Two main routes lead from Maryland and Pennsylvania

Two main routes lead from Maryland and Pennsylvania

into the Valley of Virginia, meeting at Winchester: one passing through Frederick, and crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry; the

other leading through Chambersburg, Williamsport (where it crosses the Potomac), and Martinsburg. These roads are met at Winchester by

the principal one from Northwestern Virginia into "the Valley," and also by a good and direct one from Manassas Junction, through

Ashby's Gap, which, east of the Blue Ridge, had the advantage of easy communication with the Manassas Gap Railroad. This road is,

perhaps, little shorter than that from Manassas Junction to Harper's Ferry; but there were insuperable objections to the latter. Near

Harper's Ferry it follows the course of the Potomac, and could be completely swept by artillery on the north bank of the river, so that

it might have been closed to us by a few Federal batteries; and, even if our troops following it escaped that danger, they might have

been intercepted near Centreville by the Federal army.

The United States had, at that time, three armies threatening Virginia. The principal one at Washington, commanded by Major-General

McDowell; the second at Chambersburg, under Major-General Patterson's command; and the third in Northwestern Virginia, under that of

Major-General McClellan.

We supposed that these armies would coöperate with each other, and that the Federal general-in-chief would direct their combined forces

against Richmond. This supposition was partially sustained by our scouts and friends in Maryland, who reported that the armies of

Generals Patterson and McClellan
[p. 19]
were to unite at Winchester; and this report was confirmed by the Northern press.

It was necessary, of course, that the Confederate troops in the Valley should always be ready to meet this invasion, as well as to

unite quickly with the army at Manassas Junction, whenever it might be threatened by General McDowell's. At Harper's Ferry, they were

manifestly out of position for either object, for Patterson's route from Chambersburg lay through Williamsport and Martinsburg -- a

long day's march to the west; and the only direct road thence to Manassas Junction was completely under the enemy's control. Winchester

was obnoxious to neither objection, but, on the contrary, fulfilled the conditions desired better than any other point. The commanders

on both sides, in the subsequent military operations in that region, seem to have appreciated its importance, and to have estimated its

value as I did, except those who disposed the forces of the United States in September, 1862, when eleven thousand men, placed at

Harper's Ferry as a garrison, were captured, almost without resistance, by General Lee's troops, coming from Maryland.

My objections to Harper's Ferry as a position, and to the idea of making a garrison instead of an active force of the troops intrusted

with the defense of that district, were expressed to the proper authorities in letters dated May 26th and 28th, and June 6th, and

replied to by General Lee [7] on the 1st and 7th of June. These letters of his express the
[p. 20]
dissent of the authorities from my views, and their opinion that the maintenance of the existing arrangement was necessary to enable us

to retain the command of the Valley of Virginia, and our communications with Maryland, held to be very important.

General Lee wrote in his letter of June 1st: "I received, on my return from Manassas Junction, your communications of the 25th and 28th

ult., in reference to your position at Harper's Ferry. The difficulties which surround it have been felt from the beginning of its

occupation, and I am aware of the obstacles to its maintenance with your present force. Every effort has been made to remove them, and

will be continued. But, with similar necessities pressing on every side, you need not be informed of the difficulty of providing

against them. . . ." And in that of the 7th: "I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 6th inst. The importance of the

subject has induced me to lay it before the President, that he may be informed of your views. He places great value upon the retention

of the command of the Shenandoah Valley, and the position at Harper's Ferry. The evacuation of the latter would interrupt our

communication with Maryland, and injure our cause in that State. . . ."

The objects of the Confederate Government, expressed in these letters, were not to be accomplished by the concentration of its forces

at Harper's Ferry; for General Patterson's invasion was to be from Chambersburg, and therefore by Williamsport and Martinsburg, a route

beyond the control of Harper's Ferry.

Notwithstanding this determination on the part
[p. 21]
of the Executive, I resolved not to continue to occupy the place after the purposes for which the troops were sent to it should require

them elsewhere.

About the 9th of June, however, I again represented to the Government the objections to its plan, and urged it to change the character

of my command. [8]

General Beauregard came to Manassas Junction and assumed command on that frontier, a week after my arrival at Harper's Ferry. We

communicated with each other at once, and agreed that the first attacked should be aided by the other to his utmost. We were convinced

of our mutual dependence, and agreed in the opinion that the safety of the Confederacy depended on the coöperation of the armies we

commanded.

In the mean time the Potomac was observed by the cavalry from the Point of Rocks to the western part of the county of Berkeley, as had

been done under my predecessor. The manufacture of cartridge-boxes and belts was ordered in the neighboring towns and villages.

Cartridges were made of powder furnished by Governor Letcher, and lead found at the place, or procured in the neighborhood. Caps (in

small quantities only) were smuggled from Baltimore. Caissons were constructed at Captain Pendleton's suggestion, by fixing

roughly-made ammunition-chests on the running-parts of farm-wagons. Horses, and harness of various kinds, for the artillery, and wagons

and
[p. 22]
teams for field-transportation, were collected in the surrounding country; and the work of removing the machinery of the armory, begun

by Governor Letcher's orders, was continued. Two heavy guns on naval carriages, that had been placed in battery on the west side of the

village by Colonel Jackson's direction, were mounted on Furnace Ridge. My predecessors had constructed two very slight outworks, one on

the summit of the mountain on the Maryland side of the Potomac, the other on the Loudon Heights.

Before the end of the first week in June the Seventh and Eighth Georgia and Second Tennessee regiments had arrived.

About the 10th of the month, General Patterson, who had been organizing and instructing his troops at Chambersburg, advanced from that

place to Hagerstown. According to the information we could obtain from scouts and intelligent people of the country, they amounted to

about eighteen thousand men. The organization of this army, as published in a newspaper of Hagerstown, corresponded very well with this

estimate; for twenty-four regiments of infantry were enumerated in it, and several small bodies of regular artillery and cavalry. [9]

The garrison of Harper's Ferry had then been increased to almost seven thousand men of all arms.

At sunrise on the 13th the Hon. James M. Mason brought from Winchester intelligence, received there the night before, that two thousand

Federal troops, supposed to be the advanced guard of General McClellan's army, had marched into Romney the day before. That place is

forty-three miles west of
[p. 23]
Winchester. As this information had come from the most respectable sources, it was believed, and Colonel A. P. Hill immediately

dispatched to Winchester with his own (Thirteenth) and Colonel Gibbons's (Tenth Virginia) regiments on trains provided by Mr. Mason's

forethought. Colonel Hill was instructed to add Colonel Vaughn's (Third Tennessee) regiment, which had just reached the town, to his

detachment, and to move on toward Romney without delay, and to take the best measures in his power to retard the progress of the

Federal troops, if they should be approaching "the Valley."

During that day and the next the heavy baggage of the troops (almost every private soldier had a trunk), the property of the

quartermaster's and subsistence departments, and the remaining machinery of the armory, were removed to Winchester by railroad, whence

the machinery was transported over the turnpike to Strasburg, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, and the bridges over the Potomac were

destroyed from the Point of Rocks to Shepardstown.