This was the real christening fight of the regiment, and was badly managed. In the assault on greatly superior numbers, the brigade was marched in line of battle in quick time through the forest which was fiercely shelled, as though at drill, the men not breaking -- at least not in the Tenth Vermont -- until within about seventy-five yards of the enemy's unusually strong and favorably posted skirmish line behind a very high rail fence in the edge of a large cleared field in the midst of the forest, a corner of which field opposite the three left companies of the regiment formed an acute angle slightly less than a right angle, the two long sides of which opposite us being skirted by a Virginia rail fence eight rails or more in height, in the edge of the woods, considerably higher than a man's head. [*]
When in the woods in a ravine running parallel to the long base of the triangle directly in front -- the sharp angle to the right -- with gradually upward sloping ground toward the enemy about seventy-five yards away, the three left companies under severe
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fire had considerably curved to the rear, each being a little further back than the one on its right, as usual in such circumstances, which brought Company B being on the left of the regiment, not only exposed to the severest fire, but the furtherest to the rear of any. With reason, as unwisely no order had been given to fire in Company B, and the men being inexperienced and supposing they had got to await orders to do so as at drill, the line commenced to waver, when Colonel Albert B. Jewett approached from the rear and cried out loudly, among other things: "Company B, what's the matter?" or to that effect. As a matter of fact there was matter enough, which he soon found after arriving, as he not only wisely sought cover himself, but someone ordered the men to do so by lying down. There were no troops immediately on the left of Company B and it drew the fire of the enemy's Infantry behind the fence, not only in front, but for some distance to the left; and as the ground occupied by the enemy was considerably higher the situation was most trying. I am aware it is claimed that the regiment was in the centre of the brigade, [*] but if it was, the regiment on its left was out of sight, and as it was almost a dead level along the ravine as far as the eye could reach through the woods from Company B which was on the left of the regiment, it couldn't be seen by me. It is not probable this
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and many other similar errors are the faults of the painstaking and estimable Historian Dr. E. M. Haynes, but it is more probably due to erroneous official reports of battles of regimental, brigade and other commanders as well as unreliable verbal reports, etc., which when once in history are hard to correct.
When forming, too, for the assault, Lieut. Ezra Stetson who was in command of Company B stood in front of it, and supposing he was going to advance in that position, I (then Second Lieutenant Company D, but assigned to fight with my old Company B that day), also took my position in front of the Company expecting to advance in the same way, but was finally ordered just before advancing, by Stetson, to go to the right of the front rank in line, where I supposed in my ignorance of warfare, although a fair tactician, I had got to remain and did until the line broke in the second advance, Stetson meantime being a novice in fighting men in battle, going to the rear of the Company. As it may be convenient for the good of the service for some to cite this battle, together with others, to Congressman as an important reason why men with no experience in battle should never be placed in high position to command men especially in the regular army where it can generally be avoided, I feel constrained to state that the derisive smile and expression on the men's faces, etc., as I turned to obey Stetson's order plainly showed that they disapproved of any such arrangement and
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persistently hung back in the advance in consequence, which to say the least, was very embarrassing to a proud spirit, my pride being very much centered in my old Company, which I knew, if properly handled, would give a good account of itself. Several times I was greatly tempted to go in front of the men and lead them, as it was plain to be seen they sensibly wouldn't be driven at a slow gait into battle like so many lambs for slaughter without even being given the command to fire when within a stone's throw of the enemy, which with deadly aim was shooting them down deliberately, for there was nothing to prevent its doing so on our part, and why shouldn't it do so? It was war, that's what we were there for, and being veteran fighters they took advantage of the situation. Who wouldn't? The only trouble with us was there wasn't anyone with authority from the highest officer down on that part of the line, who knew how to fight the command or if there was they didn't do it. But they were not to blame for it. Who was? It was the Congress which makes the laws for the Government of the army; it has never enacted a law as important as it is, making it impossible to appoint men to high army positions who have never been in battle enough to know how to take care of their men, or to tell the officers of their command how to do so.
But realizing that to lead the Company and make a dash for the fence would be virtually taking the
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command from my superior officer, and only at that time having a crude idea of such things even in such an emergency, I held my peace, although the comparatively simple act of leading men in battle in the circumstances, as some Company Commanders did in this fight, would have been much more satisfactory to my troubled spirit than otherwise. As First Sergeant it was generally acknowledged I had made Company B the best drilled and disciplined Company in the regiment, and feeling much genuine pride in the Company I had never felt more anxious for it than in this battle, as I wanted it to give a good account of itself as a good fighting Company as well, which it did in the latter part of the battle, when it largely went over the fence in an endeavor to help make the star movement of the day, but which it failed in helping to do, because of the weakness of some of the left Company Commanders of the regiment. Although General Wm. H. Morris in his official report of the fight cites this movement as due to enthusiasm on the part of the men on the left of the Tenth Vermont, had he been on that part of the line he would not only have commended it in stronger terms than he did, but if a good strategist would have insisted on the movement being executed as if it was worth while to engage the enemy at all here -- which is now greatly doubted as Meade's army wasn't then ready for a general engagement -- it was certainly worth while to try and turn the enemy's
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flank at this point, which could have been done by advancing the three left companies of the regiment by a two-thirds right turn or wheel across the before-mentioned angle to the second fence. The enemy understood the importance of the move, which was one reason doubtless that made them contest so stubbornly the first line of fence. This we tried to do and in the second assault the men, led by some of the most daring wisely broke and made a dash for the first fence and over it half across the open field of the triangle to the second fence when we were recalled to the first behind which most had stopped and opened fire, including Stetson, Captain Hiram R. Steele and others. I was the only officer over the fence, so far as seen by me, and had fearlessly endeavored seeing at a glance an opportunity for an effective flank movement which would greatly relieve the entire brigade to the right to take the second line of fence on the opposite side of the triangle, which was just what was needed, and which could have been done if the movement had been supported with vim by the entire left wing of the regiment. During the day private G. D. Storrs was killed, and Sergeant H. M. Pierce, of Montpelier, and privates John Blanchard and Lafayette G. Ripley, of Barre, Peter Bover, H. W. Crossett, J. M. Mather and W. M. Thayer, and perhaps others of Company B, all brave good men, were so badly wounded as to disable most of them, such as did not die, for the balance of
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the war for duty at the front; but two or more of these died of their wounds.
Feeling nettled, although not in command of Company B, and not responsible for its behavior, at Colonel Jewett's brusque manner towards it in the ravine, when it was discovered that the flank movement before mentioned, would be a failure for want of support, in order to say I had been the furtherest to the front of anyone over the fence or in the regiment, I foolishly ran forward under heavy fire a few steps after ordered back, to a big stump, hit it with my sword savagely, as I was disgusted at not being fully supported, when on turning round I found myself alone with bullets flying about me faster than ever, and the men rapidly scaling the fence twenty-five yards in rear on the left in full retreat from the angle. The men of Company B had gone the furtherest ahead of any over the fence, Stetson and others repeatedly calling, "Come back! Come back!" As usual, whenever there was an exceedingly hot place on the line of battle in our front, Alexander Scott, A. H. Crown and others of the Burlington Company (D), as well as Z. M. Mansur, the Bruces, W. H. Blake, Judson Spofferd, J. W. Bancroft and others of Company K, were sure to be there fighting vigorously in the very front, as most of them were on this occasion. Fully forty or more men were with me from the three left companies, and it is regretted more of them can't be remembered
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by name, but the movement was too quickly executed, to go minutely into details, and forty years is a long time for a professional soldier where he has had to do with so many enlisted men meantime, to remember names.
Says General W. H. Morris in his official report of this battle which as a whole is not in the best judgment, although he was a brave, courageous man: "The enemy was holding a fence on the crest of a hill in our front. I ordered the Tenth Vermont to charge and take it, and the regiment advanced in gallant style and took the crest. The left wing in its enthusiasm having advanced too far beyond the fence, it was necessary to recall it * * * I cannot speak of the conduct of the officers and men with too much praise." The regiment's loss was seventy-one killed and wounded, of which eight were from Company B. This loss was as needless as the fight, as we suspected at the time, and as history has proved since.
Like most other engagements the most deserving who are generally on the fighting line where their work is not usually seen by such as can reward them in orders or otherwise, it was favorite staff officers and pets who were mentioned for gallantry in general orders afterwards. Had the men advanced less regularly in line as at drill, more independently and rapidly, firing meantime when in range of the enemy, our loss in comparison with what it was would have
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been insignificant. All the rest of the brigade had a less trying time of it than the three left companies of the Tenth Vermont, as they were advancing through the woods with no open field in front with two natural lines of breastworks, such as the formidable rail fences which bordered both long sides of the triangle before mentioned. This statement is in justice to the three left companies of the Tenth Vermont. The manner in which they stood the galling fire without breaking shows what splendid discipline they were under. I commanded all three companies afterwards in battle separately, and felt honored in doing so. There were few skulkers in these companies in any battle they were ever in when under my command.
This battle is another illustration of the folly of appointing men inexperienced in scientific warfare to high military office if it can be avoided, and it generally can be in time of peace, especially in the regular army. Every army, Corps, Division, Brigade and Regimental Commander, should be a man who has had enough actual experience in fighting to know how to take care of his men in battle. If such had been the case in this fight, comparatively few men would have been killed or wounded. It is criminal to make any man a general, especially in the regular army, who has not had enough experience in actual fighting to know how to fight his command without an unnecessary loss of life; and Congress which has the authority and is indirectly responsible in such matters,
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should make laws such as will render it impossible to do so except in emergencies, and until it does so every individual member of Congress will be criminally guilty before God for every man so sacrificed in battle. It is not known to me whose fault it was that orders were not given to advance more rapidly, and to fire sooner in the fight at Locust Grove.
I was absent wounded in Vermont at the time of the battle of Cedar Creek, Va., and only know that my regiment fought desperately and lost heavily in killed and wounded. Captain Lucian D. Thompson of Waterbury, Vt., was decapitated by a solid shot from the enemy and Captain Chester F. Nye, Adjutant Wyllys Lyman and Lieutenants George E. Davis, B. Brooks Clark, Austin W. Fuller and George P. Welch were wounded. From June 1st to October 19, 1864, we had seven officers killed which included all the officers who originally went out with my old Company B, twelve wounded and two captured, making twenty-one in all. Surely, the blood shed in the Tenth Vermont for the preservation of the Union should satisfy the most exacting that the regiment stood up
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to the rack all through the Civil War from the time it entered it.
After the morning surprise at Cedar Creek, Oct. 19, 1864, just a month after the battle of Winchester, the Sixth Corps, I was told by officers of my regiment afterwards, was the only unstampeded infantry organization in the command around which General H. G. Wright soon rallied the better part of the surprised little army which Sheridan, after his historic ride of "Twenty Miles Away" from Winchester, found awaiting him ready to advance and again punish the enemy which it most effectually did. It was the last fight in the valley of the Civil War, and it was fitting that the Sixth Corps should have been allowed so largely to have so brilliantly rung down the curtain on the great Civil War stage in this section. The Sixth Corps was the mainstay of Sheridan's brilliant little army in the Shenandoah Valley campaign, and no one knew it better than he. When the spring campaign opened in 1865, he wanted it at Five Forks again, but Grant wanted it, too, at the same time to break the backbone of the Confederacy by breaking its lines in front of Petersburg on that memorable morning of April 2nd, 1865, which was the greatest possible honor of the day, and it did it. When given his choice by Grant of any corps in the army of the Potomac, Sheridan again called for it, too, a few days later, April 6, 1865, at Sailor's Creek, Va., the last real battle fought in the Civil War by
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the Army of the Potomac, when the Sixth Corps was rushed forward by Grant's order at pell-mell speed, where in another of Sheridan's characteristic, snappy, short, effective, two-hour fights, it largely helped to capture several -- said to be eleven -- general officers, 13,000 [*] prisoners and a burning wagon train, almost an entire column, excepting about 2,000 of General Lee's fleeing veterans, including himself, three days before his surrender at Appomattox. It was fitting, too, here, that the Sixth Corps should largely fight this battle and thus again brilliantly and virtually finally ring down the stage curtain of the greatest war tragedy of modern times -- The Great Civil War.
Surely with all the brag and conceit in late years by members of other corps, that its corps was the best in the Army of the Potomac -- and the Second as well as the Fifth were fine corps, and probably both these and the Sixth Corps were about equal -- neither Grant nor Sheridan could have regarded the Sixth as an unreliable one, or second to any as a fighting corps however often members of other corps may conceitedly dub theirs the best in the army. And what other
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than the Sixth Corps can point to any such enviable repeated preferences on the part of both Grant and Sheridan, or to such a proud record in the closing scenes of the great rebellion? Would they not be glad to do so if they could? And still neither of the able commanders of the Sixth Corps -- Sedgwick and Wright -- have been honored by an appropriation for a monument by Congress in the capital city of the Nation which the Sixth Corps twice saved, once at the battle of the Monocacy, largely by the Third Division, July 9th, and again three days later largely by the First and Second Divisions at the battle in front of Ft. Stevens in the suburbs of Washington, July 12th, 1864, when Early came so near capturing the city.
I do not believe in being invidious, but having been satiated for years by the egotistic statements of the superior qualifications by members of other corps of their particular corps, especially in Washington, and knowing only too well from long experience that frequently true merit goes unrewarded in history and otherwise, because of an over-modest inclination to mention facts by those interested who can, when organizations and persons less worthy get more than is due by being more aggressive, is one of the reasons for my partially treating this matter. There was no corps, during the last few months of the war, to which Grant and Sheridan more frequently turned in emergencies than to the Sixth Corps, which is significant,
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as it shows their estimate of its merits as a reliable fighting corps, over all others. The Sixth Corps was ever proud of the Second and Fifth Corps and felt honored in being associated with such splendid organizations in the same army all through the Civil War, but the Sixth Corps yields the palm to no other in the whole Union Army east or west when it comes to fighting or any other soldierly qualifications pertaining to a model army corps.
Said General Grant in the closing scenes of the Civil War: "I can trust the Sixth Corps anywhere." Said General Sheridan: "Give me the Sixth Corps and I will charge anywhere."
This memorable siege extending over a period of several months, was full of exciting, eventful fights, but none more so than the final assault on the main works, April 2, 1865. For three nights the Sixth Corps, which had been selected by General Grant to break the main line of the formidable-looking fortifications in and near its front to its left, around Petersburg, because of its known reliability for any work assigned it, had been ordered out between the
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lines as noiselessly as possible about midnight, and directed to lie in line of battle on the ground about two hundred yards from the enemy's picket line for the purpose of a morning assault. The First Brigade of the Third Division composed of five regiments, the One Hundred and Sixth and One Hundred and Fifty-first New York, Fourteenth New Jersey, Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania and Tenth Vermont Volunteer Infantry, was formed in three lines, the Tenth Vermont being on the right and the One Hundred and Sixth New York on the left forming the front line, the brigade being on the left of the Division and Corps near Fort Fisher on the side towards Hatcher's Run. As the distance between the works of the belligerent forces was the least here of any point along the front of the Sixth Corps probably, as claimed by Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Damon, in his official report, the colors of the Tenth Vermont were the first over the enemy's works in the Third Division though it is difficult to understand how in the darkness and confusion anyone could positively know this.
The nights were cold and after the first one those who were fortunate enough to possess a rubber raincoat, as I was, put it on over the blue overcoat which, when the sword belt was on made one fairly comfortable even after lying on the ground for a long time. We were not allowed to talk or move about which made the blood sluggish, and lying on the
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cold frosty ground most of the night, together with the surroundings, etc., was not conducive to cheerfulness, warmth or comfort. To our right, in front of Petersburg, the artillery firing was unusually brisk and even appalling. The damp heavy powder smokeladen atmosphere was stifling as the dense smoke from the ominous artillery fire of hundreds of guns all along the lines from Richmond to Five, Forks, about forty miles, except where General Park's Corps and the Sixth Corps were, where later in the night in front of the Sixth Corps, the grand finale of the battle that was to soon bring peace to our stricken country and rest to two valiant armies, was to take place, settled to the ground, which added to the gloom of a terrible night of waiting and suspense, as had been the previous two when so situated.
The enemy's earthworks were very formidable, [*] fully eight feet high and in places still higher between thickly interspersed forts and redoubts and especially in front of our brigade, in front of which works was a ditch or moat about eight feet deep and wide, partially filled with water, bridged at intervals of about fifty yards and in some places much less, with a single log hewn flat on top for the use of the pickets. In front of this moat there were three -- not "one or two" as stated in General H. G. Wright's official
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report -- lines of heavy abatis and chevaux-de-frise heavily wired together. With a strong force well in hand behind this formidable array of works it would have been impregnable against any assaulting column of infantry alone. The pioneer corps, Capt. S. H. Perham commanding had been assigned the unenviable task of cutting away the abatis and chevaux-de-frise in places as it advanced with us to enable the men to pass. During the night word was passed along the line that it was not known from which flank the movement to advance would begin, but to follow it whichever way it came from by advancing as it reached each company. This threw great responsibility on me as my company was in the front line and on the right of the brigade. I knew nothing of the signal gun for the general advance to be fired from Fort Fisher at "about 4.45" o'clock a. m.; indeed if it was fired amid the din I did not know it or its significance. I had just been promoted Captain of Company G, overslaughing several other First Lieutenants who had been less regularly on the fighting line.
To the right of Company G, there was no connecting line that could be seen, owing to the darkness. Not then knowing the division formation I was much perplexed over this, and finally after directing the men on the left of the Company, which joined the next company to the left, to advance with the line in case the movement forward commenced with the left flank, I concluded for obvious reasons to take my position
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on the right of my company, where intently watching and listening for any advance in that direction, supposing I could hear it and that I could rely on the left guide of my Company to do as directed, I paid no attention to the left flank; but shortly after the line had advanced and before any firing had occurred in our front on the advancing column, one of the men, more conscientious than the guide on the left of the Company, who had heard my orders to him came to me and said the line to the left had advanced a little before, but it had done so so silently everything on the person, canteens, etc., that would make a noise having been tied fast, in the darkness, smoke and din the advance hadn't been seen or heard by me to the left of the Company where it commenced.
There was no time for investigation or anything but prompt, vigorous action, and greatly annoyed at being placed in a false position and for other obvious reasons for I was no shirk in battle, I sprang to the front of my Company intent on catching up with the column, directed the Company to follow me which it did at first, but in the darkness that was the last seen of it, for as in most battles, the men broke, only the most intrepid taking the lead, and what became of such in this instance is not known. It would have been much better, easier and safer to have advanced when the movement first commenced, as the enemy's pickets, except such as fell back into their works, threw down their arms without firing and surrendered;
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and those behind their works were largely in bed fast asleep except a few in a strong fort and redoubt in front of the First Brigade, to the left of where my Company lay in line, who seemed to have been alert all night. These, as soon as they discovered we were assaulting, swept the ground we and others advanced over in front of the works -- the two lines of works here of the two armies being about two thousand yards apart more or less -- with grape and cannister, the firing commencing just as I was about half way to the enemy's works, together with desultory musketry firing, showing that none of our men were yet over them. The enemy fought most desperately in this fort, for two hours or so after daylight. Indeed, it is plain to me that it momentarily abandoned the fort at first until the bulk of our men had passed by them to the left towards Hatcher's Run, and then almost at once reoccupied it, as the discharge of artillery from it was almost continuous excepting a few minutes after I entered the enemy's works, until we took it about 8.15 o'clock a. m. The fort was to my left front, hence I did not approach it directly, but moved along to it later on after entering the works. The first redoubt from the fort about one hundred and fifty yards towards Petersburg had given up without much resistance there being but one or two guns in it, after the first weak musketry volley, the men in and infantry supporting it, running into the woods in rear, such as did not surrender.
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The second redoubt from the fort towards Petersburg had no artillery in it and was easily taken.
As soon as it was light enough to see, some of our heterogeneous force in which were two or three artillerymen -- for there was no organized separate Union command anywhere either inside or about the enemy's works here -- turned the enemy's gun from this first redoubt after moving it to a more advantageous point overlooking the fort, on its intrepid little party which from the first was supported by about a hundred of its infantry in the brush and woods -- a jungle -- in rear of and running down a small ravine passing between the fort and redoubt to within twenty yards of the fort and its right environment or earthwork, until finally some of our men in the last assault on it sprang into the fort, clubbed and knocked down with their discharged muskets the few remaining men who had not fled or been killed, some of whom, when lying on their backs, seizing the lanyards just within reach and persistently endeavored to fire the pieces, and were only prevented by some of our men standing dramatically over the prostrate men with inverted guns and fixed bayonet ready to impale them if they persisted. This ended the fighting in front of where the First Brigade lay before the assault, and probably in front of the whole Sixth Corps, at any rate in front of the Third Division all the works having been taken, the capture of these two works being the most difficult being nearer together than any other similar
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fortifications in the Sixth Corps front, which made it the hardest point to take in its front, especially as the ground was high and the enemy's artillery commanded the gradually sloping ground in front and to its right and left. There were three or four pieces of artillery in this fort which also fell into our hands. The woods a quarter of a mile in rear of the fort was swarming with armed and unarmed Johnnies. It was plucky fighting on both sides, for those engaged.
But what had become of Company G was a quandary, as not a man could be found. I had run with all speed possible in order to get over the shell-swept ground as soon as practicable in front of the enemy's works supposing some of my men would follow me as usual, and within a few minutes had scaled the works, having caught up with the advance which had been delayed by the abatis, etc., greatly wondering at the few who had really reached the works which were actually taken, all other flowery reports to the contrary notwithstanding, for a distance of about six hundred yards or more including finally the redoubts and fort by a very few determined men such as generally lead any assaulting column and cannot be turned back except greatly outnumbered; but this number was rapidly increased by stragglers. There was no jumping into the ditch in front of the works, and out again in my vicinity, for as our men were not then taught to scale perpendicular walls eight or ten feet high, they could not have gotten out of
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the ditch alone even if they had gotten in and wanted to; besides, it had several feet of water in it almost continuously, and for obvious reasons others under stress of circumstances could not stop to help them out if they wanted to even if any had fallen into the ditch by accident, and they certainly wouldn't have gotten into it in any other way in the circumstances. The ditch was the same as found around permanent forts, very formidable, and if anything even deeper. The works and protections in front were wonderfully strong; more so here than at any other point in front of the Sixth Corps. The redoubt and ugly-looking fort on a slight eminence in front of the First Brigade a little to the left of where my Company lay in line, had caused most of our brigade and other organizations within reach of the fort's guns, to oblique -- as I could see them doing it by the momentary flash of the enemy's artillery from this fort which lit up the ground in its front and on either side -- both to the right and left but largely to the left where most of such as went over the works in the assault to the left of the fort probably turned along them towards Hatcher's Run -- as the enemy once flanked in their work would fall back from them except where there were forts, etc., -- leaving the redoubt and fort with some half dozen pieces of field artillery, which belonged to the rest of our corps to help take to be subdued by such of the more intrepid of the Third Division and other commands, as marched straight
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up to the rack whether there was anything in it or not. At any rate, so far as I know, no considerable number of our regiment or of any other regiment was in the enemy's works opposite where the First Brigade of the Third Division lay in line before assaulting shortly before daylight, nor was any of the Tenth Vermont, or any other of our forces in the last fort taken for obvious reasons for any length of time till it was finally taken about 8.15 o'clock a. m. There was not a score of men in sight as soon as light enough to see, for two hundred yards inside the works, everyone acting independently, where I first entered them to the right of the two redoubts and fort with others of the assaulting men only two of whom were killed immediately near the works in the assault, one just in front, and another whose body fell on the front slope of the works where I entered, which shows comparatively speaking, what a bloodless affair it was at this point, which was generally the case, too, all along the line except where there were forts, etc., and how little resistance there really was in front of the First Brigade excepting that of the one fort which so stubbornly held out. There were so few of our men in the works it was lonesome after some of the men had moved to the left in the darkness and could not be seen any distance away by such as didn't know it was the plan of battle to go to the left; and not one of the enemy even after dawn could be seen for long intervals, dead or alive. What few had been in the
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works except such as surrendered, mostly ran halfclad, save such as were timely warned, into the woods back of the works before and at the time we entered them, and hid. It was the most remarkable case of stampede and temporary disorganization on the part of both veteran armies seen during the war. The formidable-looking works supposed to be fairly well manned, which we had faced for months, had had their effect on our army, and the Confederates being surprised and supposing they were attacked by an overwhelming number, but were really not so confronted in their works except as the men accumulated moving to the left, largely gave up in the darkness without a struggle. Surely God was with us in this latter case. We could never have assaulted these works successfully by daylight, even with the force then in them of the enemy.
Rather cautiously after waiting a little inside the works for the gray of the morning, as there were not men enough to be aggressive in the darkness, I, with a couple of men, there being no other officer in the neighborhood so far as I could see, commenced to investigate the cabins to make sure the premises were as safe as appearances would indicate. An investigation of one was startling. On approaching it in the early gray of the morning, and peering in at the open door, two of the enemy were dimly observed, one lying on the floor, and the other sitting upon the edge of his bunk apparently hesitating about dressing,
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but on cautiously going near the door which faced the east and craning my neck so as to get one eye on the men without exposing my body, I rather doubtfully demanded their surrender, but they had already made their final surrender to their Maker; they were both dead. The sitting man's body had been so perfectly balanced when instantly killed it had remained in its lifelike sitting position. I had seen one other such case during the war before. The discovery that he was dead was startling in the dim morning light which, on leaning forward after a step inside the cabin, revealed the pallor of his face and look of death. Afterwards gradually drifting and stumbling along the works with others a short distance in the gloam of the morning to the enemy's right to where the fort was, about seventy-five of our men, the odds and ends of many different commands, frequently increased by stragglers who had not entered the works at first, were gathering to assault the fort containing the guns which had shelled us so fiercely when approaching the enemy's works, those undelayed by investigation as I was delayed, reaching it first. Finding none of my men here or a familiar face -- although it is stated in the regimental history that Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Damon and Major Wyllys Lyman were there -- and seeing that the force was small and made up promiscuously, and that as great a show as possible should be made, I joined in the assaults, the result of which has already been given. It's a mistake to
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suppose this was a large affair; it was a hot fight for those engaged, but all told on both sides, though, there wasn't three hundred men. The Second Brigade never came to us during the struggle. The fight was wholly by a heterogeneous lot of officers and men separated from their commands by darkness in the general assault. As this was the first fight I was in with my new Company, being but a short time with it, and unfamiliar with the men's faces, a goodly number of whom were recruits, and as all in such circumstances would be powder and dirt-stained and very smutty, and as the men were unusually bundled up for the occasion, it is possible that some of them may have taken part in the capture of this fort unknown to me, the same as I did. Corp. George W. Wise has since told me he did.
The fighting being over on this part of the line, and not knowing we were to go along the line to the left or that the Sixth Corps had any business in front of the Corps on its left such being unusual, and never dreaming, being unable to see in the darkness, so few of us had taken our part of the enemy's works alone, i. e. the redoubts and fort -- which together with the contiguous breastworks covered our brigade front -- but of course knowing we had captured the fort alone, and wondering if it could be possible that others could have followed the enemy's main body into the forest in rear of their works when first entering, where I would possibly find some of my
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men, I commenced to investigate. Going about a quarter of a mile into the woods alone, soon individual members of the enemy looking comical enough, commenced to appear from their hiding places here and there half-clad, some without hats, pants, shoes, guns, etc., showing how completely they had been surprised, offering to surrender, but were afraid when directed to go to the rear of our lines to go alone through them for fear of being misunderstood and shot. In less time than it takes to tell it, three comical-looking long haired, shriveled, half-clad and starved cadaverous-looking specimens of humanity had surrendered within a space a rod square, the woods being full of them, when it dawned on me that there could be no Federal force in that direction, or these men would have been taken and that I might be out of luck if I happened to strike alone one or more of the unbeaten enemy with loaded gun; and so drawing my loaded revolver ready for emergency, I returned to the works with my numerous prisoners, others surrendering en route, just in season to see General Grant, who had probably been waiting for information that the fort had been taken, and his retinue of about one hundred pass inside the enemy's works by the fort we had taken, going towards Petersburg. He was mounted on a proud-stepping dark charger, dressed with unusual care and never appeared to better advantage. The occasion inspiring it, he was a perfect picture of a conquering hero, but
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seemed all unconscious of it. The artist who could put Grant and his suite on canvas as he appeared then would win renown. As Grant's eye caught the motley group of prisoners with me, who were regarding him with silent, open-mouthed wonder, he slightly smiled, drew in his horse a little as though to speak or in doubt of his safety, seeing the rebs had guns, but finally dashed on, an impressive picture not only in the midst of war, but surrounded by grand fortifications and the victorious and defeated living, wounded, dying and dead, real heroes of both the blue and the gray, never to be forgotten by those who were fortunate enough to see it.
But by this time, it being about 9 o'clock a. m. or later, being nearly melted from over-exertion and affected with nausea from long fasting and rushing about fighting and looking for my men from one point to another, clad with two overcoats, which I had no time to remove or place to leave them if I did, being without food and not able to find any of my men, and feeling bad and worried about them, I felt constrained to go to the hospital joining my Company which had gotten together meantime by probably going along that portion of the enemy's comparatively fortless works which when once broken would have to be evacuated, about two miles to the right of where I had gone over the enemy's works, towards Petersburg, the next morning. As nothing but straggling men, the best fighters who lead every
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assaulting column were found from the time I entered the enemy's works before dawn up to about 9 o'clock a. m., owing to the assault having been made in the dark, nothing was thought of it at the time as I knew that where I had been all commands were similarly disorganized. It was fortunate for the Union forces, though, there was so few of the enemy behind its works near and in the fort before mentioned; though as a whole taking the prisoners, the major part of those who ran into the woods, together with those who stood their ground and fought us, their number greatly exceeded ours inside their works at this point. It was the easiest fight of the war, but we expected it to be the hardest. But there were a goodly numbe of dead and wounded about the last fort taken, where about a hundred or more of the enemy had caused a needless sacrifice of life. There was never any doubt but that we should take the fort from the first, but it did seem provoking that the whole corps should shy by it in the darkness and leave it for a few to do and especially not make its work more through in taking prisoners; but I've always felt reconciled to it, as it gave me such an excellent view of General Grant at such an important time in his life.
It has always seemed strange that it wasn't fully understood by all Company Commanders that a signal gun would be fired from Fort Fisher "about 4.45 o'clock a. m." for obvious reasons, and that the Sixth Corps was to turn to its left after entering the enemy's
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works and sweep them in that direction to Hatcher's Run in front of the other Corps. Of course it and the fact that Grant's headquarters were close to the left of the First Brigade, Third Division, Sixth Corps (See Grant's Memoirs p. 310), shows that he had implicit faith in its ability to break the enemy's line of works and a possible doubt as to whether the other three corps including the Second, all of which were to the left of the Sixth, could do so or not in front of where they respectively laid. It was fortunate, however, that it wasn't fully understood that the Sixth Corps was to turn to its left and sweep the works as in case it had been the men who ran into the woods which was full of them, in rear of their works would have probably retaken some portions of them and caused still larger unnecessary loss of life. Probably it was thought instead, the enemy would move along their works to their right towards Hatcher's Run, no one ever dreaming they would become quite as badly disorganized at once on our entering their works as we necessarily were after passing through the obstructions in front of the same; but being surprised and on suddenly waking up, and finding us right amongst them, stampede followed. Aside from the foregoing defects in not having the plan of attack, etc., fully understood, the preliminaries of the assault were most admirably carried out; but the Creator knew what was best, and His unseen hand predominated. The slight shelling during the night to try and discover
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if we were preparing to attack proved futile notwithstanding it did kill and wound a few men in our Brigade. No shells reached Company G, prior to its advancing. My Company being on the right of the Brigade, owing to the long interval between it and the next Brigade on its right, there were fewer men of either army where I entered the works than any where else in the neighborhood. Most of the enemy from here ran to the redoubt and fort just to their right before mentioned and into the woods for obvious reasons, so fortunately there was hardly any resistance at this point; still I saw the only two dead Union soldiers in front of the enemy's work and our Brigade right here, except after the fort was taken.
General Grant was more highly pleased with what the Sixth Corps did than any other. He says in effect in his memoirs (ibid. p. 309), among other things, that General Wright with the Sixth Corps "Swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run sweeping everything before him," and after reaching there (ibid. p. 310), Wright "Sent a regiment to destroy the South Side railroad just outside the city." But does he mention any other Corps so pleasingly? Let the misinformed or biased historians, and others of the so-called "best" Corps of the Army of the Potomac, read what Grant says of each in this fight in his Memoirs. He cannot be accused of fulsome praise in regard to any Corps, but he does mention in flattering terms the clean, brilliant work of the old
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reliable Sixth Corps which twice almost single-handed saved the National Capital during the last ten months of the war. Again here, too, at Petersburg as in the Shenandoah Valley, it was more conspicuous than any other Corps in ringing down the great stage curtain of this memorable siege.
Had a long strong skirmish line with an occasional reserve been deployed at right angles to the enemy's works and swept to Hatcher's Run or further in rear of their works, probably many thousand more prisoners would have been captured than were. As it was, the Sixth Corps took 3,000 prisoners, which Grant, whose headquarters were at Dabney's Saw Mill (ibid. p. 310), says he met going out of their works just as he was going over them to join the victorious Sixth Corps within the enemy's works where I saw him a few minutes later as before related. Grant does not say anything in his Memoirs about any other Corps having captured any prisoners, in case they did. Probably similar conditions existed all along the lines taken in this closing, most unique and interesting battle of this historic siege so far as both sides were concerned as herein described; and this is one reason I have so fully gone into details never before having seen them as fully given by any eye witness and participant. Of course General Grant not being inside the lines he nor probably any other general officer at the moment of their being taken, was not an eye witness to the remarkable,
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stirring and unusual scenes of the moment and which immediately followed, and could not go fully into such details in their reports.