Lincoln, on the other hand, shut down many newspapers. Chief Justice William Rehnquist discusses some of these cases of suppress

Lincoln, on the other hand, shut down many newspapers. Chief Justice William Rehnquist discusses some of these cases of suppression

Michael T. Griffith

2006

@All Rights Reserved

Fourth Edition

Newspaper publishers did not escape the government's watchful eye either. The [Lincoln] Administration was especially concerned about the New York press, which had a disproportionate impact on the rest of the country. In that era before press wire services, newspapers in smaller cities frequently simply reprinted stories which had been run earlier in the metropolitan press. In New York, the Tribune, the Herald, and the Times generally supported the Northern war effort, but several other papers did not. In August 1861, a Grand Jury sitting in New York was outraged by an article in the New York Journal of Commerce--a paper which opposed the war--that listed over one hundred Northern newspapers opposed to "the present unholy war." The Journal of Commerce frequently editorialized in no uncertain words about the malfeasance of the Administration.

The grand jurors inquired of the presiding judge whether such vituperative criticism was subject to indictment. Because the Grand Jury was about to be discharged, the judge did not oblige. Nevertheless, the jurors simply requested that a list of several New York newspapers, including the Journal of Commerce, be called to the attention of the next Grand Jury. They had heard no evidence, and received no legal instructions from the judge; they simply made a "presentment"--a written notice taken by a Grand Jury of what it believes to be an indictable offense.

On this thin reed, the Administration proceeded to act. Postmaster General Montgomery Blair directed the Postmaster in New York to exclude from the mails the five newspapers named by the Grand Jury. This was significant because the newspapers of that day were almost entirely dependent upon the mails for their circulation. Gerald Hallock, the part owner and editor of the Journal of Commerce, was obliged to negotiate with the Post Office Department to see what the paper would have to do to regain its right to use of the mails. The Post Office Department told him that he must sell his ownership in the newspaper. Hallock reluctantly agreed, and retired, thereby depriving the paper of its principal editorialist opposing the war. The New York News, owned by Benjamin Wood, brother of New York Mayor Fernando Wood, decided to fight the ban against his paper. He sought to send its edition south and west by private express, and hired newsboys to deliver the paper locally. The government ordered U.S. Marshals to seize all copies of the paper. In fact one newsboy in Connecticut was arrested for having hawked it. Eventually Wood, too, gave up. (Rehnquist, "Civil Liberty and the Civil War," speech given at the University of Indiana School of Law, Bloomington, October 28, 1996)

Lincoln not only shut down newspapers he viewed as unpatriotic, he also ordered the arrest and imprisonment of some of their editors and publishers, without due process of law. Lincoln issued the following order to General John Dix:

You will take possession by military force, of the printing establishments of the New York World and Journal of Commerce . . . and prohibit any further publication thereof . . . You are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest and imprison . . . The editors, proprietors and publishers of the aforementioned newspapers. (Order of Abraham Lincoln to General John Dix, May 18, 1864)

Lincoln suppressed newspapers even in states that were far from the fighting and in which local courts were functioning. Historian James Rhodes, though an ardent Lincoln defender, found it necessary to condemn this suppression of the freedom of the press:

For my own part, after careful consideration, I do not hesitate to condemn the arbitrary arrests and the arbitrary interference with the freedom of the press in States which were not included in the theatre of the war and in which the courts remained open. (Rhodes, History of the Civil War, 1861-1865, New York: Bartleby.com, 2000, electronic reprint of 1917 edition, chapter 11, page 19)

18. Major Anderson, the commander of the federal garrison at Fort Sumter, questioned the wisdom of trying to resupply the fort. Anderson also said that he had been led to believe by Colonel Lamon, one of Lincoln's confidential agents, that Captain Fox's plan to resupply the fort would not be carried out, and that the South had been led to believe the fort would not be resupplied. Anderson said these things in a letter that he wrote to "Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant-General Unites States Army." Anderson wrote the letter on the same day South Carolina's governor was informed about the coming of the resupply mission, the day after Anderson himself learned of the mission. Said Anderson,

I had the honor to receive, by yesterday's mail, the letter of the Honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4th, and confess that what he there states surprises me greatly--following, as it does, and contradicting so positively, the assurance Mr. Crawford telegraphed he was "authorized" to make. I trust that this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed that none such would be attempted, would produce most disastrous results throughout the country. . . .

I ought to have been informed that this expedition [to resupply the fort] was to come. Colonel Lamon's remark convinced me that the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be carried out.

We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my heart is not in this war, which I see is to be thus commenced. (Letter from Major Anderson to Colonel Thomas, April 8, 1861, reproduced in Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. 1, pp. 243-244)

19. Charles Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War during the Lincoln Administration, said "the evidence proves that it was not the Confederates who insisted on keeping our prisoners in distress, want and disease, but the commander of our armies" (as quoted in Lynn Tyler, A Confederate Catechism, Dahlonega, Georgia: Crown Rights Book Company, 2000, reprint, p. 36, quoting "Treatment of Prisoners During the War Between the States," Southern Historical Papers, Vol. 1, pp. 112-327). Dana also said the following to the New York Sun:

We think after the testimony given that the Confederate authorities and especially Mr. [Jefferson] Davis ought not to be held responsible for the terrible privations, suffering, and injuries which our men had to endure while kept in Confederate Military Prisons, the fact is unquestionable that while Confederates desired to exchange prisoners, to send our men home, and to get back their own men, General Grant steadily and strenuously resisted such an exchange. (As quoted in Mildred Rutherford, Truths of History, Dahlonega, Georgia: Crown Rights Book Company, reprint of original 1920 edition, p. 21)

McPherson blames the Confederacy for the prolonged failure to resume prisoner exchanges, which in turn led to the unintended deaths of thousands of Union prisoners of war (p. 792). Many Northern soldiers and civilians placed the majority of the blame on Lincoln and General Grant because they refused the Confederacy's repeated offers to exchange nearly all prisoners and instead insisted on an all-or-nothing arrangement. McPherson accepts the official explanation for the delay in the resumption of prisoner exchanges, i.e., that Lincoln and Grant refused to resume exchanges because the Confederacy refused to release black Union prisoners as part of those exchanges. There are arguments that can be made for and against the Confederacy's policy on black prisoners. Confederate authorities argued that former slaves who had taken up arms against the South were guilty of federally sanctioned slave insurrection. They also argued that slaves did not have the right to be soldiers since slavery was still legal, even under the U.S. Constitution, and since those slaves had either run away and/or had been forced to fight for the Union. In any case, I have my doubts that the Confederate policy on black prisoners was the real reason for Lincoln and Grant's opposition to a resumption of exchanges. I suspect their real reason was that they didn't want to replenish the Confederate army's manpower. They knew the Union could replace captured soldiers much more easily than could the Confederacy.

In fact, in August 1864 Grant said it was better not to exchange prisoners and that "if we release or exchange prisoners captured it simply becomes a war of extermination." McPherson denies this was the real reason behind the suspension of exchanges, and he notes that Grant made these comments "more than a year after the exchange cartel had broken down over the Negro prisoner question" (p. 800). However, one could certainly make the argument that Grant was expressing his real reason for opposing the resumption of exchanges, regardless of when he made the statement. Some find this the more plausible view, given the rather uncaring attitude that Grant had already shown and expressed toward blacks, and given Lincoln's own well-known views on blacks.

It is true that when the Confederacy finally offered to include black prisoners in exchanges, Lincoln and Sherman accepted the offer. But this occurred in January 1865, and by that time there was no doubt the Union was going to win the war and win it soon. It would have been interesting to see what the response would have been if the Confederacy had offered to exchange all prisoners several months earlier. In any case, Assistant Secretary of War Dana spoke for many of his fellow Northerners when he blamed General Grant for the long suspension of prisoner exchanges.

20. Lincoln refused to sell medicines to the Confederacy, even though Jefferson Davis offered to pay for them in gold and even though Davis explained that the medicines would be used to care for sick and wounded Union prisoners of war. The Confederacy had a very hard time obtaining medical supplies. Although McPherson mentions in passing (and without condemnation) that Lincoln resorted to the cruel step of blocking medicines from entering the Confederate states, he doesn't mention that Lincoln refused Davis's request to buy medicines for Union prisoners. Captain Samuel Ashe, the last officer commissioned in the Confederate army, complained about this refusal:

As Lincoln declared medicines contraband of war, Davis asked for permission to buy at the North medicines for the Northern prisoners, but his request was refused. (Ashe, A Southern View of the Invasion of the Southern States, Crawfordville, Georgia: The Ruffin Flag Company, reprint of 1938 edition, p. 57)

Some Northerners criticized Lincoln's policy of preventing medical supplies from going to the South:

The United States government early declared . . . all medicines, surgical instruments and appliances contraband of war, and they were so regarded to the end of the struggle.

The ill temper and inhumanity of the time in the North extended even to the medical profession, as evidenced at the convention of the American Medical Association, held in Chicago, in 1863, when Dr. Gardner, of New York, introduced preamble and resolutions petitioning the Northern government to repeal the orders declaring medical and surgical supplies contraband of war; arguing that such cruelty rebounded on their own soldiers, many of whom, as prisoners in the hands of the Confederates, shared the suffering resulting from such a policy, while the act itself was worthy of the dark ages of the world's history. It is lamentable to have record that this learned and powerful association of the medical men . . . in their senseless passion hissed their benevolent brother from the hall. (Rutherford, Truths of History, p. 22)

In spite of the omissions discussed above, I still believe The Battle Cry of Freedom should be read by every serious student of the Civil War. McPherson discusses many issues fairly and thoroughly, and he provides a significant amount of information that supports the Southern view of the war to varying degrees. I would especially recommend the book to Southern heritage defenders, partly because McPherson refutes myths that continue to appear in their books and articles.