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History records that the campaign commenced in both Virginia and Georgia about the first of May, 1864, and these campaigns were in fact decisive, though not soon to end, for the Georgia campaign ended with the capture of Atlanta, four months later, and then Sherman's triumphant march to the sea; and the Virginia campaign only ended when the splendid army of Lee, of about sixty-two thousand men, with which he first met Grant and won his victories, reduced to a mere handful of about eight or ten thousand ragged and worn-out veterans, was compelled to evacuate Petersburg, and then a few days later, at Appomattox, unable either to fight or retreat further, surrendered.
Of the situation at the commencement of these campaigns I quote again from General Dick Taylor's plain-spoken but well and, I think, fairly written book:
"Upon what foundations the civil authorities of the Confederacy rested their hopes of success, after the campaign of 1864 fully opened, I am unable to say, but their commanders in the field, whose rank and position enabled them to estimate the situation, fought simply to afford statesmanship an opportunity to mitigate the sorrows of inevitable defeat."
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This may have been true, but all the resources of statesmanship could never "mitigate the sorrows of defeat" to the southern soldier if defeat was to come; and, in fact, no attempt at statesmanship was ever made to end the war, except the much-talked-of Hampton Roads conference, and the slogan on one side was "Union" and on the other "Independence." Statesmanship had no place in the question now; only the generals in the field could settle it. But if General Taylor was right, and he and other generals only saw "inevitable defeat" staring us in the face when this campaign opened, no such feeling existed in the army; fear there sometimes was, but no doubt yet of ultimate success.
General Jackson's division when it left Columbus to take part in the Georgia campaign was as full of hope and confidence as it had ever been, and in all the bloody path it followed from Adairsville, where we first joined General Johnston, to Atlanta, when he was removed from the command, and till he was removed, it never lost it, and even then not wholly. But this is anticipating.
We left Mississippi almost wholly defenseless along its western border and in the north, save for General Wirt Adams' cavalry brigade in the south and General Chalmers in the north, with his headquarters at Oxford, with such troops as he could gather; but the state had been so completely overrun by both armies that there was not much at the time to tempt the federals, and besides everything seemed to wait as with hushed breath the result of the great campaigns just commencing in Virginia and Georgia.
Our route lay by Tuscaloosa and Monte Vallo, and thence north, by Talledega and Anniston, straight to Rome, Georgia. This country had not yet been polluted by the tread of a hostile force, and few confederate forces had been through it. Its clear, running streams and
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beautiful valleys, its lovely towns and villages, and sometimes it blue-topped mountains, all dwell in my memory yet. A few days was to bring a rude contrast to these peaceful scenes.
We reached Rome on the evening of the 15th of May, and went into camp a little east of the town, while General Ross remained on the west of it. General Jackson was not with the division, having been in some way disabled, I do not recollect how, and General Armstrong was in command of the division, and Colonel Pinson the ranking officer present, in command of the brigade. Early on the morning of the sixteenth news was received that a strong cavalry force was approaching Rome from the northwest, and they soon came into contact with Ross, and I was ordered to take the First Mississippi to his aid. The enemy retired however, having found a stronger force than they expected.
That evening late, we were ordered to move, and we made a forced march all night long, reaching General Johnston's army a little after daylight on the morning of the 17th, at Adairsville. We were at once ordered into action, and from that day till the fall of Jonesboro, on the first of September, we were incessantly engaged in fighting, scouting and guarding the left flank and side of the army. I have looked in vain for some report of the operations of Jackson's division, but except brief references, I can find nothing. General Wheeler who commanded the cavalry on the right of the army, has left an official report of the operations of his command from May 6th to 31st, included, and from July 17th to October 9th, 1864, but only twice, I believe, does he notice General Jackson's division, and these times were to give some information sent him by Jackson. The fact was, these cavalry commands never acted together, but each retained its position on the right and left of the army respectively,
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or on the east and west of the railroad. In Jackson's division, the whole division seldom were together, but were often widely separated, so that what I have to relate of that campaign after we joined the army, is more a detail (partially) of the operations of Armstrong's brigade than of the division, and this I regret, for never was a braver brigade than Ross had, or one more gallantly commanded. It did its full share of all the work that was done by the division, and there was more than work enough for us all.
General Johnston in his report of the operations of his army from December 27th, 1863, to July 17th, 1864, mentions the arrival of the command at Adairsville, and so does Lieutenant Mackall, aid-de-camp to General Mackall, chief of staff. But of course no more than slight references could be made. It is to supply deficiencies of this sort as far as I can, that these memoirs are written, and I am glad to be able to write and publish them while there are some still living, who took part in all the affairs I relate.
I have said that we were ordered into action as soon as we reached the army, on the morning of the 17th, and this was to reinforce General Wheeler, who at the time was holding the enemy in check, our position being on his right, but he was soon forced back, and our brigade retired to the infantry. Almost immediately we were again ordered forward to support General Hardee's right, who had moved out to engage the enemy. General Johnston disposes of this affair in these words: "At Adairsville on the 17th, Polk's cavalry, under Brigadier General Jackson (General Armstrong was at the time in command) met the army, and Hardee after severe skirmishing checked the enemy." I cannot better describe the part our brigade took in this affair, or indeed all our operations after we reached Rome, than by quoting from an old
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letter to my wife, written at Cartersville on the 23rd. I have but one other letter written from Georgia, and to which in its place I will refer.
. . . "I wrote you a long letter from Monte Vallo, Alabama, which I sent by mail to Macon. Next day after writing we started to Rome, Georgia, which place we reached after five days' hard marching. Next morning after we got there, I commenced a letter to you, to send by mail to Macon, Mississippi, but only wrote a few lines, when we were ordered into the saddle to meet the enemy advancing on Rome, and my regiment was ordered to reinforce General Ross, who was fighting them. I was, and have been since we have been here, in command of the regiment, Pinson having been in command of the brigade. The enemy retired from Rome without a fight that day, but I have been too busy since to write. The next night we were ordered forward to join General Johnston's army, which was falling back, and after marching all night, we got to him about sun up next morning. Our brigade was immediately ordered to the front to reinforce General Wheeler, who was engaged. We took a post on his right, but he was soon driven back, and we were ordered to retire. We had hardly got back to the infantry before we were ordered to support General Hardee's right, who moved out to engage the enemy, and for some time a general engagement was imminent. We went forward at a gallop, and took position with the men dismounted, and fought the enemy for three hours without giving back an inch. The loss in the brigade was thirty-one killed and wounded, only one man in my regiment killed, and two or three wounded. We fought in the woods, and were greatly protected by them. Starke's regiment, commanded by Major McBee, fought
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gallantly and sustained more loss than any other. They got first into the fight and were somewhat more exposed. Our brigade gained great credit with the whole army by the fight, as they were in hearing and sight of it all. That night (of 17th) the army fell back, and we again marched the whole night to take a position to protect the movement."
I will never forget that night's march, nor do I suppose any of the command ever will. It was the second night we had been in the saddle all night in succession, with the busy day I have mentioned between, and never before or since did I feel the torture, of which I have read, from want of sleep. Many times when, from unavoidable delays in a night march of a long column of cavalry, in rear of an army falling back, and there were many such, would I throw myself from my horse into the road, as did many, and try and snatch a minute's repose. The morning of the 18th found us at Cassville, where the whole army was concentrated.
It is somewhere said, "there is no rest for the wicked," and our cavalry was like the wicked on this campaign, for we had no rest, and on this day of all others we needed it so much, but the following quotation from the journal kept by Lieutenant Mackall, before referred to, shows how we spent the 18th, or a part of it, at least.
Cassville, May 18th.
. . . "Colonel Hannon just reports enemy's cavalry in force advancing on Fairmount road rapidly and four miles from here. Armstrong ordered to support of Hannon."
. . . So away we went again, and were out for some hours with only a slight skirmish, when we were ordered back. It was high time, for men and horses were worn out for want of food and rest. We passed in rear of the infantry, and at last had a chance
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to unsaddle and feed our horses and get some rations for ourselves.
I had a splitting headache that night, but a night's sleep made me all right. Next day our brigade had no important work to do, but there was heavy firing all along the line, for the enemy had pressed us closely, and that day, the 19th, General Johnston issued his celebrated battle order, which was read late in the afternoon to each regiment in the army. It was received with the greatest enthusiasm, cheer after cheer could be heard in every direction, and I wondered what the enemy thought, as they were near enough to hear. The position of our division was to be on the left of General Polk, who held the left in the line of battle with his corps, and late in the evening we marched towards our place, bivouacking about nine at night on the side of a road, from which at daylight we were to move to take our place in line.
Spreading my blanket at the foot of a tree by the road side I was soon asleep, but later was wakened with the noise of troops passing on the road. I supposed, of course, they were going to take their places in line and was far too sleepy to trouble myself about them, so that my surprise may be imagined when I found in the morning that the army was again falling back. The whole army was bitterly disappointed, but no one censured General Johnston, though none knew the reason of his change of plan, and many do not perhaps to this day.
His own statement of the cause was this: "Expecting to be attacked I drew up the troops in what seemed to me an excellent position, a bold ridge immediately in rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery commenced soon after the troops were formed and continued until night. Soon
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after dark Lieutenant-Generals Polk aud Hood together expressed to me decidedly the opinion, formed upon the observation of the afternoon, that the federal artillery would render their positions untenable the next day, and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. Lieutenant-General Hardee, whose position I thought weakest, was confident that he could hold it. The other two officers were so earnest, however, and so unwilling to depend on the ability of their corps to defend the ground, that I yielded and crossed the Etowah on the 20th, a step which I have regretted ever since." This report was written at Vineville, Georgia, October 20, 1864. I do not see why he should have regretted declining battle on this occasion, with two out of three of his corps commanders anticipating defeat before an attack was made. It is certain, however, that the morale of the army was at its best, and if he had remained and tried the chances of battle this might have carried the day, but the risk would have been great with the doubts held by these two commanders.
As the army retired the enemy pressed forward rapidly, and our division was busily occupied on the different roads by which their advance was being made, as was also General Wheeler, in covering the movements of the army. There was skirmishing all the time enough to make it extremely interesting, but we had no great loss, probably inflicting more on the enemy than we suffered. Once during the day I was halted at the ford of a creek, and near the ford there was a railroad bridge with stone abutments and pretty good sized embankment, which I thought would enable me to make a good stand, and I dismounted the men and sent my horses back to a wood, which would afford them shelter, some two or three hundred yards across an open field.
We were hardly ready for them before they came on,
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but, as they were exposed, a sharp volley checked them, and drove them back to shelter, and then commenced a lively fusilade at long range, till they brought up artillery, and I was forced to retire. Some way or another, a report got back to the ambulances which were with the horses that I was badly wounded, and our assistant surgeon, Dr. Ferrell, came across the exposed field as fast as his horse could run, but fortunately I had not been hit, and he escaped, though it was almost miraculous that he did, for this little open field was swept by the bullets which were fired at us at the bridge. But the doctor was a dear friend of mine, a good surgeon and a brave soldier, and he would have run a greater risk to aid me, if he thought I needed it. He had gone out as a private, as did many other young physicians, at the beginning of the war, and was from Lafayette county, where a few years after the war he died. I kept him with me at the bridge till I retired, and then, by availing myself of the railroad embankment, we got to our horses, with only a few wounded, and none badly. I don't know whether it will interest my readers, but it is of supreme interest to me, and I will quote again from the Cartersville letter, from which I have already made some extracts:
". . . Next day, General Johnston issued a battle order, and we all expected a great fight to come off, but in the night he again fell back this side of the Etowah, where we now are, and where, if the enemy crosses, he will doubtless fight. I fought the Yankees all day yesterday -- the last day's retreat to this place -- had only a few horses and men wounded, but I can't give you any description of the fights. . . . I am in hopes the main battle will soon come off, as I have to fight and be exposed almost every day anyhow, and the sooner it comes off, the better for me. The army is in fine spirits, and have the most unbounded confidence in their general.
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. . . I had a real soldier's dream the other night of wife and children and home, but, like the soldier in the song,
". . . This place is about thirty miles northwest of Atlanta, and our army is drawn up in line of battle from here to the railroad at Marietta, about fifteen miles east. I wrote to you some days ago from near Cartersville, some twenty-five miles north of here. The enemy flanked our position there, and General Johnston threw his army in their front here. There has been constant skirmishing for some days, with occasionally a desperate battle on some part of the line, but as yet nothing decisive. Both armies are in line of battle and fortified only a few hundred yards apart. Minie balls, shot and shell are continually flying, even over our camps a short distance in rear of the works. On yesterday our brigade was in the breast-works, occupying the extreme left of our army. The enemy were only a few hundred yards from us, and we were ordered at a given signal to scale the works and advance, and it was understood a division of infantry on our right was to advance at the same time. Our regiment occupied the right of our brigade next to the infantry. The signal was given and over and at them we went, driving them into their works and capturing a battery. The infantry on our right failed to move forward, and we were compelled to retire and leave the guns and our gallant dead and some of the wounded on the field. We brought off some prisoners, and killed a good many Yankees, but lost some our best officers and men. The gallant and chivalrous captain of the Bolivar troop, Captain Herrin, fell dead at the head of his company, and right at the enemy's guns. Two men of his company, brave soldiers. Bishop and Reneau, were killed at his side. Will. Montgomery, Charley Jones and Barnet were wounded, but we brought them off; some others of my old company were hit, but not badly hurt. We lost besides in the regiment Captain Turner, of Pontotoc,
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mortally wounded (he died a day or two later), and Captain Lester, dangerously, and about twenty men killed and wounded in the regiment.
"The other regiments in the brigade suffered about equally in the loss of officers and men. Captain Clanton, of Starke's regiment, who was in Bolivar, and whom you knew, was killed. Two field, officers of my rank in the brigade, were wounded, one reported mortally. . . . If the infantry had advanced, we could have held their works and would probably have taken several hundred prisoners. We were relieved from the breast-works a little while ago and are now camped about half a mile from them, having lain on them all night." . . .
Our charge was down one hill and up another in front of the First Mississippi, the enemy's battery being on the crest of the hill and in our immediate front. Just behind it were strong works literally filled with soldiers, and it was impossible to hold what we had gained.
We got back to our own works and reoccupied them, momentarily expecting and indeed hoping to be assaulted in our turn, as we felt sure we could repulse any attack made on us. But the enemy contented themselves with heavy firing of small arms and cannon till it was after dark, and in fact all through the night it was more or less heavy.
I always thought and still think "somebody blundered." I know it was not General Armstrong, who led his brigade and was in the thick of the fight. Three or four days after this letter was written, we found their works abandoned, and Pinson sent a detail to recover the bodies of our dead. Captain Herrin and the two men of his company were found in a shallow grave at the place where they fell, and were given a more decent burial, as were the other dead of the regiment and brigade. A decent burial meant deeper graves, so that their bones
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might lie undisturbed till they had all crumbled into dust, and become a part of that earth from which it is said they once had come.
We reached General Johnston at Adairville, on the 17th, and this battle was fought on the 28th, twelve days of continuous skirmishing, and at times severe fighting as related, and this was our brigade's introduction to that army and to that general, upon whom it seemed to me then and seems to me now, the hopes of the confederacy rested.
". . . I firmly believe, that if we continue successful a few months longer, the war will close this year, and, as God has hitherto protected me so long amid so many dangers, I trust it is not presumption in me to hope for his protection to the end." . . . It is a little curious to me that, though constantly falling back, I thought then that we were successful. I suppose it must have been that, so far as the mere fighting was concerned, we always held our own, as General Armstrong, in his letter, says, never "yielding except under orders," and for another reason, that the confidence in General Johnston was so great that we all felt that he would at last crush Sherman's army, and I believe he would have done it, if he had not been removed from the command. Besides, I made it a rule always to write home cheerfully, for it was bad enough there anyway without the apprehension of defeat.
On the afternoon of the 23d, the day my letter was written, our brigade was ten or twelve miles to the west of Cartersville, observing the enemy, who that evening crossed the Etowah at Stilesborough, of which General Johnston was duly apprised, as appears from his report "that Jackson's troops reported enemy moving down Etowah, which they crossed at Stilesborough on 23d." Our brigade fell back slowly, and on the 25th found ourselves in rear and to the left of General Hood's corps, which had its center at New Hope Church, and where a desperate assault was made late that evening, with a bloody repulse to the enemy, whose loss was estimated at three thousand killed and wounded, and our loss about
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four hundred and fifty. This battle lasted about two hours, and we were in full hearing of the horrid roar of the guns without taking any part, for we had other duties assigned to us. On the 26th we moved still farther to the left, and on the 27th another fierce assault was made on Cleburne's division, with about the same loss to the enemy and to us. Generals Polk and Hardee had fallen back a little south of Dallas, where the enemy had arrived on the 25th, and had intrenched. I take these figures and dates from General Johnston's report before alluded to. On the morning of the 28th of May we -- our brigade under General Armstrong, for General Jackson was now in command of his division -- were in rear of the left of General Polk's corps, which had its left intrenched in front of the enemy before Dallas. General Johnston disposes of the events of that day by saying, the "usual skirmishing was kept up.
" Armstrong's brigade did not consider it a skirmish in which late in the day they were engaged, nor was it, as the account will show. While resting quietly about half a mile in rear of our works and listening to the incessant rattle of small arms with the occasional bursting of shells, sometimes in the tree-tops over our heads, General Armstrong received an order to leave only his horse-holders and move his brigade up and occupy the trenches on the left which had been vacated by a brigade of infantry moved to some other point. We did not reach the trenches without having a few wounded, for the enemy's fire of small arms was constant, and we had to cross an open field to get to our place. Once there, we were safe enough if we kept under the shelter of the works, but several men were wounded and one killed by incautiously exposing himself. Colonel Pinson went to where Armstrong was, near the center of the brigade (we were on its right), and as I saw nothing to do, I walked carefully along the works to a battery on a hill just a
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little ways off, and where the left of General Bates' division rested. In our front was thick woods, and though the enemy's works were not more than two hundred yards away, we could not see them, and this I hoped to be able to do from this hill where the battery was. I stopped a moment to look through an embrasure at the battery, and a half dozen minie-balls hissed viciously by my head, and I quickly got behind the fortification. One of the artillerymen said to me, "You made a narrow escape; I have seen several men killed and wounded at that place." If he had warned me beforehand it would have been more to the purpose. I caught, however, a good look at a part of their works, which seemed very strong, and I had no doubt were well manned.
I returned in a few minutes to the regiment, taking good care as I passed the embrasure, and a little later Colonel Pinson came back and informed me General Armstrong had received an order from General Bates, at a given signal (a cannon-shot) to assault the enemy's works on our front. He said, further, that General Bates was of the opinion that the enemy had only a skirmish line in the works, and that his division would advance as we did. I told Pinson what I had seen, and that I was satisfied the enemy were in their works in force, for it was certain they had artillery; but, of course, we were powerless, and had nothing to do but obey. It was late in the afternoon when the shot came, and the whole brigade with a cheer scaled the works and dashed forward. I felt we were going to a useless slaughter of brave men, for if there was only a skirmish line it would be withdrawn at night, but if the enemy were in force nothing but disaster could come of the assault. I copy from the last letter written from Georgia home which was received and has escaped destruction, written the next day, and briefly describing the battle:
THE introduction of General Paixhans's brilliant invention, the shell-gun, in 1824, followed, in 1858, by the successful application of armor-plating to the steam-frigate La Gloire, under Napoleon III., compelled an immediate change in naval construction which startled the maritime countries of Europe, especially England, whose boasted security behind her "wooden walls" was shown to be a complete delusion. The English naval architects, however, did not overlook the fact that their French rivals, while producing a gun which rendered wooden navies almost useless, had also by their armor-plating provided an efficient protection against the destructive Paixhans shell.
Accordingly, the Admiralty without loss of time laid the keel of the Warrior, an armored iron steam-frigate 380 feet long, 58 feet beam, 26 feet draught, and 9200 tons displacement. The work being pushed with extraordinary vigor, this iron-clad ship was speedily launched and equipped, the admiration of the naval world.
Shortly after the adoption of armor-plating as an essential feature in the construction of vessels of war, the Southern States seceded from the Union, some of the most efficient of the United States naval officers resigning their commissions. Their loss was severely felt by the Navy Department at Washington; nor was it long before the presence of great professional skill among the officers of the naval administration of the Confederate States became manifest. Indeed, the utility of the armor-plating adopted by France and England proved to be better understood at Richmond than at Washington. While the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles, and his advisers were discussing the question of armor, news reached Washington that the partly burnt and scuttled steam-frigate Merrimac, at the Norfolk Navy Yard, had been raised and cut down to her berth-deck, and that a very substantial structure of timber, resembling a citadel with inclined sides, was being erected on that deck.
The Navy Department at Washington early in August advertised for plans and offers for iron-clad steam-batteries to be built within a stipulated time. My attention having been thus called to a subject which I had thoroughly considered during a series of years, I was fully prepared to present plans of an impregnable steam-battery of light draught, suitable to navigate the shallow rivers and harbors of the Confederate States. Availing myself of the services of a friend who chanced to be in Washington at the time, proposals
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were at once submitted to a board of naval officers appointed by the President; and the plans presented by my friend being rejected by the board, I immediately set out for Washington and laid the matter personally before its members, all of whom proved to be well-informed and experienced naval experts. Contrary to anticipation, the board permitted me to present a theoretical demonstration concerning the stability of the new structure, doubt of which was the principal consideration which had caused the rejection of the plan presented. In less than an hour I succeeded in demonstrating to the entire satisfaction of the board appointed by President Lincoln that the design was thoroughly practical, and based on sound theory. The Secretary of the Navy accordingly accepted my proposal to build an iron-clad steam-battery, and instructed me verbally to commence the construction forthwith.
Returning immediately to New York, I divided the work among three leading mechanical establishments, furnishing each with detailed drawings of every part of the structure; the understanding being that the most skillful men and the best tools should be employed; also that work should be continued during night-time when practicable. The construction of nearly every part of the battery accordingly commenced simultaneously, all hands working with the utmost diligence, apparently confident that their exertions would result in something of great benefit to the national cause. Fortunately no trouble or delay was met at any point; all progressed satisfactorily; every part sent on board from the workshops fitted exactly the place for which it was intended. As a consequence of these favorable circumstances, the battery, with steam-machinery complete, was launched in one hundred days from the laying of the keel-plate. It should be mentioned that at the moment of starting on the inclined ways toward its destined element, the novel fighting-machine was named Monitor.
Before entering on a description of this fighting-machine I propose to answer the question frequently asked: What circumstances dictated its size and peculiar construction?
1. The work on the Merrimac had progressed so far that no structure of large dimensions could possibly be completed in time to meet her.
2. The well-matured plan of erecting a citadel of considerable dimensions on the ample deck of the razeed Merrimac admitted of a battery of heavy ordnance so formidable that no vessel of the ordinary type, of small dimensions, could withstand its fire.
3. The battery designed by the naval authorities of the Confederate States, in addition to the advantage of ample room and numerous guns, presented a
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formidable front to an opponent's fire by being inclined to such a degree that shot would be readily deflected. Again, the inclined sides, composed of heavy timbers well braced, were covered with two thicknesses of bar iron, ingeniously combined, well calculated to resist the spherical shot peculiar to the Dahlgren and Rodman system of naval ordnance adopted by the United States navy.
4. The shallow waters on the coast of the Southern States called for very light draught; hence the upper circumference of the propeller of the battery would be exposed to the enemy's fire unless thoroughly protected against shot of heavy caliber. A difficulty was thus presented which apparently could not be met by any device which would not seriously impair the efficiency of the propeller.
5. The limited width of the navigable parts of the Southern rivers and inlets presented an obstacle rendering manoeuvring impossible; hence it would not be practicable at all times to turn the battery so as to present a broadside to the points to be attacked.
6. The accurate knowledge possessed by the adversary of the distance between the forts on the river-banks within range of his guns, would enable him to point the latter with such accuracy that unless every part of the sides of the battery could be made absolutely shot-proof, destruction would be certain. It may be observed that the accurate knowledge of range was an advantage in favor of the Southern forts which placed the attacking steam-batteries at great disadvantage.
7. The difficulty of manipulating the anchor within range of powerful fixed batteries presented difficulties which called for better protection to the crew of the batteries than any previously known.
Several minor points familiar to the naval artillerist and naval architect presented considerations which could not be neglected by the constructor of the new battery; but these must be omitted in our brief statement, while the foregoing, being of vital importance, have demanded special notice.
The plans on pages 732-3 represent a longitudinal section through the center line of the battery, which, for want of space on the page, has been divided into three sections, viz., the aft, central, and forward sections, which for ready reference will be called aft, central, and forward.
Referring particularly to the upper and lower sections, it will be seen that the hull consists of an upper and lower body joined together in the horizontal plane not far below the water-line. The length of the upper part of the hull is 172 feet, beam 41 feet; the length of the lower hull being 122 feet, beam
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34 feet. The depth from the underside of deck to the keel-plate is 11 feet 2 inches, draught of water at load-line 10 feet.
Let us now examine separately the three sectional representations.
Forward Section. The anchor-well, a cylindrical perforation of the over-hanging deck, near the bow, first claims our attention. The object of this well being to protect the anchor when raised, it is lined with plate iron backed by heavy timbers, besides being protected by the armor-plating bolted to the outside of the overhang. It should be noticed that this method proved so efficient that in no instance did the anchor-gear receive any injury during the several engagements with the Confederate batteries, although nearly all of the monitors of the Passaic class were subjected to rapid fire at short range in upward of twenty actions. It will be remembered that the unprotected anchor of the Merrimac was shot away during the short battle with the Congress and the Cumberland. Having described the method of protecting the anchors, the mechanism adopted for manipulating the same remains to be explained. Referring to the illustration, it will be seen that a windlass is secured under the deck-beams near the anchor-well. The men working the handles of this mechanism were stationed in the hold of the vessel, and hence were most effectually protected against the enemy's shot, besides being completely out of sight. The Confederate artillerists were at first much surprised at witnessing the novel spectacle of vessels approaching their batteries, then stopping and remaining stationary for an indefinite time while firing, and then again departing, apparently without any intervention of anchor-gear. Our examination of this gear and the anchor-well affords a favorable opportunity of explaining the cause of Lieutenant Greene's alarm, mentioned
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in a statement recently published by a military journal, concerning a mysterious sound emanating from the said well during the passage of the Monitor from New York to Fort Monroe. Lieutenant Greene says that the sound from the anchor-well "resembled the death-groans of twenty men, and was the most dismal, awful sound [he] ever heard." Let us endeavor to trace to some physical cause this portentous sound. The reader will find, on close examination, that the chain cable which suspends the anchor passes through an aperture ("hawse-pipe") on the after side of the well, and that this pipe is very near the water-line; hence the slightest vertical depression of the bow will occasion a flow of water into the vessel. Obviously, any downward motion of the overhang will cause the air confined in the upper part of the well, when covered, to be blown through the hawse-pipe along with the admitted water, thereby producing a very discordant sound, repeated at every rise and fall of the bow during pitching. Lieutenant Greene also states that, apart from the reported sound, the vessel was flooded by the water which entered through the hawse-pipe; a statement suggesting that this flooding was the result of faulty construction, whereas it resulted from gross oversight on the part of the executive officer, -- namely, in going to sea without stopping the opening round the chain-cable at the point where it passes through the side of the anchor-well.
The pilot-house is the next important object represented in the forward section of the illustration now under consideration. This structure is situated 10 feet from the anchor-well, its internal dimensions being 3 feet 6 inches long, 2 feet 8 inches wide, 3 feet 10 inches high above the plating of the deck; the sides consisting of solid blocks of wrought iron, 12 inches deep and 9 inches thick, firmly held down at the corner by 3-inch bolts passing through the iron-plated deck and deck-beams. The wheel, which by means of ordinary tiller-ropes operates the rudder, is placed within the pilot-house, its axle being supported by a bracket secured to the iron blocks as shown by the illustration. An ordinary ladder resting on the bottom of the vessel leads to the grated floor of the pilot-house. In order to afford the commanding officer and the pilot a clear view of objects before and on the sides of the vessel, the first and second iron blocks from the top are kept apart by packing pieces at the corners; long and narrow sight-holes being thereby formed extending round the pilot-house, and giving a clear view which sweeps round the entire horizon, all but that part which is hidden by the turret, hardly twelve degrees on each side of the line of keel. Regarding the adequacy of the elongated sight-hole formed between the iron blocks in the manner described, it should be borne in mind that an opening of five-eights of an inch affords a vertical view 80 feet high at a distance of only 200 yards. More is not needed, a fact established during trials instituted by experts before the constructor delivered the vessel to the Government. Unfortunately the sight-holes were subsequently altered, the iron blocks being raised and the opening between them increased to such an extent that at sea, to quote Lieutenant Greene's report, the water entered "with such force as to knock the helmsman completely round from the wheel." It may be shown that but for the injudicious increase
[p. 735]
of the sight-holes, the commander of the Monitor would not have been temporarily blinded during the conflict at Hampton Roads, although he placed his vessel in such an extraordinary position that, according to Lieutenant Greene's report, "a shell from the enemy's gun, the muzzle not ten yards distant [from the side of the Monitor], struck the forward side of the pilot-house." The size of the sight-hole, after the injudicious increase, may be inferred from the reported fact that the blast caused by the explosion of the Confederate shell on striking the outside of the pilot-house had the power of "partly lifting the top." This "top," it should be observed, consisted of an iron plate two inches thick, let down into an appropriate groove, but not bolted down -- a circumstance which called forth Lieutenant Greene's disapprobation. The object of the constructor in leaving the top plate of the pilot-house loose, so as to be readily pushed up from below, was that of affording egress to the crew in case of accident. Had the monitor Tecumseh, commanded by Captain T. A. M. Craven, when struck by a torpedo during the conflict in Mobile Bay, August 5th, 1864, been provided with a similar loose plate over the main hatch, the fearful calamity of drowning officers and crew would have been prevented. In referring to this untoward event, it should be observed that means had been provided in all the sea-going monitors to afford egress in case of injury to the hull: an opening in the turret-floor, when placed above a corresponding opening in the deck, formed a free passage to the turret, the top of which was provided with sliding hatches. Apparently the officer in charge of the turret-gear of Captain Craven's vessel was not at his post, as he ought to have been during action, or else he had not been taught the imperative duty of placing the turret in such a position that these openings would admit of a free passage from below. [*]
Lieutenant Greene's report with reference to the position of the pilot-house calls for particular notice, his assertion being that he "could not fire ahead within several points of the bow." The distance between the center of the turret and the pilot-house being fifty-five feet, while the extreme breadth of the latter is only five feet, it will be found that by turning the turret through an angle of only six degrees from the center line of the vessel, the shot will clear the pilot-house, a structure too substantial to suffer from
[p. 736]
the mere aërial current produced by the flight of the shot. Considering that the Monitor, as reported by Lieutenant Greene, was a "quick-turning vessel," the disadvantage of not being able to fire over the bow within six degrees of the line of keel is insignificant. Captain Coles claimed for his famous iron-clad turret-ship the advantage of an all-round fire, although the axis of his turret-guns had many times greater deviation from the line of keel than that of the Monitor.
The statement published by Lieutenant Greene, that the chief engineer of the vessel immediately after the engagement in Hampton Roads "suggested the clever plan of putting the pilot-house on top of the turret," is incorrect and calls for notice. The obvious device of placing the pilot-house in the center and above the turret was carefully considered before the Monitor turret was constructed, but could not be carried out for these reasons:
1. The turret of the battery was too light to support a structure large enough to accommodate the commanding officer, the pilot, and the steering-gear, under the severe condition of absolute impregnability against solid shot from guns of 10-inch caliber employed by the Confederates.
2. A central stationary pilot-house connected with the turret involved so much complication and additional work (see description of turret and pilot-houses further on), that had its adoption not been abandoned the Monitor would not have been ready to proceed to Hampton Roads until the beginning of April, 1862. The damage to the national cause which might have resulted from that delay is beyond computation.
The next important part of the battery delineated on the forward section of the illustration, namely, the quarters of the officers and crew, will now be considered; but before entering on a description it should be mentioned that in a small turret-vessel built for fighting, only one-half of the crew need be accommodated at a time, as the other half should be in and on the turret, the latter being always covered with a water-proof awning. Referring again to the forward and to part of the central section, it will be seen that the quarters
[p. 737]
extend from the transverse bulkhead under the turret to within five feet of the pilot-house, a distance of fifty feet; the forward portion, twenty-four feet in length, being occupied by the officers' quarters and extending across the battery from side to side. The height of the aft part of these quarters is 8 feet 6 inches under the deck-beams; while the height of the whole of the quarters of the crew is 8 feet 6 inches. A mere glance at the illustrations showing a side elevation [p. 733] and top view of internal arrangement [p. 735] gives a correct idea of the nature of the accommodations prepared for the officers and crew of the vessel which Lieutenant Greene regards as a "crude" structure, and of which he says: "Probably no ship was ever devised which was so uncomfortable for the crew." If this opinion were well founded, it would prove that submerged vessels like the monitors are unfit to live in.
Fortunately, the important question whether crews can live permanently below water-line has been set at rest by the report of the chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to the Secretary of the Navy, 1864. This minute and carefully considered report enabled the naval administration, organized by President Lincoln, to prove the healthfulness of the monitors, by the following clear presentation of the subject: "The monitor class of vessels, it is well known, have but a few inches of their hulls above the water-line, and in a heavy sea are entirely submerged. It has been doubted whether under such circumstances it would be possible long to preserve the health of the men on board, and consequently maintain the fighting material in a condition for effective service. It is gratifying, therefore, to know that an examination of the sick-reports, covering a period of over thirty months, shows that, so far from being unhealthy, there was less sickness on board the monitors than on the same number of wooden ships with an equal number of men and in
[p. 738]
similar exposed positions. The exemption from sickness upon the iron-clads in some instances is remarkable. There were on board the Saugus, from November 25th, 1864, to April 1st, 1865, a period of over four months, but four cases of sickness (excluding accidental injuries), and of these two were diseases with which the patients had suffered for years. On the Montauk, for a period of one hundred and sixty-five days prior to the 29th of May, 1865, there was but one case of disease on board. Other vessels of the class exhibit equally remarkable results, and the conclusion is reached that no wooden vessels in any squadron throughout the world can show an equal immunity from disease."
Apart from the ample size of the quarters on board the vessel, shown by the illustration, it should be mentioned that the system adopted for ventilating those quarters furnishes an abundant supply of fresh air by the following means. Two centrifugal blowers, driven by separate steam-engines, furnished seven thousand cubic feet of atmospheric air per minute by the process of suction through standing pipes on deck. Part of the air thus drawn in supported the combustion of the boiler furnaces, the remainder entering the lower part of the hull, gradually expelling the heated and vitiated air within the vessel. It has been imagined that the fresh air supplied by the blowers ought to have been conveyed to the quarters at the forward end of the vessel, by a system of conducting pipes. The laws of static balance, however, render the adoption of such a method unnecessary, since agreeably to those laws the fresh cold air, unless it be stopped by closed doors in the bulkheads, will find its way to every part of the bottom of the hull, gradually rising and expelling the upper heated strata through the hatches, and lastly through the grated top of the turret. Naval constructors who speculate on the cause of the extraordinary healthfulness of the monitors need not extend their researches beyond a thorough investigation of the system of ventilation just described.
Turret Department. The most important object delineated on the central section of the illustration, namely, the rotating turret, will now be considered; but before describing this essential part of the monitor system, it will be well to observe that the general belief is quite erroneous that a revolving platform, open or covered, is a novel design. So far from that being the case, this obvious device dates back to the first introduction of artillery. About 1820 the writer was taught by an instructor in fortification and gunnery that under certain conditions a position assailable from all sides should be defended by placing the guns on a turn-table. Long before building the Monitor I regarded the employment of a revolving structure to operate guns on board ships as a device familiar to all well-informed naval artillerists. But although constructors of revolving circular gun-platforms for naval purposes, open or covered, have a right to
[p. 739]
employ this ancient device, it will be demonstrated further on that the turret of the monitors is a distinct mechanical combination differing from previous inventions. The correctness of the assumption that revolving batteries for manipulating guns on board floating structures had been constructed nearly a century ago will be seen by the following reference to printed publications.
The "Nautical Chronicle" for 1805 contains an account of a "movable turning impregnable battery, invented by a Mr. Gillespie, a native of Scotland, who completed the model of a movable impregnable castle or battery, impervious to shot or bombs, provided with a cannon and carriage calculated to take a sure aim at any object." It is further stated that "the invention proposed will be found equally serviceable in floating batteries. Its machinery is adapted to turn the most ponderous mortars with the greatest ease, according to the position of the enemy." Again, the Transactions of the Society for the Promotion of Useful Arts in the State of New York, 1807, contains an illustration representing a side elevation of a circular revolving floating battery constructed by Abraham Bloodgood. The guns of this battery, as the inventor points out, "would be more easily worked than is common, as they would not require any lateral movement." It is also stated, as a peculiar feature of this floating battery, that "its rotary motion would bring all its cannon to bear successively, as fast as they could be loaded, on objects in any direction"; and that "its circular form would cause every shot that might strike it, not near the center, to glance." Thirty-five years after the publication of the illustration and description of the circular floating revolving tower of Abraham Bloodgood, Theodore R. Timby proposed to build a tower on land for coast defense, to be composed of iron, with several floors
[p. 740]
and tiers of guns, the tower to turn on a series of friction-rollers under its base. The principal feature of Timby's "invention" was that of arranging the guns radially within the tower, and firing each gun at the instant of its coming in line with the object aimed at during the rotary motion of the tower, precisely as invented by Bloodgood. About 1865 certain influential citizens presented drawings of Timby's revolving tower to the authorities at Washington, with a view of obtaining orders to build such towers for coast defense; but the plan was found to be not only very expensive, but radically defective in principle. The slides of the gun-carriages being fixed permanently in a radial direction within the tower, the guns, of course, are directed to all points of the compass. Hence, during an attack by a hostile fleet, with many ships abreast, only one assailant can be fired at, its companions being scot-free in the dead angle formed between the effective gun and the guns on either side. In the meantime the numerous guns, distributed round the tower on the several floors, cannot be fired until their time comes during the revolution of the tower. The enemy's fleet continuing its advance, of course, calls for a change of elevation of the pieces, which, considering the constant revolution of the tower and the different altitudes above the sea of the several tiers, presents perplexing difficulties. Nothing further need be said to explain why the Government did not accept the plans for Timby's revolving towers.
The origin of rotating circular gun-platforms being disposed of, the consideration of the central section of the illustration will now be resumed. It will be seen that the turret which protects the guns and gunners of the Monitor consists simply of a short cylinder resting on the deck, covered with a grated iron roof provided with sliding hatches. This cylinder is composed of eight thicknesses of wrought-iron plates, each one inch thick, firmly riveted together, the inside course, which extends below the rest, being accurately faced underneath. A flat, broad ring of bronze is let into the deck, its upper
[p. 741]
face being very smooth in order to form a water-tight joint with the base of the turret without the employment of any elastic packing, a peculiar feature of the turrets of the monitors, as will be seen further on. Unfortunately, before the Monitor left New York for Hampton Roads, it was suggested at the Navy Yard to insert a plaited hemp rope between the base of the turret and the bronze ring, for the purpose of making the joint perfectly water-tight. As might have been supposed, the rough and uneven hemp rope did not form a perfect joint; hence during the passage a great leak was observed at intervals as the sea washed over the decks. "The water came down under the turret like a waterfall," says Lieutenant Greene in his report. It will be proper to observe in this place that the "foundering" of the Monitor on its way to Charleston was not caused by the "separation of the upper and lower part of the hull," as was imagined by persons who possessed no knowledge of the method adopted by the builders in joining the upper and lower hulls. Again, those who asserted that the plates had been torn asunder at the junction of the hulls did not consider that severe strain cannot take place in a structure nearly submerged. The easy motion at sea, peculiar to the monitors, was pointed out by several of their commanders. Lieutenant Greene in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board the Monitor, March 27th, 1862, says with reference to sea-going qualities:
"During her passage from New York her roll was very easy and slow and not at all deep. She pitched very little and with no strain whatever."
Captain John Rodgers's report to the Secretary of the Navy, dated on board of the monitor Weehawken, January 22d, 1863, refers specially to the easy motion of his vessel:
"On Tuesday night, when off Chincoteague shoals, we had a very heavy gale from the E. N. E. with a very heavy sea, made confused and dangerous by the proximity of the land. The waves I measured after the sea abated; I found them twenty-three feet high. They were certainly seven feet higher in the midst of the storm. During the heaviest of the gale I stood upon the turret and admired the behavior of the vessel. She rose and fell to the waves, and I concluded that the monitor form had great sea-going qualities. If leaks were prevented no hurricane could injure her."
The true cause of the foundering of the Monitor was minutely explained to the writer some time after the occurrence by the engineer, a very intelligent person, who operated the centrifugal pumping-engine of the vessel at the time. According to his statement, oakum was packed under the base of the turret before going to sea, in order to make sure of a water-tight joint; but this expedient failed altogether, the sea gradually washing out the oakum in those places where it had been loosely packed, thereby permitting so large a
[p. 742]
quantity of water to enter under the turret, fully sixty-three feet in circumference, that the centrifugal pumping-engine had not sufficient power to expel it. The hull consequently filled gradually and settled, until at the expiration of about four hours the Monitor went to the bottom. It will be asked, in view of the preceding explanation of the construction of the monitor turrets, namely, that the smooth base of the turret forms a water-tight joint with the ring on the deck, why was oakum packed under the turret before going to Charleston? The commander of the vessel, Captain Bankhead, in his report of the foundering, adverts to the admission of water under the turret, but does not duly consider the serious character of the leak, sixty-three feet in length. Captain Bankhead evidently had not carefully investigated the matter when he attributed the accident to an imaginary separation of the upper and lower hull. [*] It should be observed, in justice to this officer, that having commanded the Monitor only during a brief period he possessed but an imperfect knowledge of his vessel, and probably knew nothing regarding the consequence of employing packing, -- namely, that it might cause "water to come down under the turret like a waterfall," as previously reported by the second officer in command. It is proper to mention as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the second officer, Lieutenant Greene, that previous to the battle in Hampton Roads he had "never performed any but midshipman duty." The important question, therefore, must remain unanswered, whether in the hands of an older and more experienced executive officer the Monitor, like the other vessels of her type, might not have reached Charleston in safety.
Referring again to the central part of the illustration [p. 733] and the sectional representation of the turret [above], it will be found that the guns are
[p. 743]
placed across the vessel; consequently only the end of the breech and upper part of the port-hole are seen. The object of the pendulum port-stoppers suspended under the roof is to afford protection to the turret crew while loading the guns. Generally, however, the turret should be moved, and the port-holes thereby turned away from the enemy. Much time was lost during the conflict with the Merrimac by closing the port-stoppers in place of merely moving the turret, the latter operation being performed by a small steamengine controlled by a single hand; while opening and closing the port-stoppers, as reported by Lieutenant Greene, required the entire gun-crew. The slow fire of the Monitor during the action, complained of by critics, was no doubt occasioned by an injudicious manipulation of the port-stoppers. There are occasions, however, when the turret should not be turned, in which case the port-stoppers are indispensable. The method adopted for turning the turret will be readily understood. The small steam-engine controlled by one man, before referred to, drives a double train of cog-wheels connected with the vertical axle of the turret, this axle being stepped in a bronze bearing secured to the central bulkhead of the vessel. The mechanism thus described was carefully tested before the Monitor left New York for Hampton Roads, and was found to move very freely, the turret being turned and the guns accurately pointed by the sailing-master without aid. The trouble reported by Lieutenant Greene regarding the manipulation of the turret was caused by inattention during the passage from New York, the working-gear having been permitted to rust for want of proper cleaning and oiling while exposed to the action of salt-water entering under the turret, from causes already explained.
Having thus briefly described the turret and its mechanism, our investigation of the central part of the sectional view of the battery will be completed by a mere reference to the steam-boilers placed aft of the turret. There are two of these boilers placed side by side, as shown in the cut on page 736. Two views being thus presented, the nature of the boilers will be understood without further explanation. It should be mentioned, however, that they proved very economical and efficient.
Aft Section. The following brief reference to this section of the sectional illustration, showing the motive engine, propeller, and rudder, will complete our description:
1. The motive engine, the construction of which is somewhat peculiar, consists of only one steam-cylinder with pistons applied at opposite ends, a steam-tight partition being introduced in the middle. The propeller-shaft has only one crank and one crank-pin, the difficulty of "passing the centers" being overcome by the expedient of placing the connecting-rods, actuated by the steam-pistons, at right angles to each other. Much space is saved within the vessel by employing only one steam-cylinder, an advantage of such importance in the short hulls of the monitors that the entire fleet built during the war was provided with engines of the stated type.
2. The propeller, being of the ordinary four-bladed type, needs no description; but the mode of protecting it against shot demands full explanation.
[p. 744]
Referring to the illustration, it will be seen that the under side of the overhang near the stern is cut out in the middle, forming a cavity needed to give free sweep to the propeller-blades; the slope of the cavity on either side of the propeller being considerably inclined in order to favor a free passage of the water to and from the propeller-blades.
3. The extreme beam at the forward side of the propeller-well is 31 feet, while the diameter of the propeller is only 9 feet; it will therefore be seen that the deck and side armor projects 11 feet on each side, thus protecting most effectually the propelling instrument as well as the equipoise rudder applied aft of the same. It will be readily admitted that no other vessel constructed here or elsewhere has such thorough protection to rudder and propeller as that just described.
The foregoing description of the hastily constructed steam-battery proves that, so far from being, as generally supposed, a rude specimen of naval construction, the Monitor displayed careful planning, besides workmanship of superior quality. Experts who examined the vessel and machinery after completion pronounced the entire structure a fine specimen of naval engineering.
The conflict in Hampton Roads, and the immediate building of a fleet of sea-going monitors by the United States Government, attracted great attention in all maritime countries, especially in the north of Europe. Admiral Lessoffsky, of the Russian navy, was at once ordered to be present during the completion and trial of our sea-going monitors. The report of this talented officer to his government being favorable, the Emperor immediately ordered a fleet of twelve vessels on the new system, to be constructed according to copies of the working-drawings from which the American sea-going monitors had been built. Sweden and Norway also forthwith laid the keels of a fleet of seven vessels of the new type, Turkey rapidly following the example of the northern European nations. It will be remembered that during the naval contest on the Danube the Russian batteries and torpedo-boats subjected the Turkish monitors to severe tests. England, in due course, adopted our turret system, discarding the turn-table and cupola.
Passage of Ordinance of Secession by Virginia Convention. -- Resign Office of Quartermaster-General of the United States. -- Defense of
West Point Officers, who resigned, from Unjust Attack. -- Assigned to Duty of organizing Virginia Troops. -- Ordered by President Davis
to take command at Harper's Ferry. -- Convineed, on Examination, that it was untenable. -- Correspondence, on the Subject, with General
Lee and the Confederate Authorities. -- General Beauregard assigned to command of Confederate Army at Manassas. -- Movements of General
Patterson. -- Withdrawal from Harper's Ferry. -- Affair near Romney. -- General Patterson again marches on Martinsburg. -- Battle
offered at Darkesville. -- General McDowell advances on Manassas. -- Precautions preparatory to assisting General Beauregard.
The composition of the convention assembled in Richmond in the spring of 1861, to consider the question of secession, proved that the
people of Virginia did not regard Mr. Lincoln's election as a sufficient cause for that measure, for at least two-thirds of its members
were elected as "Union men." And they and their constituents continued to be so, until the determination to "coerce" the seceded States
was proclaimed by the President of the United States, and Virginia required to furnish her quota of the troops to be organized for the
purpose. War being then inevitable, and the convention compelled to decide whether the State should aid in the subjugation
[p. 10]
of the other Southern States, or join them in the defense of principles it had professed since 1780 -- belong to the invading party, or
to that standing on the defensive -- it chose the latter, and passed its ordinance of secession. The people confirmed that choice by an
overwhelming vote.
The passage of that ordinance, in secret session on the 17th of April, was not known in Washington, where, as Quartermaster-General of
the United States Army, I was then stationed, until the 19th. I believed, like most others, that the division of the country would be
permanent; and that, apart from any right of secession, the revolution begun was justified by the maxims so often repeated by
Americans, that free government is founded on the consent of the governed, and that every community strong enough to establish and
maintain its independence has a right to assert it. Having been educated in such opinions, I naturally determined to return to the
State of which I was a native, join the people among whom I was born, and live with my kindred, and, if necessary, fight in their
defense.
Accordingly, the resignation of my commission, written on Saturday, was offered to the Secretary of War Monday morning. That gentleman
was requested, at the same time, to instruct the Adjutant-General, who had kindly accompanied me, to write the order announcing its
acceptance, immediately.
No other officer of the United States Army of equal rank, that of brigadier-general, relinquished his position in it to join the
Southern Confederacy.
Many officers of that army, of Southern birth, had previously resigned their commissions, to return
[p. 11]
to the States of which they were citizens, and many others did so later. Their objects in quitting the United States Army, and their
intentions to enter the service of the seceded States, were well known in the War Department. Yet no evidence of disapproval of these
intentions was given by the Federal Administration, nor efforts made by it to prevent their execution. This seems to me strong proof
that they were not then considered criminal.
Northern editors and political speakers accuse those who thus left the service of the United States for that of the Southern
Confederacy, of perjury, in breaking their oaths of allegiance. It is impossible that the inventors and propagators of this charge can
be ignorant that it is false. The acceptance of an officer's resignation absolves him from the obligations of his military oath as
completely as it releases the government from that of giving him the pay of the grade he held. An officer is bound by that oath to
allegiance to the United States, and obedience to the officers they may set over him. When the contract between the government and
himself is dissolved by mutual consent, as in the cases in question, he is no more bound, under his oath, to allegiance to the
government, than to obedience to his former commander. These two obligations are in force only during tenure of office. The individual
who was an officer has, when he becomes a citizen, exactly the same obligations to the United States as other citizens.
This principle was always acted upon by the United States. Whenever a military officer received a new appointment, either of a higher
grade, or of an equal one in another corps, he was required to
[p. 12]
repeat the oath of office, because the previous one, including of course that of allegiance, was held to have expired with the previous
office, although the individual had not ceased to be an officer of the army. When he left the army, as well as a particular office in
it, the case was certainly stronger.
Leaving all my property but personal arms and clothing, I set off to Richmond with my family, on Tuesday. In consequence of railroad
accidents, however, we did not reach that place until day-break, Thursday.
General Lee had been appointed commander-in-chief, with the rank of major-general. There were, however, several other officers of that
grade. A few hours after my arrival, Governor Letcher gave me the appointment of major-general.
The commander-in-chief assigned me to the service of organizing and instructing the volunteers then just beginning to assemble at the
call of the Governor. He himself was then selecting the points to be occupied by these troops for the protection of the State, and
determining the number to be assigned to each. Norfolk, a point near Yorktown, another in front of Fredericksburg, Manassas Junction,
Harper's Ferry, and Grafton, seemed to be regarded by him as the most important positions, for they were to be occupied in greatest
force.
I was assisted in my duties by Lieutenant-Colonel Pemberton, Majors Jackson and Gilham, and Captain T. L. Preston. Near the end of
April, however, the second named was promoted to a colonelcy and assigned to the command of Harper's Ferry, held until then by Colonel
Kenton Harper.
[p. 13]
I was employed in this way about two weeks. Then, Virginia having acceded to the Southern Confederacy, the government of which assumed
the direction of military affairs, I accepted a brigadier-generalcy offered me by telegraph by the President. It was then the highest
grade in the Confderate army. The offer had been made in one or two previous telegrams sent to General Lee, for me, but not delivered.
The Virginia Convention had abolished my office in the State service, and offered me the next lower. But, as it was certain that the
war would be conducted by the Confederate Government, and its officers had precedence of those having like State grades, I preferred
the Confederate commission.
The President had me called to Montgomery to receive instructions, and there assigned me to the command of Harper's Ferry.
In my journeys from Washington to Richmond, from Richmond to Montgomery, and thence to Harper's Ferry, I saw in the crowds assembled at
all the railroad-stations the appearance of great enthusiasm for the war against subjugation -- so much as to give me the impression
that all of the population fit for military service might have been brought into the field, if the Confederate Government could have
furnished them with arms and ammunition -- which, unfortunately, it had not provided. That government depended for arms, for the war
then imminent, mainly upon those found in the arsenals at Fayetteville, Charleston, Augusta, Mount Vernon, and Baton Rouge; United
States muskets and rifles of discarded pattern, the number supposed to be about
[p. 14]
seventy-five thousand; above forty thousand muskets belonging to the State of Virginia in course of rapid conversion from "flint" to
"percussion lock" by Governor Letcher's orders; and twenty thousand lately procured for the State of Georgia, by Governor Brown.
I reached Harper's Ferry soon after noon of the 23d of May, accompanied by Colonel E. Kirby Smith, [1] acting adjutant-general, Major
W. H. C. Whiting, [2] of the Engineer Corps, Major E. McLean, of the Quartermaster's Department, and Captain T. L. Preston, assistant
adjutant-general. Within an hour the commanding officer, Colonel Jackson, [3] visited me; learned the object of my coming, and read the
order of the War Department, assigning me to the command he had been exercising. My order announcing the change of commanders, made by
the President's authority, was sent to him next morning, with the request that he would have the proper number of copies made and
distributed to the troops, as I had no office as yet. He replied very courteously, in writing, that he did not "feel at liberty to
transfer his command to another without further instructions from Governor Letcher or General Lee;" but offered me, in the mean while,
every facility in his power for obtaining information relating to the post. Major Whiting, who had been his school-fellow, saw him at
my request, and convinced him very soon that the President's authority was paramount in military affairs, and his action in the
[p. 15]
case in accordance with military usage. This misunderstanding of military custom produced little more delay than the time consumed by
the messenger in bringing me Colonel Jackson's note, and by Major Whiting in going to that officer's quarters from mine.
This little affair is mentioned, only because what seems to me a very exaggerated account of it has been published. [4]
Governor Letcher had taken possession of Harper's Ferry as soon as possible, and had it occupied by a body of troops commanded by
Colonel Kenton Harper -- not soon enough, however, to prevent the destruction of the small-arms stored in the armory. The Federal
commanding officer, when compelled by the approach of the Virginia troops to abandon the place, set fire to the buildings containing
these arms, [5] to destroy what he could not save for his government. Soon after being appointed commander-in-chief of the forces of
the State, General Lee increased the garrison of Harper's Ferry, and placed Colonel Jackson in command there. On extending its control
of military affairs over Virginia, the Confederate Government, as if equally impressed with the importance of the position, made
another addition to the troops assembled there -- of three regiments and two battalions of infantry. I was also instructed in
Montgomery to "take Lynchburg in my route, and to make arrangements there for sending forward to Harper's Ferry `such force' as I might
deem necessary to strengthen my command." I found no available "force" there, however.
[p. 16]
The forces thus assembled were, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-seventh Virginia, Second and Eleventh
Mississippi and Fourth Alabama regiments of infantry, and a Maryland and a Kentucky battalion; four companies of artillery (Virginia),
with four guns each, but without caissons, horses, or harness; and the First Regiment of Virginia Cavalry -- of about two hundred and
fifty men, including Captain Turner Ashby's company, temporarily attached to it by Colonel Jackson -- in all, about five thousand two
hundred effective men. Among the superior officers were several who subsequently rose to high distinction: "Stonewall" Jackson; A. P.
Hill, who won the grade of lieutenant-general; Stuart, matchless as commander of outposts; and Pendleton, General Lee's commander of
artillery.
These troops were undisciplined, of course. They were also badly armed and equipped -- several regiments being without accoutrements --
and were almost destitute of ammunition, and, like all new troops assembled in large bodies, they were suffering very much from
sickness; nearly forty per cent. [6] of the "total" being in the hospitals there or elsewhere, from the effects of measles and mumps.
General Lee's command in Virginia, as major-general in the State service, was continued until Richmond became the Confederate seat of
government. The law converting the Confederate brigadier-generals into generals, approved May 16th, had not been published to the army
in orders, by the War Department, but was known to be in existence, for it had appeared in the newspapers.
[p. 17]
My conversations with General Lee in Richmond, and the President's oral instructions to me in Montgomery; had informed me distinctly
that they regarded Harper's Ferry as a natural fortress -- commanding the entrance into the Valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania and
Maryland -- and that it was occupied in that idea, and my command not that of a military district and active army, but of a fortress
and its garrison. Maps, and intelligent persons of the neighborhood, told me that the principal route into "the Valley" from
Pennsylvania crosses the Potomac at Williamsport, and the railroad at Martinsburg, at least twenty miles west of this garrison, and of
course beyond its control. A careful examination of the position and its environs, made on the 25th, with the assistance of an engineer
of great ability, Major Whiting, convinced me that it could not be held against equal numbers by such a force as then occupied it.
Harper's Ferry is untenable against an army by any force not strong enough to hold the neighboring heights north of the Potomac and
east of the Shenandoah, as well as the place itself. It is a triangle formed by the Potomac, Shenandoah, and Furnace Ridge, the latter
extending from river to river, a mile and a half above their junction. Artillery on the heights above mentioned to the north and east
could sweep every part of this space. As the rivers are fordable at various points, it was easy to turn or invest the place, or assail
it on the west (Furnace Ridge) side.
into the Valley of Virginia, meeting at Winchester: one passing through Frederick, and crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry; the
other leading through Chambersburg, Williamsport (where it crosses the Potomac), and Martinsburg. These roads are met at Winchester by
the principal one from Northwestern Virginia into "the Valley," and also by a good and direct one from Manassas Junction, through
Ashby's Gap, which, east of the Blue Ridge, had the advantage of easy communication with the Manassas Gap Railroad. This road is,
perhaps, little shorter than that from Manassas Junction to Harper's Ferry; but there were insuperable objections to the latter. Near
Harper's Ferry it follows the course of the Potomac, and could be completely swept by artillery on the north bank of the river, so that
it might have been closed to us by a few Federal batteries; and, even if our troops following it escaped that danger, they might have
been intercepted near Centreville by the Federal army.
The United States had, at that time, three armies threatening Virginia. The principal one at Washington, commanded by Major-General
McDowell; the second at Chambersburg, under Major-General Patterson's command; and the third in Northwestern Virginia, under that of
Major-General McClellan.
We supposed that these armies would coöperate with each other, and that the Federal general-in-chief would direct their combined forces
against Richmond. This supposition was partially sustained by our scouts and friends in Maryland, who reported that the armies of
Generals Patterson and McClellan
[p. 19]
were to unite at Winchester; and this report was confirmed by the Northern press.
It was necessary, of course, that the Confederate troops in the Valley should always be ready to meet this invasion, as well as to
unite quickly with the army at Manassas Junction, whenever it might be threatened by General McDowell's. At Harper's Ferry, they were
manifestly out of position for either object, for Patterson's route from Chambersburg lay through Williamsport and Martinsburg -- a
long day's march to the west; and the only direct road thence to Manassas Junction was completely under the enemy's control. Winchester
was obnoxious to neither objection, but, on the contrary, fulfilled the conditions desired better than any other point. The commanders
on both sides, in the subsequent military operations in that region, seem to have appreciated its importance, and to have estimated its
value as I did, except those who disposed the forces of the United States in September, 1862, when eleven thousand men, placed at
Harper's Ferry as a garrison, were captured, almost without resistance, by General Lee's troops, coming from Maryland.
My objections to Harper's Ferry as a position, and to the idea of making a garrison instead of an active force of the troops intrusted
with the defense of that district, were expressed to the proper authorities in letters dated May 26th and 28th, and June 6th, and
replied to by General Lee [7] on the 1st and 7th of June. These letters of his express the
[p. 20]
dissent of the authorities from my views, and their opinion that the maintenance of the existing arrangement was necessary to enable us
to retain the command of the Valley of Virginia, and our communications with Maryland, held to be very important.
General Lee wrote in his letter of June 1st: "I received, on my return from Manassas Junction, your communications of the 25th and 28th
ult., in reference to your position at Harper's Ferry. The difficulties which surround it have been felt from the beginning of its
occupation, and I am aware of the obstacles to its maintenance with your present force. Every effort has been made to remove them, and
will be continued. But, with similar necessities pressing on every side, you need not be informed of the difficulty of providing
against them. . . ." And in that of the 7th: "I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 6th inst. The importance of the
subject has induced me to lay it before the President, that he may be informed of your views. He places great value upon the retention
of the command of the Shenandoah Valley, and the position at Harper's Ferry. The evacuation of the latter would interrupt our
communication with Maryland, and injure our cause in that State. . . ."
The objects of the Confederate Government, expressed in these letters, were not to be accomplished by the concentration of its forces
at Harper's Ferry; for General Patterson's invasion was to be from Chambersburg, and therefore by Williamsport and Martinsburg, a route
beyond the control of Harper's Ferry.
Notwithstanding this determination on the part
[p. 21]
of the Executive, I resolved not to continue to occupy the place after the purposes for which the troops were sent to it should require
them elsewhere.
About the 9th of June, however, I again represented to the Government the objections to its plan, and urged it to change the character
of my command. [8]
General Beauregard came to Manassas Junction and assumed command on that frontier, a week after my arrival at Harper's Ferry. We
communicated with each other at once, and agreed that the first attacked should be aided by the other to his utmost. We were convinced
of our mutual dependence, and agreed in the opinion that the safety of the Confederacy depended on the coöperation of the armies we
commanded.
In the mean time the Potomac was observed by the cavalry from the Point of Rocks to the western part of the county of Berkeley, as had
been done under my predecessor. The manufacture of cartridge-boxes and belts was ordered in the neighboring towns and villages.
Cartridges were made of powder furnished by Governor Letcher, and lead found at the place, or procured in the neighborhood. Caps (in
small quantities only) were smuggled from Baltimore. Caissons were constructed at Captain Pendleton's suggestion, by fixing
roughly-made ammunition-chests on the running-parts of farm-wagons. Horses, and harness of various kinds, for the artillery, and wagons
and
[p. 22]
teams for field-transportation, were collected in the surrounding country; and the work of removing the machinery of the armory, begun
by Governor Letcher's orders, was continued. Two heavy guns on naval carriages, that had been placed in battery on the west side of the
village by Colonel Jackson's direction, were mounted on Furnace Ridge. My predecessors had constructed two very slight outworks, one on
the summit of the mountain on the Maryland side of the Potomac, the other on the Loudon Heights.
Before the end of the first week in June the Seventh and Eighth Georgia and Second Tennessee regiments had arrived.
About the 10th of the month, General Patterson, who had been organizing and instructing his troops at Chambersburg, advanced from that
place to Hagerstown. According to the information we could obtain from scouts and intelligent people of the country, they amounted to
about eighteen thousand men. The organization of this army, as published in a newspaper of Hagerstown, corresponded very well with this
estimate; for twenty-four regiments of infantry were enumerated in it, and several small bodies of regular artillery and cavalry. [9]
The garrison of Harper's Ferry had then been increased to almost seven thousand men of all arms.
At sunrise on the 13th the Hon. James M. Mason brought from Winchester intelligence, received there the night before, that two thousand
Federal troops, supposed to be the advanced guard of General McClellan's army, had marched into Romney the day before. That place is
forty-three miles west of
[p. 23]
Winchester. As this information had come from the most respectable sources, it was believed, and Colonel A. P. Hill immediately
dispatched to Winchester with his own (Thirteenth) and Colonel Gibbons's (Tenth Virginia) regiments on trains provided by Mr. Mason's
forethought. Colonel Hill was instructed to add Colonel Vaughn's (Third Tennessee) regiment, which had just reached the town, to his
detachment, and to move on toward Romney without delay, and to take the best measures in his power to retard the progress of the
Federal troops, if they should be approaching "the Valley."
During that day and the next the heavy baggage of the troops (almost every private soldier had a trunk), the property of the
quartermaster's and subsistence departments, and the remaining machinery of the armory, were removed to Winchester by railroad, whence
the machinery was transported over the turnpike to Strasburg, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, and the bridges over the Potomac were
destroyed from the Point of Rocks to Shepardstown.
Mr. Davis's Unsent Message. -- Letters of Governor Humphreys and Major Mims. -- Synopsis of Unsent Message. -- Reply to Unsent Message.
In the winter of 1866-'67, I learned in Jackson, Mississippi, that a paper had been seen by my three or four friends there, purporting to be a message from the President of the Confederacy to the two Houses of Congress, explaining why his Excellency could not conscientiously restore me to military command. This explanation was, ostensibly, a narrative of my military service to the time of my removal from the command of the Army of Tennessee, with comments.
My friends endeavored, but unsuccessfully, to obtain a copy of the paper for me. They gave me, however, the name of the gentleman to whom they supposed that it had been committed.
When informed of Mr. Davis's address, or rather, how I could send a letter to him, I requested him to instruct the gentleman my friends had named to me, to give me a copy of the document. He replied promptly that, although he had written no such message, he desired the gentleman named, by that mail, to give me a copy of any paper written by him in relation to me, that might be in his possession. In due time that gentleman informed me that he had not the paper, but told me who had it in his keeping.
[p. 431]
I then wrote to Mr. Davis again, explaining my mistake, and requesting him to instruct the gentleman who really had the message to give me a copy. As Mr. Davis had gone to Mississippi in the mean time, this letter was sent to a gentleman in Jackson, who was his friend as well as mine. In that way I know it was received, although never acknowledged; nor was the copy asked for given; I am therefore compelled to believe that the instructions so promptly received by one who had not the paper described, were not given to him to whom it had been intrusted.
The fact that this document was shown to the only gentlemen of Jackson whom I was well acquainted with, gives me reason to think that it has been exhibited freely, while the care with which it is preserved, and the language of him who has it in his keeping, indicate that it is so preserved for publication. Having waited for that event as long as one at my time of life can afford to do, I now defend myself against these accusations as given in the following synopsis -- the only form in which I have been able to see them. I am confident of its accuracy, from the best evidence -- that of gentlemen of intelligence and honor, who are well known in Mississippi. It is given in the following letter:
Vicksburg, Miss., January 10, 1870.
"Dear General: Your letter of 26th December last was received while I was confined to my bed with catarrh-fever, which is my excuse for the delay in answering it.
I have carefully read the synopsis (furnished you by a friend and sent to me) of the paper read to me
[p. 432]
by General T. J. Wharton, in the Executive Office at Jackson in 1866, purporting to be a message prepared by President Davis, to be sent to Congress, giving his reasons for withholding from you any further command in the Confederate Army. I find it to agree wonderfully with my recollections of the contents of that paper. The synopsis is somewhat meagre in elaboration and detail, but, with some few omissions, it is substantially correct, I think. First, in the charges stated in regard to your conduct and course in the Valley before the battle of Manassas; then of what is said of your movement from Manassas and preliminary to it; then the accusations against you at Yorktown, at Seven Pines, and at Vicksburg; and the alleged misconduct in Georgia, are all given substantially correct. As to the omissions I allude to, I think it is stated in the original paper that you were ordered to take command of Bragg's army in January, 1863, if it appeared to you to be advisable, but that you sustained Bragg, expressed confidence, etc., in him. Then you are taken to task for remaining in Tennessee instead of going to Mississippi, where you ought to have been, and where you did not go until expressly ordered. I think another omission is, that you were charged with the loss of rolling-stock on the railroad above Big Black, in July, 1863, which could have been saved easily by making a temporary bridge at Jackson. I think, if the original paper ever sees daylight, it will show the synopsis and these omissions to be substantially given as stated.
Very truly, your sincere friend,
(Signed)
Benj. G. Humphreys.
To General J. E. Johnston,
Savannah, Ga."
[p. 433]
Passage of Ordinance of Secession by Virginia Convention. -- Resign Office of Quartermaster-General of the United States. -- Defense of
West Point Officers, who resigned, from Unjust Attack. -- Assigned to Duty of organizing Virginia Troops. -- Ordered by President Davis
to take command at Harper's Ferry. -- Convineed, on Examination, that it was untenable. -- Correspondence, on the Subject, with General
Lee and the Confederate Authorities. -- General Beauregard assigned to command of Confederate Army at Manassas. -- Movements of General
Patterson. -- Withdrawal from Harper's Ferry. -- Affair near Romney. -- General Patterson again marches on Martinsburg. -- Battle
offered at Darkesville. -- General McDowell advances on Manassas. -- Precautions preparatory to assisting General Beauregard.
The composition of the convention assembled in Richmond in the spring of 1861, to consider the question of secession, proved that the
people of Virginia did not regard Mr. Lincoln's election as a sufficient cause for that measure, for at least two-thirds of its members
were elected as "Union men." And they and their constituents continued to be so, until the determination to "coerce" the seceded States
was proclaimed by the President of the United States, and Virginia required to furnish her quota of the troops to be organized for the
purpose. War being then inevitable, and the convention compelled to decide whether the State should aid in the subjugation
[p. 10]
of the other Southern States, or join them in the defense of principles it had professed since 1780 -- belong to the invading party, or
to that standing on the defensive -- it chose the latter, and passed its ordinance of secession. The people confirmed that choice by an
overwhelming vote.
The passage of that ordinance, in secret session on the 17th of April, was not known in Washington, where, as Quartermaster-General of
the United States Army, I was then stationed, until the 19th. I believed, like most others, that the division of the country would be
permanent; and that, apart from any right of secession, the revolution begun was justified by the maxims so often repeated by
Americans, that free government is founded on the consent of the governed, and that every community strong enough to establish and
maintain its independence has a right to assert it. Having been educated in such opinions, I naturally determined to return to the
State of which I was a native, join the people among whom I was born, and live with my kindred, and, if necessary, fight in their
defense.
Accordingly, the resignation of my commission, written on Saturday, was offered to the Secretary of War Monday morning. That gentleman
was requested, at the same time, to instruct the Adjutant-General, who had kindly accompanied me, to write the order announcing its
acceptance, immediately.
No other officer of the United States Army of equal rank, that of brigadier-general, relinquished his position in it to join the
Southern Confederacy.
Many officers of that army, of Southern birth, had previously resigned their commissions, to return
[p. 11]
to the States of which they were citizens, and many others did so later. Their objects in quitting the United States Army, and their
intentions to enter the service of the seceded States, were well known in the War Department. Yet no evidence of disapproval of these
intentions was given by the Federal Administration, nor efforts made by it to prevent their execution. This seems to me strong proof
that they were not then considered criminal.
Northern editors and political speakers accuse those who thus left the service of the United States for that of the Southern
Confederacy, of perjury, in breaking their oaths of allegiance. It is impossible that the inventors and propagators of this charge can
be ignorant that it is false. The acceptance of an officer's resignation absolves him from the obligations of his military oath as
completely as it releases the government from that of giving him the pay of the grade he held. An officer is bound by that oath to
allegiance to the United States, and obedience to the officers they may set over him. When the contract between the government and
himself is dissolved by mutual consent, as in the cases in question, he is no more bound, under his oath, to allegiance to the
government, than to obedience to his former commander. These two obligations are in force only during tenure of office. The individual
who was an officer has, when he becomes a citizen, exactly the same obligations to the United States as other citizens.
This principle was always acted upon by the United States. Whenever a military officer received a new appointment, either of a higher
grade, or of an equal one in another corps, he was required to
[p. 12]
repeat the oath of office, because the previous one, including of course that of allegiance, was held to have expired with the previous
office, although the individual had not ceased to be an officer of the army. When he left the army, as well as a particular office in
it, the case was certainly stronger.
Leaving all my property but personal arms and clothing, I set off to Richmond with my family, on Tuesday. In consequence of railroad
accidents, however, we did not reach that place until day-break, Thursday.
General Lee had been appointed commander-in-chief, with the rank of major-general. There were, however, several other officers of that
grade. A few hours after my arrival, Governor Letcher gave me the appointment of major-general.
The commander-in-chief assigned me to the service of organizing and instructing the volunteers then just beginning to assemble at the
call of the Governor. He himself was then selecting the points to be occupied by these troops for the protection of the State, and
determining the number to be assigned to each. Norfolk, a point near Yorktown, another in front of Fredericksburg, Manassas Junction,
Harper's Ferry, and Grafton, seemed to be regarded by him as the most important positions, for they were to be occupied in greatest
force.
I was assisted in my duties by Lieutenant-Colonel Pemberton, Majors Jackson and Gilham, and Captain T. L. Preston. Near the end of
April, however, the second named was promoted to a colonelcy and assigned to the command of Harper's Ferry, held until then by Colonel
Kenton Harper.
[p. 13]
I was employed in this way about two weeks. Then, Virginia having acceded to the Southern Confederacy, the government of which assumed
the direction of military affairs, I accepted a brigadier-generalcy offered me by telegraph by the President. It was then the highest
grade in the Confderate army. The offer had been made in one or two previous telegrams sent to General Lee, for me, but not delivered.
The Virginia Convention had abolished my office in the State service, and offered me the next lower. But, as it was certain that the
war would be conducted by the Confederate Government, and its officers had precedence of those having like State grades, I preferred
the Confederate commission.
The President had me called to Montgomery to receive instructions, and there assigned me to the command of Harper's Ferry.
In my journeys from Washington to Richmond, from Richmond to Montgomery, and thence to Harper's Ferry, I saw in the crowds assembled at
all the railroad-stations the appearance of great enthusiasm for the war against subjugation -- so much as to give me the impression
that all of the population fit for military service might have been brought into the field, if the Confederate Government could have
furnished them with arms and ammunition -- which, unfortunately, it had not provided. That government depended for arms, for the war
then imminent, mainly upon those found in the arsenals at Fayetteville, Charleston, Augusta, Mount Vernon, and Baton Rouge; United
States muskets and rifles of discarded pattern, the number supposed to be about
[p. 14]
seventy-five thousand; above forty thousand muskets belonging to the State of Virginia in course of rapid conversion from "flint" to
"percussion lock" by Governor Letcher's orders; and twenty thousand lately procured for the State of Georgia, by Governor Brown.
I reached Harper's Ferry soon after noon of the 23d of May, accompanied by Colonel E. Kirby Smith, [1] acting adjutant-general, Major
W. H. C. Whiting, [2] of the Engineer Corps, Major E. McLean, of the Quartermaster's Department, and Captain T. L. Preston, assistant
adjutant-general. Within an hour the commanding officer, Colonel Jackson, [3] visited me; learned the object of my coming, and read the
order of the War Department, assigning me to the command he had been exercising. My order announcing the change of commanders, made by
the President's authority, was sent to him next morning, with the request that he would have the proper number of copies made and
distributed to the troops, as I had no office as yet. He replied very courteously, in writing, that he did not "feel at liberty to
transfer his command to another without further instructions from Governor Letcher or General Lee;" but offered me, in the mean while,
every facility in his power for obtaining information relating to the post. Major Whiting, who had been his school-fellow, saw him at
my request, and convinced him very soon that the President's authority was paramount in military affairs, and his action in the
[p. 15]
case in accordance with military usage. This misunderstanding of military custom produced little more delay than the time consumed by
the messenger in bringing me Colonel Jackson's note, and by Major Whiting in going to that officer's quarters from mine.
This little affair is mentioned, only because what seems to me a very exaggerated account of it has been published. [4]
Governor Letcher had taken possession of Harper's Ferry as soon as possible, and had it occupied by a body of troops commanded by
Colonel Kenton Harper -- not soon enough, however, to prevent the destruction of the small-arms stored in the armory. The Federal
commanding officer, when compelled by the approach of the Virginia troops to abandon the place, set fire to the buildings containing
these arms, [5] to destroy what he could not save for his government. Soon after being appointed commander-in-chief of the forces of
the State, General Lee increased the garrison of Harper's Ferry, and placed Colonel Jackson in command there. On extending its control
of military affairs over Virginia, the Confederate Government, as if equally impressed with the importance of the position, made
another addition to the troops assembled there -- of three regiments and two battalions of infantry. I was also instructed in
Montgomery to "take Lynchburg in my route, and to make arrangements there for sending forward to Harper's Ferry `such force' as I might
deem necessary to strengthen my command." I found no available "force" there, however.
[p. 16]
The forces thus assembled were, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-seventh Virginia, Second and Eleventh
Mississippi and Fourth Alabama regiments of infantry, and a Maryland and a Kentucky battalion; four companies of artillery (Virginia),
with four guns each, but without caissons, horses, or harness; and the First Regiment of Virginia Cavalry -- of about two hundred and
fifty men, including Captain Turner Ashby's company, temporarily attached to it by Colonel Jackson -- in all, about five thousand two
hundred effective men. Among the superior officers were several who subsequently rose to high distinction: "Stonewall" Jackson; A. P.
Hill, who won the grade of lieutenant-general; Stuart, matchless as commander of outposts; and Pendleton, General Lee's commander of
artillery.
These troops were undisciplined, of course. They were also badly armed and equipped -- several regiments being without accoutrements --
and were almost destitute of ammunition, and, like all new troops assembled in large bodies, they were suffering very much from
sickness; nearly forty per cent. [6] of the "total" being in the hospitals there or elsewhere, from the effects of measles and mumps.
General Lee's command in Virginia, as major-general in the State service, was continued until Richmond became the Confederate seat of
government. The law converting the Confederate brigadier-generals into generals, approved May 16th, had not been published to the army
in orders, by the War Department, but was known to be in existence, for it had appeared in the newspapers.
[p. 17]
My conversations with General Lee in Richmond, and the President's oral instructions to me in Montgomery; had informed me distinctly
that they regarded Harper's Ferry as a natural fortress -- commanding the entrance into the Valley of Virginia from Pennsylvania and
Maryland -- and that it was occupied in that idea, and my command not that of a military district and active army, but of a fortress
and its garrison. Maps, and intelligent persons of the neighborhood, told me that the principal route into "the Valley" from
Pennsylvania crosses the Potomac at Williamsport, and the railroad at Martinsburg, at least twenty miles west of this garrison, and of
course beyond its control. A careful examination of the position and its environs, made on the 25th, with the assistance of an engineer
of great ability, Major Whiting, convinced me that it could not be held against equal numbers by such a force as then occupied it.
Harper's Ferry is untenable against an army by any force not strong enough to hold the neighboring heights north of the Potomac and
east of the Shenandoah, as well as the place itself. It is a triangle formed by the Potomac, Shenandoah, and Furnace Ridge, the latter
extending from river to river, a mile and a half above their junction. Artillery on the heights above mentioned to the north and east
could sweep every part of this space. As the rivers are fordable at various points, it was easy to turn or invest the place, or assail
it on the west (Furnace Ridge) side.
Movement of Troops to Manassas. -- Discouragements of the March. -- Arrival at Manassas. -- President Davis's Telegram. -- General Beauregard's Proposed Plan of Attack approved. -- General McDowell anticipates it. -- Battle of Manassas. -- Arrival of President Davis. -- Reasons why an Advance on Washington was impracticable.
The troops left their camps about noon, Jackson's brigade leading. After the march was fairly begun, and the rear had left Winchester a mile or two, the different regiments were informed, at the same time, of the important object in view, of the necessity of a forced march, and exhorted to strive to reach the field in time to take part in the great battle then imminent.
The discouragement of that day's march to one accustomed, like myself, to the steady gait of regular soldiers, is indescribable. The views of military command and obedience, then taken both by officers and privates, confined those duties and obligations almost exclusively to the drill-ground and guards. In camps and marches they were scarcely known. Consequently, frequent and unreasonable delays caused so slow a rate of marching as to make me despair of joining General Beauregard in time to aid him. Major Whiting was therefore dispatched to the nearest station of the Manassas Gap Railroad, Piedmont, to
[p. 37]
ascertain if trains, capable of transporting the troops to their destination more quickly than they were likely to reach it on foot, could be provided there, and, if so, to make the necessary arrangements. That officer met me at Paris, after executing his instructions, with a report so favorable as to give me reason to expect that the transportation of the infantry over the thirty-four miles between Piedmont and Manassas Junction would be accomplished easily in twenty-four hours.
Jackson's brigade, his leading men, that is to say, reached Paris, seventeen miles from Winchester, about two hours after dark. The four others halted for the night on the Shenandoah, having marched thirteen miles; Jackson's brigade marched the six miles from Paris to Piedmont before eight o'clock, Friday morning; and, as trains enough for its transportation were found there, it moved in an hour or two. The other brigades came up separately in the afternoon -- Bartow's first. Other trains, capable of transporting two regiments, being in readiness about three o'clock, the Seventh and Eighth Georgia regiments were dispatched in them. No other infantry had the means of moving that day, although the president of the railroad company had promised that the last regiment should reach Manassas Junction Saturday morning -- nine thousand men -- before sunrise.
The artillery and cavalry were directed to continue their march by the wagon-road, under Colonels Stuart and Pendleton.
At night, Captain Chisholm, an officer of General Beauregard's staff, arrived, bringing a suggestion from him to me, to march by Aldie and fall upon the
[p. 38]
rear of the Federal right, at Centreville, while his troops, advancing from Bull Run, assailed that army in front. I did not agree to the plan, because, ordinarily, it is impracticable to direct the movements of troops so distant from each other, by roads so far separated, in such a manner as to combine their action on a field of battle. It would have been impossible, in my opinion, to calculate when our undisciplined volunteers would reach any distant point that might be indicated. I preferred the junction of the two armies at the earliest time possible, as the first measure to secure success.
Enough of the cars, sent down in the morning to convey about two regiments, were brought back before midnight, but the conductors and engineers disappeared immediately, to pass the night probably in sleep, instead of on the road. And it was not until seven or eight o'clock Saturday morning that the trains could be put in motion, carrying the Fourth Alabama and Second Mississippi regiments, with two companies of the Eleventh. General Bee and myself accompanied these troops. Brigadier-General E. Kirby Smith was left at Piedmont to expedite the transportation of the remaining brigades -- about three-fifths of the army.
We reached General Beauregard's position about noon. The Seventh and Eighth Georgia regiments were united to the detachment just arrived, to form a temporary brigade for General Bee.
As the army had not been informed, in the usual way, of the promotion of Generals Cooper, Lee, and myself, to the grade of general, I had, after leaving Winchester, requested the President, by telegraph, to
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state what my rank in the army was, to prevent the possibility of a doubt of the relative rank of General Beauregard and myself in the mind of the former. His reply was received on the 20th. His excellency said, in his telegram: "You are a general in the Confederate army, possessed of all the powers attaching to that rank."
The position occupied by the Confederate army was too extensive, and the ground, much of it, too broken, thickly wooded, and intricate, to be studied to any purpose in the brief space of time at my disposal; for I had come impressed with the opinion that it was necessary to attack the enemy next morning, to decide the event before the arrival of General Patterson's forces. Meanwhile, it might reasonably be expected all of ours would be united. Delay was dangerous, because it was not to be hoped that our movement from Winchester could be concealed from General Patterson more than twenty-four hours; or that, after learning it, he would fail to follow the movement, and march promptly to join McDowell. Battle being inevitable, it was certainly our part to bring it on before the arrival of so great an addition to the number of our enemies. My intention, and these reasons for it, were expressed to General Beauregard at once. He had formed the same opinion, as I had expected.
He then showed me, on a map prepared by his engineer officers, the position of his own troops, and that of the Federal army near Centreville. Unfortunately, this map only represented the roads and streams, without expressing the configuration of the ground.
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He had chosen the southern bank of Bull Run for his defensive line; and, on information communicated by spies, to the effect that Lieutenant-General Scott had ordered the Federal army to advance from Centreville by roads eastward of that leading directly to Manassas Junction, which crosses Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford, he had posted his main force below (to the east of) that ford: Ewell's brigade on the right, at Union Mills, D. R. Jones's at McLean's Ford, Longstreet's at Blackburn's, and Bonham's at Mitchell's. Holmes's and Early's were in the second line, the former on the right. The remaining brigade, Colonel Cocke's, was at Ball's Ford, four miles above Mitchell's. Fourteen companies and a battery belonging to that brigade, under Colonel Evans, guarded "the Stone Bridge" (by which the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run) a half-mile above, and a farmford a thousand yards still farther up the stream. Jackson's and Bee's brigades, as they arrived, had been placed near Bonham's and Longstreet's by General Beauregard's orders.
Some slight field-works constructed for the defense of the depot at Manassas Junction were armed with fourteen or fifteen old twenty-four-pounders on naval carriages, and occupied by two thousand men. The heavy artillery was under the command of naval officers.
General Beauregard pointed out, on his map, five roads converging to Centreville from different points of his front, and proposed an order of march on these roads, by which the army should be concentrated near the Federal camps. It was accepted without hesitation; and, having had no opportunity to sleep
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in either of the three nights immediately preceding, I requested him to draw up this order of march and have the number of copies necessary written by our staff-officers and brought to me in time for distribution that evening, while I was preparing, by rest, for the impending battle.
These papers were not ready for distribution that evening, nor until the next morning (21st), when I was able to sign them by the light of day in the grove where I had slept. They were not in the form usual in the United States Army, being written by General Beauregard's adjutant-general in his name, [1] my sanction to be written on each copy. This was too immaterial to be worth correction; but, even if it had not been so, it was now too late to make such a correction, for the troops should then have been in motion.
Soon after sunrise, and before the distribution of these orders could have been completed, a light cannonade was opened upon our troops at the Stone Bridge, and a little later a similar demonstration was made in General Bonham's front. At half-past five o'clock a report was received from Colonel Evans that a body of Federal infantry, with a long line of skirmishers deployed before it, was visible on the opposite side of the valley of Bull Run. I had previously requested General Beauregard to send orders for me to Bee and Jackson to move their brigades to the left and place them near the Stone Bridge. He also ordered Colonel Hampton with the infantry of his legion, just arrived at Manassas, to hasten to the same locality.
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The plan of operations adopted the day before was now, apparently, made impracticable by the enemy's advance against our left. It was abandoned, therefore, and another adopted -- suggested by General Beauregard. This was, a change of front to the left, and a vigorous attack on the left flank of the troops assailing our left, by the six brigades of our centre and right, while Cocke's, Jackson's, and Bee's brigades, and Hampton's legion, were meeting their assault. The orders for this, like those preceding them, were distributed by General Beauregard's staff-officers, because they were addressed to his troops, and my staff knew neither the positions of the different brigades, nor the paths leading to them. Want of promptness in the delivery of these orders frustrated this plan -- perhaps fortunately.
Scouts, sent forward in the mean time by Generals Longstreet and D. R. Jones, reported strong bodies of Federal troops on the wooded heights in front of their brigades. From their reports it seemed to be as probable that McDowell was forming his main force in front of our main body, as that he was directing it against our left. At nine o'clock, Captain Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, who was also chief signal-officer, reported that large bodies of Federal troops could be seen from one of his signal-stations, crossing the valley of Bull Run, about two miles above our extreme left. When these troops were just observed, the head of the column had passed the open ground, in which they were visible. Their number, consequently, could not be estimated. He called our attention, soon after, to a heavy cloud of dust, such as the marching of an army might raise,
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about ten miles from us, to the north-northwest -- the direction of the road from Harper's Ferry. This excited apprehensions of the near approach of General Patterson's army.
General McDowell had marched from the Potomac with instructions from the general-in-chief to turn the right of the Confederate army and seize its line of communication with Richmond. Before involving himself in such an enterprise, the Federal general bestowed three days upon the examination of the ground before him. In this way he learned that the region into which he would have been led, by obedience to his instructions, was altogether unfavorable to the more numerous assailing army, and advantageous to the smaller force standing on the defensive; for it is rugged, and covered with thick woods, and the Occoquan, a stream to be crossed, is large enough to be a serious obstacle; while to the west the country is open, the hills gentle, and Bull Run almost everywhere fordable. He therefore decided, judiciously, to attempt to turn the Confederate line by moving through the open and favorable ground on his right, instead of involving his army in the thick woods and rugged hills on his left. The best argument for this change of plan, however, was the object explained by General McDowell -- "to break up the communication between the two Confederate armies," an object which might have been accomplished by prompt action.
For some unexplained purpose, one Federal division, Runyon's, had been left between the Potomac and Centreville, near Vienna. Leaving another, Miles's, at Centreville, to divert attention from the
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movements of his main body by demonstrations in front of the Confederate right and centre, General McDowell had marched at daybreak with Tyler's, Hunter's, and Heintzelman's divisions, to cross Bull Run at Sudley Ford, two miles and a half above the Warrenton Turnpike, seize that road, and, as he expresses it, "send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the Valley of Virginia." [2]
The Federal army followed the Warrenton Turnpike three miles, and then turned to the right into a country-road by which it reached Sudley Ford and Church. There it entered, at right angles, a road crossing the turnpike a mile and a half from the Stone Bridge, and leading, though not very directly, to Manassas Junction. Before the column turned out of the turnpike, the leading brigade and a battery were sent forward and formed near the Stone Bridge, to conceal the movement around the Confederate left.
This movement was reported to Colonel Evans, by his detachment stationed above the bridge. On receiving the intelligence, he moved rapidly to the left and rear with eleven companies and two field-pieces, to endeavor to check or delay the progress of the enemy, having left three companies and two field-pieces to prevent the passage of the bridge by the body of troops he had been observing in front of it. Following the base of the hill on the north of Young's Branch, he threw himself in the enemy's way a little in advance of the intersection of the
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turnpike and Sudley road, and formed his small force under cover of a detached wood. Here he was soon assailed by greatly superior and continually-increasing numbers, against which he and his little band held their ground bravely. The change of direction at Sudley Ford was so strong that the portion of the column beyond the stream, when the firing commenced, was almost parallel with the line of battle. This greatly expedited the deployment of the Federal army. Burnside's brigade, leading the march, attacked first, and was soon joined by a part of Porter's and one of Heintzelman's regiments.
The noise and smoke of the fight were distinctly heard and seen by General Beauregard and myself near Mitchell's Ford, five miles off; but, in its earlier stages, they indicated no force of the enemy that the troops on the ground and those of Bee, Hampton, and Jackson, that we could see hastening toward the firing in the order given, were not competent to cope with.
Bee, who was much in advance of the others, saw the strength and dispositions of the combatants, and the character of the ground around and before him, from the summit of the hill south of Young's Branch; and, seeing the advantage given to this position by its greater elevation than that of the opposite ridge, on which the enemy stood, by its broad, level top, and by the extent of open ground before it, he formed his brigade, including Bartow's two regiments and Imboden's battery, there; but, being appealed to for aid by Evans, then fully engaged, and seeing that his troops, that had suffered much in the unequal contest, were about to be overwhelmed, he moved forward
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to disengage him, and, crossing the valley under the fire of the Federal artillery, formed on the right, and in advance of his line.
Although, even after this accession, the Confederate force was less than that of a Federal brigade, Bee maintained the fight for some time with such appearance of equality as to inspire in him the hope, apparently, of holding his ground until effective aid could reach him. At length, however, finding himself engaged with fivefold numbers in Burnside's, Porter's, Sherman's, and Keyes's brigades, and in danger of being enveloped by the coming into action of Heintzelman's division, he fell back to the position he had first chosen; crossing the broad, open valley, closely pressed by the Federal army.
Fortunately Hampton, hastening up with his legion, had reached the valley when the retrograde movement began. He promptly formed his battalion and joined in the action, and, by his courage and admirable soldiership, seconded by the excellent conduct of the gentlemen he had assembled in his legion, contributed greatly to the maintenance of order in the retreat. His lieutenant-colonel, Johnson, fell while gallantly aiding him. Imboden rendered excellent service with his battery in this difficult operation.
On the ground where he intended to reform, Bee met Jackson at the head of his brigade, and they began, the one to reform, and the other to deploy, simultaneously; Jackson on the left.
In the mean time, I had waited with General Beauregard, on an eminence near the centre, where my headquarters had been fixed at eight o'clock, the
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full development of General McDow