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If the tone of the press indicated public opinion and feeling in the South, my failure to capture Washington received strong and general condemnation. Many erroneously attributed it to the President's prohibition; but he gave no orders, and expressed
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neither wish nor opinion on the subject, that ever came to my knowledge. Considering the relative strength of the belligerents on the field, the Southern people could not reasonably have expected greater results from their victory than those accomplished: the defeat of the invasion of Virginia, and the preservation of the capital of the Confederacy.

All the military conditions, we knew, forbade an attempt on Washington. The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army -- not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit the trophies picked up on the field; others left their regiments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, frequently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. Such were the reports of general and staff officers, and railroad officials. Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more men than the Federal army lost by defeat.

Besides this condition of our army, the reasons for the course condemned by the non-combatant military critics were:

The unfitness of our raw troops for marching, or assailing intrenchments.

The want of the necessary supplies of food and ammunition, and means of transporting them. Until near the 10th of August, we never had rations for more than two days, and sometimes none; nor half enough ammunition for a battle.
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The fortifications upon which skillful engineers, commanding the resources of the United States, had been engaged since April, manned by at least fifty thousand Federal troops, [9] half of whom had not suffered defeat.

The Potomac, a mile wide, bearing United States vessels-of-war, the heavy guns of which commanded the wooden bridges and southern shore.

The Confederate army would have been two days in marching from Bull Run to the Federal intrenchments, with less than two days' rations, or not more. [10] It is asserted that the country, teeming with grain and cattle, could have furnished food and forage in abundance. Those who make the assertion forget that a large Federal army had passed twice over the route in question. Many of the Southern people have seen tracts of country along which a Federal army has passed once; they can judge, therefore, of the abundance left where it has passed twice. As we had none of the means of besieging, an immediate assault upon the forts would have been unavoidable; it would have been repelled, inevitably, and our half supply of ammunition exhausted; and the enemy, previously increased to seventy thousand men by the army from Harper's Ferry, and become the victorious party, could and would have resumed their march to Richmond without fear of further opposition.

And, if we had miraculously been successful in our assault, the Potomac would have protected
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Washington, and rendered our further progress impossible.

It is certain that the Federal Government and generals did not regard the capture of Washington by us as practicable, like the non-combatant authors of the criticisms to which I refer. The fact that the army at Harper's Ferry was left idle there instead of being brought to Washington, is conclusive on that point. I have never doubted the correctness of my course on that occasion. Had I done so, the results of the invasions made subsequently by disciplined and much more numerous armies, properly equipped and provided, and commanded by the best soldiers who appeared in that war, would have reassured me. The first of these expeditions was after General Lee's victory over Pope, and those of Majors-General Jackson and Ewell over Fremont, Banks, and Shields, in 1862; the second, when the way was supposed to have been opened by the effect of General Lee's victory at Chancellorsville, in 1863.

The armies defeated on those occasions were four times as numerous as that repulsed on the 21st of July, 1861, and their losses much greater in proportion to numbers; yet the spirit of the Northern people was so roused by these invasions of their country, that their armies, previously defeated on our soil, met ours on their own at Sharpsburg and Gettysburg so strong in numbers and in courage as to send back the war into Virginia from each of those battle-fields. The failure of those invasions, directed by Lee, aided by Longstreet and Jackson, with troops inured to marches and manoeuvres as well as to battle, and attempted under the most favorable circumstances of
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the war; proves that the Confederacy was too weak for offensive warfare, and is very strong evidence in favor of the course against which Southern writers have declaimed vehemently.

The authors of Alfriend's "Life of Jefferson Davis" seem to regard this tone of the Southern press as evidence of Southern opinion on this question, and claim that "Mr. Davis was far from approving the inaction which followed Manassas. He confidently expected a different use of the victory. . . . Indeed, before leaving Manassas, President Davis favored the most vigorous pursuit practicable. . . . The evidences of disorganization upon which General Johnston dwells with such force and emphasis were indeed palpable, but Mr. Davis confidently believed that an efficient pursuit might be made by such commands as were in comparatively good condition. Such were his impressions then; and that he contemplated immediate activity, as the sequel of Manassas, is a matter of indisputable record" (pp. 812-314).

These assertions are accompanied by no proofs, by no orders, nor even suggestions to the commander of the army by the President while he was at Manassas Junction, nor correspondence on the subject after his return to Richmond. The author cannot assume for him, as he does for Jackson, that "his sense of official propriety sealed his lips." He came to the army as President -- to give instructions -- and, if necessary, orders in such a crisis.

If he had been "far from approving the inaction that followed Manassas," he would have required action.
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If he had "expected a different use of victory," he would have compelled me to attempt to fulfil that expectation. He came to control both general and army.

If he thought that "an advance" would secure "immediate and consecutive triumphs," and the certainty of "even more glorious and valuable achievements," he violated his duty and his oath, by neglecting to compel an aggressive movement by the army, to accomplish such results.

He was with the army about forty hours -- quite long enough to see what had been accomplished, and to learn if more could be done, but expressed none of the "views" and opinions ascribed to him in the biography, and gave me no orders for movements of troops, and discussed no matters concerning the army, except such as related to administration. The fact that he gave no instructions in relation to the employment of the army, nor orders to make any aggressive movement nor even suggested such, proves conclusively that he thought none expedient, and was satisfied with the victory as it was. His dispatch of Sunday night, and the speech at the depot of the Central Railroad in Richmond, express that satisfaction, and it only.

The President approved the course pursued after the victory at Manassas, because he knew the discouragements of a march without sufficient food, the utterly inadequate supply of ammunition, the hopelessness of assailing a far more numerous enemy in strong intrenchments, and that the Potomac was impassable. At that time, too, defensive war was regarded by the Southern leaders as our best policy,
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as, it was apprehended, invasion by us would unite all the people of the North, Democrats and Republicans, in the defense of their country. It is certain that either country could have raised armies stronger, both in numbers and in spirit, for defensive than for offensive war.

The President could have expected no "different use of victory," because he [11] knew that I thought that the next important service of that army would be near the end of October, against the invasion of a much greater Federal army than McDowell's; and he proposed, the day after the battle, to send me, with a part of the army at Manassas, to Western Virginia.

Our own dead were buried without unnecessary delay; but the expectation on our part that General McDowell would send a party of his own soldiers to perform that duty to their late comrades, left the Federal dead unburied several days, until we found it necessary to inter them.

After the troops had been somewhat reorganized, new positions were assigned to them. Among the charges against me, is that of exposing the army at the same time to the stench of the battle-field, [12] and the miasma of the August heat, and thus producing "camp-fevers tenfold more fatal than the bullets of the enemy."

Those who have seen large bodies of new troops know that they are sickly in all climates. Our Southern volunteers were peculiarly so, being attacked in the early part of their camp-life by measles and
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mumps -- epidemics to which adults of thickly-inhabited regions, like the Northern States, are not liable. The former was often followed by pneumonia or typhoid fever. The ignorant attributed the prevalence of inevitable disease to extraordinary causes. The troops of the Army of the Shenandoah suffered as much in the healthy climate of the Valley as they and others did at Centreville and Fairfax Court-House.

I have said that the dead were all buried as soon as it appeared that General McDowell intended to leave his share of that duty to us. Before their burial, the nearest troops, a mile or mile and a half from the field, were not incommoded by its neighborhood; they were Whiting's (late Bee's) and Evans's brigades. I say this from personal observation, having been in their camps daily. After the interments were all made, parties of ladies visited the ground without inconvenience. The camp of Whiting's brigade was removed to the neighborhood of Bristow, on account of complaints of bad water -- not of stench or tainted air; and Evans's was sent to Leesburg as an outpost. Longstreet's, D. R. Jones's, Cocke's, and Forney's brigades, were placed near and beyond Centreville; those of Ewell, S. Jones, and Early, were encamped from seven to nine miles from the places of burial. Jackson's camp, [13] the nearest to them, was about four miles off. The headquarters of the army were at the same distance. On the 29th of July the surgeons of Jackson's brigade reported that the number of its sick was increasing. Upon that information General Jackson was requested to choose
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the most convenient and healthy position for his camp that could be found. He selected one a mile from Centreville, on the road to Fairfax Court-House, on which he established his camp on the 1st or 2d of August. The cavalry was in advance of Fairfax Court-House, supported by Elzey's brigade. The positions described above, except Jackson's, were occupied by the troops on the 23d or 24th of July.

Although we were near the rich Piedmont region, and on a railroad leading from the Valley of the Shenandoah, complaints of scarcity, even absolute want of food, were not unfrequent. Until the 10th of August we never had a supply for more than two days, somtimes none. The chief commissary of the army, Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Lee, an officer of capacity and experience, and a tried soldier, was not permitted by the chief of his department to purchase the more important articles of food for the troops -- products of the country -- but was required to apply for them to a commissary in Richmond; so the flour sent to us in one week had, in most cases, passed by our depot on its way to Richmond the previous one. The effects of this system were delay and irregularity in receiving this important article, and an addition of at least twenty-five per cent. to its price. Efforts were made by General Beauregard and myself, by correspondence with the Government, to bring about a change of system for the sake of economy, regularity of supply, and the military object of anticipating the Federal army in the consumption of the beef and flour of the rich and exposed counties of Loudon, Jefferson, and Frederick.

These efforts had no effect, unless they caused
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the loss to the army of its excellent chief commissary, who was summarily removed. He had no other part in them than furnishing, at my orders, information from his office for my use in the correspondence.