OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY

OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY

 On getting to Richmond by the roundabout way I had to go, it was a great gratification to find that the authorities there immediately upon the receipt of my dispatch, had telegraphed to North Carolina for additional troops and that General Lawton with several thousand men, was already en route to reinforce Jackson in the Valley, his advance passing by rail through Richmond the day after my arrival there. In the meantime Jackson with his little army of 15,000 men, was making good his promise to send forward the prisoners, captured property, etc., and at the same time not only to baffle the converging armies that were seeking to surround him, but also to beat them in detail. The masterly movements by which these results were accomplished have been so fully and faithfully described by others, and especially by Colonel Allan, in his admirable paper on “Jackson's Valley Campaign,” published in the Philadelphia Weekly Times of November 30, 1878, that I shall not attempt to detail them here, contenting myself with a mere outline of their more salient features to preserve the continuity of my narrative.

Leaving Winchester on Saturday morning, May 31, he made a forced march that day with the main body of his troops as far as Strasburg, his line, including prisoners, a large park of artillery and 1,500 wagons, being nearly twelve miles long. At Strasburg he went into camp to rest his men, who, since the previous afternoon, had come fifty miles, and also to wait for Winder, who had been left behind with the Stonewall Brigade to cover the retreat and recall the Second Virginia Regiment, which had been sent to Loudown Heights, and which, by the way, marched that Saturday evening from across Shenandoah to a point beyond Newtown, making more than thirty-five miles without rations, over muddy roads, amidst a succession of showers that drenched its members to the skin. Jackson's position was now directly between that of the two hostile armies which had been sent to “crush or capture” him; Fremont, with a force numerically equal to his own, being but five miles to the west of him, and Shields within twelve to the east, with a full division, supported by McDowell with two other divisions. But though 36,000 men were thus upon his flanks within striking distance of him and two other armies, under Banks and Saxton, were following his rear, he halted for twenty-four hours at Strasburg.

Standing there like a hunted stag at bay defying his pursuers, he presented so bold a front to them that Fremont paused in his advance near Wardensville, and Shields came no further than Front Royal; though the former had telegraphed to Washington that he would certainly occupy Strasburg by Saturday, 31st, and the latter had boasted that, with the division sent forward under him by McDowell, to seize the same strategic point, he would be able to “clean out the Valley.” Both were puzzled by the celerity of Jackson' movements, and, apparently, deterred by his audacity. While there had been nothing in the previous career of either Shields or Fremont to justify the suspicion that they were deficient in gallantry and dash they certainly, on this occasion, seemed to be like the cat in the adage, “letting I would wait on I dare not,” for they remained at a convenient distance from Strasburg all the while that Jackson was resting his troops there and securing a safe passage for his prisoners and trains.

A MASTERLY RETREAT

On Sunday morning, June 1, in order to observe the movements of Fremont, a small force was sent out toward Wardensville, which was attacked by the Federal advance. But General Ewell going to the support of the Confederates with his division, drove the enemy back into the mountain gorge from which he had emerged, and Jackson that evening, with his forces refreshed and his rear guard closed up, slowly resumed his retreat, which seemed more like a triumphal march in the bearing of his men, as well as in the superabundant amount of his “spoila optima belli.” During that night the Federal cavalry attacked the Confederate rear guard, throwing it into some confusion, but were soon repulsed with the loss of several prisoners, from whom it was ascertained that Shields, instead of attempting to unite with Fremont, had wasted two days at Front Royal, marching and countermarching on different roads, and finally was marching southward toward Luray in the Page Valley, which is parallel with the main Valley of Virginia, up which Jackson was retiring. Penetrating his purpose to cross the Massanutton Mountain, which separates the two valleys, so as to intercept him at New Market, Jackson had the White House and Columbia bridges over the Shenandoah, in the Page Valley, destroyed, which, as the river was swollen by recent rains, effectually prevented Shields, who had no pontoon train, from coming over to the western side of it, and, consequently, from crossing the mountains to co-operate with Fremont.