Memoir of Louis Trezevant Wigfall part 2

Trezevant Wigfall

Part 2

 If General Hood, by the term "at and near Dalton," refers to the forces after this date received by General Johnston from General Polk, he is again in error as to numbers. It was not till the 4th of May that General Polk was ordered to "move with Loring's division and other available force at your command, to Rome, Georgia, and thence unite with General Johnston." On the 6th, the day on which General Hood says this army "lay at and near Dalton, waiting the advance of the enemy," General Polk telegraphs to General Cooper from Demopolis: "My troops are concentrating and moving as directed." On the 10th, at Rome, he telegraphs the President: "The first of Loring's brigade arrived and sent forward to Resaca; the second just in; the third will arrive to-morrow morning. . . . French's brigade was to leave Blue Mountain this morning. The others will follow in succession; Ferguson will be in supporting distance day after to-morrow; Jackson's division is thirty-six hours after." Yet General Hood asserts that, four days before this, the army was "assembled" at and near Dalton, and "within the easy direction of a single commander." The last of these reënforcements joined General Johnston at New Hope Church the 26th of May, nearly three weeks after they were alleged to be "at and near Dalton," and
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amounted to less than nineteen thousand men. If none were lost by sickness, desertion, or the casualties of battle, which is not probable, General Johnston had at New Hope about sixty-four thousand men on the 26th of May, instead of seventy thousand, at Dalton, on the 6th -- a difference of six thousand, not very great, it is admitted, yet it shows General Hood to be not quite accurate in his estimates.

General Hood asserts that General Johnston lost twenty-two thousand seven hundred men in his retreat, and offers to prove that by the record. At New Hope he had about sixty-four thousand men. The field returns of the 10th of July, the last made while the army were under his command, shows, at Atlanta: forty thousand six hundred and fifty-six infantry and artillery, and ten thousand two hundred and seventy-six cavalry -- fifty thousand nine hundred and thirty-two -- say fifty-one thousand. Deduct this from sixty-four thousand and it leaves thirteen thousand loss in artillery, infantry, and cavalry, instead of twenty-two thousand seven hundred, as alleged by General Hood. General Johnston does not give the losses of his cavalry, for want of reports. He had four thousand at Dalton, and received four thousand (Polk's) at Adairsville on the 17th of May -- eight thousand. At Atlanta he had ten thousand two hundred and seventy-six, showing that he had recruited his cavalry twenty-two hundred and seventy-six over and above his losses. Leaving out his cavalry, he had at Atlanta, 10th of July, forty thousand six hundred and fifty-six infantry and artillery. At New Hope he had of all arms sixty-four thousand. Of these, eight thousand were cavalry, supposing it not to have increased by recruiting up to that time. That gives him fifty-six thousand infantry and artillery. At Atlanta he had, of these arms, forty thousand six hundred and fifty-six, which deduct from the fifty-six thousand and it shows his losses to be, in infantry and artillery, fifteen thousand three hundred and forty-four.

Under repeated orders from the War Department, General Johnston had before this time sent off three regiments. Supposing them to average two hundred effective total, they
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would amount to six hundred each; deduct that amount from the fifteen thousand three hundred and forty-four, and it leaves but fourteen thousand seven hundred and forty-four total loss in killed, wounded, deserters, stragglers, and prisoners, of his infantry and artillery. From this amount deduct ten thousand killed and wounded, and we have four thousand seven hundred and forty-four lost from all other causes in these arms. But it appears that the cavalry had increased twenty-two hundred and seventy-six. Deduct this from the four thousand seven hundred and forty-four, and his losses in all arms, except in killed and wounded, amount to but twenty-four hundred and sixty-eight.

We have, then, a loss by desertion and straggling, and prisoners, of only some two thousand five hundred from the "digging and retreating" policy. The demoralization of the army could not have been as great as General Hood supposes, or its losses from these causes would have been greater. The "working by night and traveling by day" would seem, too, not to be a very bad policy where the army has confidence in its leader.

General Hood asserts that a retreating army must lose more by straggling and desertion, if it does not fight, than it would in killed and wounded if it does. He attempts to show this by what he regards well-established principles, and not by figures. Napier differs from General Hood on this point. In discussing the losses of Massena from the Torres Vedras, he says: "It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible."