require soaking in water to give it softness and pliancy enough to be worked. She wants Mary to give her full directions--says that she will write Mary in a few days.
The General's house is six miles from my quarters, and the ride a pretty cold one. Altogether it was a very pleasant dinner. Mrs. Ewell is very agreeable and clever, decidedly smart, and must have been very handsome when she was young. The General is not what he was--so all that know him say. The loss of his limb has seriously affected his usefulness and even impaired his mind. His artificial leg is as poor a concern as I ever saw.
The Yankees gave us a slight turn on Saturday. They drove in our pickets in the morning, crossing the Rapidan under cover of a heavy fog. I paid a visit to General Johnson yesterday, and he gave me a full account of it. About five brigades crossed. It was nearly dark before we got our troops up to the line, and it was then too late to attack. The night was as black as Erebus, but everyone anticipated an engagement in the morning. During the night, they quietly returned to the other side of the river. They had no artillery or wagons with them, and consequently could move without noise. General Johnson said he was within two hundred yards of their lines, and yet did not hear them moving.
During the early part of Saturday night and early Sunday morning, troops and artillery were moved to the front and things looked lively for a little while. For although the Yankees had re-crossed the river, they were in line of battle on the opposite side, with their artillery in position. So both sides stood until Sunday night, when the Yankees moved back to their old quarters. General Lee was quite anxious that they should attack, as our position was a very strong one, and he said that if we could not thrash them out there, we could not do it anywhere. By Monday morning everything was quiet again.
We are having glorious weather. No snow, no sleet, and rain only one day since I have been here. Bright sunny days, but very cold. There is an immense fire in my room, and yet water freezes if you drop it on the door. The roads are as hard as marble. They were in terrible order, and the hard weather has made them solid. One night's snow, and two days sun would put them knee deep in mud.
All the Yankees, dead and prisoners, in the little brush on Saturday are foreigners. Not a real live Yankee among them. General Johnson said he had a good deal of chat with them. Said they re-enlisted to jump the bounty of a thousand dollars. That out of a regiment of three hundred which had enlisted, only forty came back, the rest jumped the bounty, and that since then, they paid the bounty in instalments.
I have seen no one yet who knows, or can form any idea about what we will do when Spring opens. It is thought here that Meade will fall back to Washington as soon as the weather is mild enough to warrant a movement; that he is weak, and will be unable to hold the line he now occupies. If he does, of course, we move too, and perhaps may keep moving on until we go into Pennsylvania again.
I wrote you to send me that coffee. I turned it over to the mess, for of course, I could not have coffee for myself alone. I will send you money every now and then, so as to have funds in your hands. I have no use for it here. Can't buy a thing. I did manage to buy two cabbages about as big as your fist, for two dollars and a half a piece. Turnips were three for one dollar, white peas one dollar and a half a quart. Rather steep that, so I gave up my vision of pease soup, and settled down on the bacon and greens.
You may as well let Nash turn my black cutaway coat, but tell him not to take in as much of it as he did of the black frock coat. He made that so small that I could hardly squeeze into it. Tell Nat to abuse him, and blow him up, and give him the coat to turn.
Kind regards to all at the Canteys.
Yours affectionately
J.C.
P.S. William says he paid Mary the servant at the Southerland's who cared for the terrapins. Inquire into it, and let me know.
Mary Conner Moffet, editor, Letters of General James Conner, C.S.A., (Columbia, South Carolina: R.L. Bryan, Co., 1950), 110-113.
My dear Mother:
How is the jaundice coming on? Better, I hope, and that you don't see everything out of yellow eyes. In the days when we used to have a good deal of it in camp, the sovereign specific was whiskey. You had better take to tippling for a while, and call every day for your whiskey toddy, strong, and without nutmeg?
The staff Bill, which has passed both Houses, is creating some stir in the army, and especially in our corps. Mrs. Ewell, with the best intentions in the world no doubt, has very seriously injured old Ewell, and the very cleverness, which would at other times render her agreeable, has only tended to make her more unpopular. She manages everything, from the General's affairs down to the courier's, who carries his dispatches. All say they are under petticoat government.
The new Staff Bill gives additional rank to the staff of the generals, and old Ewell, acted upon by feminine influences, is dead bent on pushing Campbell Brown, Mrs. Ewell's son, up to be a Colonel, and to do it, he is trying to engineer his other staff officers out of the way. There was a knot of staff officers around my fire the other evening, all discussing their chances, when little Turner, Ewell's other aide, said: "Old Ewell told me he had never exposed Campbell but once, and then was so miserable until he came back, that he did not know what to do: "If anything had happened to him, I could never have looked at his Mother again, sir". "Hang him," said Turner, "he never thinks of my Mother, I supppose, for he pops me around, no matter how hot the fire is." A little after this speech, Turner left, and another staff officer remarked: "Well, Turner is safe, but I am in a tight place. Campbell Brown hangs on to his Mother's petticoats, and Turner is engaged to the little Brown girl, and she will prize him up, but I have to fight against the pair." I had a good laugh at them, all in trepidation about the manoeuvering of two women, and one fond foolish old man. Old Ewell is worse in love than any eighteen year old that you ever saw.
I see Congress has also passed the Currency Bill, the Tax Bill, and Military Bill--three very important Acts--and severe as they unquestionably are, I think they will do good. Even the Examiner, bitterly hostile as it is to Congress and the Administration, says they are wise and prudent measures, and congratulates Congress on its success. The effect, I think, will be good in the North. The re-enlistment of our troops, without bounty or increased pay, is in striking contrast with their scanty re-enlistments, even under the stimulus of large bounties and long furloughs. That has evinced to them that the spirit of the army is up to the mark, and now the passage, after long deliberation, of so severe a currency and tax Bill, will show that the spirit of our whole people is firm and resolved.
No nation voluntarily subjects itself to such taxation and such sacrifices, unless thoroughly in earnest. They must be possessed, inspired, with an unalterable firmness of purpose when they accept such burdens as a means of obtaining their object. I know nothing that will tend so much to convince the North that we are prepared for the worst, and intend to fight it out to the last, as these Acts. Unromantic as it sounds, taxation is the test of patriotism, and people that will stand the money test will endure anything.
The North, once fully convinced of the earnestness with which we fight this battle, will soon commence to count the cost to themselves. The army is very confident, very sanguine and it would do good to croakers if they could spend a week or two in camp and talk to the men.
Mary Conner Moffet, editor, Letters of General James Conner, C.S.A., (Columbia, South Carolina: R.L. Bryan, Co., 1950), 114-116.
Saturday May 14, 1864
Near Spottsylvania Court House
My dear Mother:
An opportunity offers for reaching the mail from which we have been cut off of some days, so I will give you the news to date.
We left camp on the third and fourth; have been fighting ever since. It is an unprecedented struggle; not so much one battle, but a series of battles. Grant was evidently endeavoring to march past Lee and get position, and thus force Lee to attack him, but "Robert" was too smart for him, and struck Grant as he was on the march, and forced him to fight just then and there. In that fight, we whipped them. We drove them back, and then built breastworks, and they charged them furiously, coming up again and again to the attack after the most terrible punishment. We just slaughtered them, and with comparatively slight loss to ourselves.
Saturday we made off to the right, and came to Spottsylvania Court House, and have been fighting here ever since--same style--we behind breastworks, and they attacking, latterly all of the prisoners full of whiskey. Our loss is heavy in officers. Poor Frank Gaillard killed; General Jenkins also, and McGowan wounded. Don't be uneasy about me. You know that I am in the life insurance also. Courier won't wait, so good-bye. Love to all.
J.C.
Mary Conner Moffet, editor, Letters of General James Conner, C.S.A., (Columbia, South Carolina: R.L. Bryan, Co., 1950), 127-128
Dear Mrs. Brune,
I wrote you two letters on two consecutive days about a fortnight ago giving you a full description of our life here, but maybe the description was too full and not allowed to go. Since your letter to me I have received another Quarterly Review (October) for which I thank you and for all your other kindnesses. Since I last wrote my condition here has been considerably ameliorated by having the parole of the Island granted for the purpose of distributing the clothing purchased by the cotton from the South. There are two other field officers besides myself paroled for that purpose and you can well imagine that we enjoy the privilege to the full and trudge about in the rain and snow just for the pleasure of living outside of the prison walls. I have the happiness also my dear friend to tell you that I have the promise of leaving here for exchange on the second boat that goes which will probably be about the middle of March. That is a long way off and you must not stop writing to me, but it is the greatest happiness to be able to see a definite end to our imprisonment. There are chances of disappointment of course, but I hope and expect to get off at that time. If I do I will carry with me the warmest and kindest remembrance of you and your sympathy and friendship and will always feel towards you as if you were my sister. I had a note from your friend Miss Nicholas in relation to a friend of hers, Major Carr. I replied to it and unfortunately addressed her as Mrs. Nicolas; having been led into that error by Major Carr. Please make my apologies. Welford Corbin is well and I shall try hard to get him off in the same boat that takes me. Can I do anything for you in Dixie? If so you know how much pleasure it will give me. I will write again soon. God bless you. Ever your affect. friend,
Jno. M. Maury, Lt. Col. C.S.A., Prisoner of War.
I take my pen to drop you a few lines to inform you that I am well at this time and I hope that these few words on my lines may find you in the enjoyment of the blessing of a kind preserved I am in the best of spirits now that we I have been in ?? Since I left home the last time and all the boys ar in good helth and fell determined to make a good Show if they get a chance to do so I would like to be out in th front if they woud not put us throug to hard but I know that they will put us throug from the ?? we left Louisville on the 7th and came her by rail and got her on the 9th and had the pleasure of meeting our friend daniel Skinner from Dry Run and you may think that we was not a little Surprised to meet him So far from home and all the boys was glad to her from the valley and all the rest of the friend in cold Pennsylvania We are at this time encamped 2 miles from this place and expect to go to Murfresboroug in a few days as the troops ar all gon up and I think that there is a battle in contemplation and you may look for stirring news from the department of the Cumberland as the Commanding General is in earnest about the matter an if the war will end it must come from the rest for the army of the potmoac is not worth a tinker cause as far as fighting is concerened for they ar defeted evry time they so fight and I think that they had better let us do the work and them do the talking for that is the best that my an at there is strong fortifications around this place and ar still strengthening them and soon they will def the Rebels to take Nashville and all the rest of the country we can easily defend all the troops think the war must end soon I will now close for this time as I must do some washing this afternoon I am as ever your brother Martin Piper
To Daniel R Piper
Dry Run Franklin PA
Martin Piper Nashville
Co. SGT PA Cav Tenn
Write Soon
give me the news
Bro Daniel dear sir I had the pleasure of recg your note of the 2d inst an the 15th which was eagerly perused by brother Mark and myself I was glad to hear of your good health but while you are in the enjoyment of was sorry to hear of the ill health of your family We are all well at this period hoping if this messenger reaches you it may fnd you and the family in the enjoyment of the same The weather is getting very warm but the nights are very cool I am sorry to hear of our last defeat an th Potomac I see by the spirit and times that some of your Valley boys have shared the fate that soldiers are so apt to share we have been very lucky so far and I hope that this protection may still continue I also see that William Gaston is wounded in the thigh some times I think that this war will not close soon and I do not think I think rong Joseph McBitty and Conrad J Echenroad are in Landalle and have bee there for one month after harsed it appears that horses are ver hard to be had I recd a letter from uncle Joseph Piper and also one from Father stating that they ware all well at the period I had ritten to you not long times but you did not state whether you had recd it or not I hope you have We are expecting an all act at this place almost daily we stand picket in sight of other they ware up at the outpost of our advance to day with a Flag of truce far what purpose I did not learn they are in with a flag of truce allmost evry three ar four days we are kept very buiddy hear I am an picket every third day and some times every other day I was sorry to hear of the ill health of Samuel she are is family but I hope by this time they are in good health agane I suppose that the Dayles Town folks are in good spirits I have not heard any thing of David Muradath since I have left the valley but I suppose he is well and in the land and among the livin I have much more to write but time will not permit me so I have the honor to be yours Jonathan Piper
To Daniel R. Piper
PS and soon and give me the general news
Direct Jonathan Piper
This is the Co. F 9th Reg PA Cavalry
Nashville Tenn
you do not need to have that care of those officers on it
Report of Surg. Jonathan Letterman,U.S. Army, Medical Director, Army of the Potomac.O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43] -- Gettysburg Campaign
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE,Camp near Culpeper Court-House, Va., October 3, 1863.
Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,A. A. G., Army of the Potomac
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report on the operations of the medical department of this army at the battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 2, and 3:
As the subject of transportation has an important bearing upon the manner in which the wounded are attended to after a battle, it is necessary to make some allusion to the manner in which this department was supplied. It is scarcely necessary to say that if-the transportation is not sufficient to enable the officers of the department to conduct it properly, the effect must fall upon the wounded.
In the autumn of 1862, I investigated the subject very carefully, with the view to the adoption of some system instead of the irregular method and want of system which prior to that time was in vogue, to limit the amount necessary, and to have that amount always available. The transportation was one wagon to each regiment and one to each brigade. This gave all that was required, and it was not too much; and, it may be remarked, was a reduction of nearly one-half of that which had been in use prior to that time. This system worked well. At the battle of Chancellorsville, the department had upon the left bank of the Rappahannock means sufficient, had it been allowed to use them, for taking care of many more wounded than there came under its control.
On June 19, while the army was on the march, as it were, from before Fredericksburg to some unknown point north of the Potomac River, the headquarters being near Fairfax Court-House, Va., the transportation of the department was cut down by Major-General Hooker on an average of two wagons in a brigade, in opposition to my opinion, expressed verbally and in writing. This reduction necessitated the turning in of a large portion of the supplies, tents, &c., which were necessary for the proper care of the wounded in the event of a battle. Three wagons were assigned to a brigade of 1,500 men, doing away with regimental wagons. This method in its practical working is no system at all, as it is liable to constant changes, and proved to be, what I supposed at the time it would be, a failure to give the department the means necessary to conduct its operations.
The headquarters left Fairfax Court-House on June 26 ultimo, for some point as yet unknown in Maryland or Pennsylvania.
On the 25th of that month, I directed Assistant Surgeon [Jeremiah B.] Brinton, U.S. Army, to proceed to Washington, and obtain the supplies I had ordered the medical purveyor to have put up, and there await orders.
On the 26th, he was ordered to proceed with them to Frederick. This step was taken to obviate the want of supplies consequent upon the reduction of transportation. At this date it was not known that the army would be near Frederick; still, the risk had to be run, and the event justified the order, Dr. Brinton arriving at Frederick on June 28, the day after the arrival of headquarters there, with twenty-five army wagon loads of such supplies as would be most required in case of a battle. The train with these supplies followed that of headquarters until we reached Taneytown.
On July 1, the trains were not permitted to go farther, and, on the 2d, were ordered farther to the rear, near Westminster.
On the 1st, it was ordered that "corps commanders and the commander of the Artillery Reserve will at once send to the rear all their trains (excepting ammunition wagons and ambulances), parking them between Union Mills and Westminster."
On the 2d, these trains were ordered still farther to the rear, and parked near Westminster, nearly 25 miles distant from the battlefield. The effect of this order was to deprive the department almost wholly of the means for taking care of the wounded until the result of the engagement of the 2d and 3d was fully known. I do not instance the effect of this order, excepting to show the influence of it upon the department. The expediency of the order I, of course, do not pretend to question, but its effect was to deprive this department of the appliances necessary for the proper care of the wounded, without which it is as impossible to have them properly attended to as it is to fight a battle without ammunition. In most of the corps the wagons exclusively used for medicines moved with the ambulances, so that the medical officers had a sufficient supply of dressings, chloroform, and such articles until the supplies came up, but the tents and other appliances, which are as necessary, were not available until July 5.
The supply of Dr. Brinton reached the field on the evening of July 4. This supply, together with the supplies ordered by me on July 5 and 6, gave more than was required. The reports of Dr. Brinton and Dr. [John H.] Taylor show that I ordered more supplies than were used up to the 18th of July, when the hospitals were taken from under my control. Surgeon Taylor, medical inspector of this army, who was ordered on July 29 to Gettysburg, to examine into the state of affairs there, reports to me that he made "the question of supplies a subject of special inquiry among the medical officers who had remained with the wounded during and for a month subsequent to the battle. The testimony in every instance was conclusive that at no time had there been any deficiency, but, on the contrary, that the supply furnished by the medical purveyor had been and still continued to be abundant." This is, perhaps, sufficient to show that not only were supplies ordered in advance, but that they were on hand when required, notwithstanding the difficulty in consequence of the inability of the railroad to meet the requirements made upon it, until after General Haupt took charge of it on July 9. I have not deemed it necessary to present any tables showing the amounts ordered and issued, considering what I have just given as ample enough to show the action of this department. The chief want was tents and other appliances for the better care of the wounded. I had an interview with the commanding general on the evening of July 3, after the battle was over, to obtain permission to order up the wagons containing the tents, &c. This request he did not think expedient to grant but in part, allowing one-half the wagons to come to the front; the remainder were brought up as soon as it was considered by him proper to permit it. To show the result of the system adopted upon my recommendation regarding transportation, and the effect of the system of field hospitals, I may here instance the hospital of the Twelfth Corps, in which the transportation was not reduced nor the wagons sent to the rear at Gettysburg.
Surgeon [John] McNulty, medical director of that corps, reports that "it is with extreme satisfaction that I can assure you that it enabled me to remove the wounded from the field, shelter, feed them, and dress their wounds within six hours after the battle ended, and to have every capital operation performed within twenty-four hours after the injury was received. I can, I think, safely say that such would have been the result in other corps had the same facilities been allowed--a result not to have been surpassed, if equaled, in any battle of magnitude that has ever taken place.
A great difficulty always exists in having food for the wounded. By the exertions of Colonel [Henry F.] Clarke, chief commissary, 30,000 rations were brought up on July 4 and distributed to the hospitals. Some of the hospitals were supplied by the commissaries of the corps to which they belonged. Arrangements were made by him to have supplies in abundance brought to Gettysburg for the wounded; he ordered them, and if the railroad could have transported them they would have been on hand.
Over 650 medical officers are reported as present for duty at that battle. These officers were engaged assiduously, day and night, with little rest, until the 6th, and in the Second Corps until July 7, in attendance upon the wounded. The labor performed by these officers was immense. Some of them fainted from exhaustion, induced by over-exertion, and others became ill from the same cause. The skill and devotion shown by the medical officers of this army were worthy of all commendation; they could not be surpassed. Their conduct as officers and as professional men was admirable. Thirteen of them were wounded, one of whom (Asst. Surg. W. S. Moore, Sixty-first Ohio Volunteers, Eleventh Corps) died on July 6 from the effects of his wounds, received on the 3d. The idea, very prevalent, that medical officers are not exposed to fire, is thus shown to be wholly erroneous. The greater portion of the surgical labor was performed before the army left. The time for primary operations had passed, and what remained to be done was to attend to making the men comfortable, dress their wounds, and perform such secondary operations as from time to time might be necessary. One hundred and six medical officers were left behind when the army left; no more could be left, as it was expected that another battle would within three or four days take place, and in all probability as many wounded thrown upon our hands as at the battle of the 2d and 3d, which had just occurred. No reliance can be placed on surgeons from civil life during or after a battle. They cannot or will not submit to the privations and discomforts which are necessary, an-d the great majority think more of their own personal comfort than they do of the wounded. Little more can be said of those officers who have for a long period been in hospitals. I regret to make such a statement, but it is a fact and often a practical one. Dr. [Henry] Janes, who was left in charge of the hospitals at Gettysburg, reports that quite a number of surgeons came and volunteered their services, but "they were of little use." This fact is so well known in this army that medical officers prefer to do the work rather than have them present, and the wounded men, too, are much better satisfied to be attended by their own surgeons. I, however, asked the Surgeon-General, July 7, to send 20 medical officers to report to Dr. Janes, hoping they might prove of some benefit, under the direction of the medical officers of this army who had been left behind. I cannot learn that they were ever sent.Dr. Janes was left in general charge of the hospitals, and, to provide against contingencies, was directed, if he could not communicate with me, to do so directly with the Surgeon-General, so that he had full power to call directly upon the Surgeon-General to supply any want that might arise.
The ambulance corps throughout the army acted in the most commendable manner during those days of severe labor. Notwithstanding the great number of wounded, amounting to 14,193, I have it from the most reliable authority and from my own observation that not one wounded man of all that number was left on the field within our lines early on the morning of July 4. A few were found after daylight beyond our farthest pickets, and these were brought in, although the ambulance men were fired upon when engaged in this duty by the enemy, who were within easy range. In addition to this duty, the line of battle was of such a character, resembling somewhat that of a horseshoe, that it became necessary to remove most of the hospitals farther to the rear as the enemy's fire drew nearer.
This corps did not escape unhurt; 1 officer and 4 privates were killed and 17 wounded while in the discharge of their duties. A number of horses were killed and wounded, and some ambulances injured. These facts will show the commendable and efficient manner in which the duties devolving upon this corps were performed, and great credit is deservedly due to the officers and men for their praiseworthy conduct. I know of no battle-field from which wounded men have been so speedily and so carefully removed, and I have every reason to feel satisfied that their duties could not have been performed better or more fearlessly.Before the army left Gettysburg, and knowing that the wounded had been brought in from the field, six ambulances and four wagons were ordered to be left from each corps, to convey the wounded from their hospitals to the railroad depot, for transportation to the other hospitals. From the Cavalry Corps but four ambulances were ordered, as this corps had a number captured by the enemy at or near Hanover a few days previous. I was informed by General Ingalls that the railroad to Gettysburg would be in operation on the 6th, and upon this based my action. Had such been the case, this number would have been sufficient. As it proved that this was not in good running order for some time after that date, it would have been better to have left more ambulances. I acted on the best information that could be obtained.
The number of our wounded, from the most reliable information at my command, amounted to 14,193. The number of Confederate wounded who fell into our hands was 6,802, making the total number of wounded thrown by that battle upon this department 20,995. The wounded of July 1 fell into the hands of the enemy, and came under our control on the 4th of that month. Instruments and medical supplies belonging to the First and Eleventh Corps were in some m-stances taken from the medical officers of those corps by the enemy.Previous to leaving Gettysburg, I, on July 5 and 6, ordered supplies to be sent to Frederick from Washington and Philadelphia, to meet the wants of the department in the event of another battle, which there was every reason to suppose would occur shortly after the army left Gettysburg. While at the latter place, I asked the Surgeon-General to have 50 medical officers ready to meet me at such a point as I should thereafter indicate.
On July 7, I desired them to be sent to Frederick. Late in the night of July 9, 47 reported. These officers were designed to make up, as far as possible, the deficiency of medical officers existing in consequence of the large detail from this army left at Gettysburg.
Tents were ordered by my request, and the corps supplied as far as their transportation would permit, and the remainder kept in reserve. It is not necessary to enter into a detailed list of the articles ordered and on hand ready for the anticipated battle. I have the orders in my office, and it is with pleasure I can state for the information of the commanding general that, notwithstanding the short time in which I had to make the necessary preparations, this department was, when near Boonsborough, fully prepared to take care of the wounded of another battle of as great magnitude as that which this army heat just passed through at Gettysburg.
It is unnecessary to do more than make an allusion to the difficulties which surrounded this department at the engagement at Gettysburg. The inadequate amount of transportation; the impossibility of having that allowed brought to the front; the cutting off our communication with Baltimore, first by way of Frederick and then by way of Westminster; the uncertainty, even as late as the morning of July 1, as to a battle taking place at all, and, if it did, at what point it would occur; the total inadequacy of the railroad to Gettysburg to meet the demands made upon it after the battle was over; the excessive rains which fell at that time-- all conspired to render the management of the department one of exceeding difficulty, and yet abundance of medical supplies were on hand at all times; rations were provided, shelter obtained, as soon as the wagons were allowed to come to the front, although not as abundant as necessary on account of the reduced transportation. Medical officers, attendants, ambulances, and wagons left when the army started for Maryland, and the wounded were well taken care of, and especially so when we consider the circumstances under which the battle was fought and the length and severity of the engagement.
The conduct of the medical officers was admirable. Their labors not only began with the beginning of the battle, but lasted long after the battle had ended. When other officers had time to rest, they were busily at work--and not merely at work, but working earnestly and devotedly.
I have not considered it necessary to give in this report other than a very general outline of the operations of this department at that time. To enter into a detailed account of them would, I presume, be more than the commanding general would desire.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,JON A. LETTERMAN,Medical Director.
[Source: "Official Records of the War of the Rebellion"